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INTRODUCTION
It is hard for everyone who wants to believe in ultimate fairness to
acknowledge that the typical decisionmaker is not the ideal decision-
maker, that racial prejudice is not an aberration, that it taints every-
one it touches, and that it touches everyone.
- Sheri Lynn Johnson'
At the start of the tour of the Museum of Tolerance in Los
Angeles, one is confronted with two doors. One is marked
"Prejudiced." The other is marked "Not Prejudiced." If one
tries to open the "Not Prejudiced" door, it will not open. The
only door that one can pass through is the door marked
"Prejudiced." The people who designed the Museum of Toler-
ance had the right idea. Most of us are prejudiced-some of us
more or less so than others. The extent to which we act upon
our prejudices, however, may depend in part upon our aware-
1. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 1739, 1803 (1993).
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ness and understanding of the stereotypes that inform our
daily lives.2
This Article examines the topic of race and self-defense
through the lens of socially constructed stereotypes about
Blacks,3 Asian Americans, 4 and Latinos. 5  Crimes of violence
2. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decision-
makers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733, 741-45, 754-59 (1995)
(arguing that, while people who have accepted and endorsed stereotypes into
their personal belief system will act on their prejudices because they fail to
recognize those prejudices as bad, others who have recognized stereotypes as
"inappropriate bases for responding to others" will, if made aware of their re-
liance on stereotypes, make a conscious effort to act opposite to their preju-
dices). In contrast to traditional definitions of "stereotypes" and "prejudice,"
this Article defines "stereotypes" as well-internalized associations regarding
groups of people that result in habitually automatic, gut-level responses. Id.
at 741. "Prejudice" is defined as one's personal beliefs about a particular
group of persons, and implies purposeful acceptance of negative stereotypes.
Id. at 742. This distinction between "stereotypes" and "prejudice" is discussed
in further detail in Part II.
3. I capitalize "Black" and "White" in this Article to highlight the fact
that Blacks and Whites, like Asian Americans and Latinos, are members of
socially constructed racial categories in American society. See generally IAN
HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1995)
(discussing the social construction of race); cf. Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women
of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 n.6 (1991) (explaining her decision to
capitalize "Black" but not "white" on the basis of her view that "Blacks, like
Asians, Latinos, and other 'ninorities,' constitute a specific cultural group
and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun," whereas whites do not
constitute a specific cultural group and, therefore, do not require denotation
as such). In using the term 'Blacks," I do not make the claim that there is an
"essential" or unitary Black experience.
4. The term "Asian American" originated in the 1960s when members of
the various Asian immigrant groups began to act politically together as Asian
Americans. Keith Aoki, Foreign-ness & Asian American Identities: Yellow-
face, World War II Propaganda and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes,4 UCLA
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 1997) (manuscript at n.18, on file with
author). "Asian American" has been defined to "include persons of Asian de-
scent who live in the United States regardless of citizenship status." Robert
S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race The-
ory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1245 n.7
(1993).
In using the term "Asian American," I do not make the claim that there is
an "essential" or unitary Asian American experience. Robert Chang explains
why one should steer clear of essentialist thinking:
I do not make the claim that there is a unitary, essential Asian
American experience. Such a claim would be foolhardy given the di-
versity encompassed in the category "Asian American" and in its in-
tersection with gender, class, sexual orientation, and disability.
However, acknowledging the limitations behind the category "Asian
American" does not render the term "Asian American" meaningless.
For example, "Asian American" can be used as a "strategic identity."
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involving claims of self-defense and victims of color represent a
microcosm of broader questions concerning race and the crimi-
nal justice system. The term "race" is utilized broadly in this
Article to include race, ethnicity, and culture, recognizing that
race is a shifting concept which means different things to dif-
ferent people.6 Even though stereotypes based on a person's
perceived race may be described more accurately as cultural or
ethnic stereotypes, this paper purposely describes these stereo-
types, using a race rather than an ethnicity model, as a means
of linking the common experiences of African Americans, Asian
Americans, and Latinos. 7 The commonality of such experi-
Or being Asian American can be used as part of one's "multiple con-
sciousness."
Id. at 1247 n.13 (citations omitted). For an excellent discussion of problems
involving gender essentialism, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 602-16 (1990) (arguing that at-
tempts to isolate an essential female self in the diversity of women's lived ex-
periences merely reinforce socially constructed norms, a danger that can be
overcome by opening ourselves up to "multiple consciousness").
5. Originally, the term "Hispanic" was used to describe the people who
came to America from the predominantly Spanish-speaking nations of the
Western Hemisphere. DAVID G. GuTIERREz, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXIcAN
AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 217 n.1
(1995). Later, the term "Latino" became the term chosen by people in the
United States from Latin America "as a way to denote their sense of a pan-
Hispanic solidarity." Id. The term "Latino" is understood to refer to people
(or, more specifically, males) in the United States who come from Latin
American countries, including countries in Central and South America, parts
of the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. See Margaret E. Montoya, Mas-
caras, Trenzas, y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina
Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 186 n.5 (1994)
(exploring through personal narrative the role of masks in the subordination
of marginalized groups). The term "Latina" is understood to refer to females
in the United States who locate their roots in these same Latin American
countries. Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males:
An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 231, 232 n.10 (1994). The term "Chicano" was adopted by young
Mexican Americans in the 1960s "as an act of defiance and self-assertion, and
as an attempt to redefine themselves along criteria of their own choosing."
DAVID G. GUTIERREZ, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 183 (1996). In using the term "Latino," I do not make the
claim that there is an "essential" or unitary Latino experience. See infra note
8 (noting that Latinos can be Black, Asian, or White).
6. See, e.g., HANEY-LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 176-77, 190-93 (discussing
the social construction of race).
7. See, e.g., Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibil-
ity, and Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995) (discussing
interracial justice as a commitment to anti-subordination by non-white racial
groups); Sumi K Cho, Model Minority Mythology and Affirmative Action: The
Racialization of Asian Americans in Antidiscrimination Law (work-in-
progress) (manuscript at 44-46, on file with author) (discussing the race-based
370 [Vol. 81:367
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ences may be obscured when certain people of color are treated
as a race and others are treated as an ethnicity.'
To a large extent, legal scholarship about race and the
criminal justice system has focused on how legal decisionmak-
ing by police officers, prosecutors, jurors, judges, and others in-
volved in the criminal justice system might be unduly influ-
enced by the race of the defendant. The discussion has
centered around Black and White defendants;9 other non-
White defendants have received little attention. The influence
of racial stereotypes about the victim on legal decisionmaking
paradigm, which focuses on commonalities between communities of color, in
opposition to the ethnicity-based paradigm, which preaches an assimilationist
European Protestant work-ethic).
8. It is important, in this regard, to recognize that Latinos, as individu-
als residing in the United States who come from Latin American countries,
may be White, Black, or Asian. See, e.g., David E. Hayes-Bautista & Jorge
Chapa, Latino Terminology: Conceptual Bases for Standardized Terminology,
77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 61, 62-63 (1987) (criticizing widespread conflation of
the term "race" with nationality in describing Mexicans and Latinos); Kevin R.
Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community
in the Twentieth Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 67-70, 77 (1995) (discussing the
heterogeneity within the Latino community); see also Robert Chang, Racial
Cross-Dressing, 1 HARV. LATINO L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (pointing out that
persons of Korean descent can also be Latino). Despite the many commonali-
ties associated with Latino identification, "[ftor the Latino community, race is
not the primary criterion for community membership." Johnson, supra, at 77.
It is also important to recognize that, technically speaking, there is no
Asian American race. Asian Americans may be Chinese, Japanese, Filipino,
Korean, or a variety of other races. Use of the term "race" to describe Asian
Americans and Latinos is not new. Historically, Asian Americans and Latinos
have been described as racial groups, though not without criticism. See Frank
H. Wu, Changing America: Three Arguments About Asian Americans and the
Law, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 811, 813-18 (1996) (discussing ways in which "main-
stream society repeatedly refers to the race of Asian American individuals in
making judgments") (emphasis added); Norimitsu Onishi, New Sense of Race
Arises Among Asian-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1996, at Al (discussing
emerging racial consciousness among Asian Americans).
9. See generally Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Proc-
ess, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472 (1988) (providing an exhaustive exploration of
racial bias in all facets of the criminal system, but focusing particularly on
Blacks); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1611, 1640, 1643 (1985) (concluding from empirical evidence that ra-
cial bias plays an integral role in the conviction of Black defendants by White
juries); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary
Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL.
U. L. REV. 243, 250 (1991) (observing that the traditional "reasonable person"
standard fails to account for the influence of race in encounters between the
police and Black community members).
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has also received less attention than the influence of racial
stereotypes about the defendant."
Racial stereotypes about members of the victim's racial
group may influence jurors and other legal decisionmakers in
two ways. First, many tend to view individuals who belong to
particular racial groups in certain ways because of deeply in-
grained racial stereotypes. If the victim belongs to a racial
group whose members are stereotyped as dangerous or violent
criminals or gang members, jurors may be more likely to per-
ceive actions of the victim as hostile or violent than if the vic-
tim belonged to another racial group. Second, members of soci-
ety tend to value people who are similar to themselves more
than those who are different from them. This phenomenon has
been described as in-group favoritism and out-group antago-
nism. If the victim belongs to a racial group whose members
have been socially constructed as foreigners or illegal immi-
grants, such as Asian Americans and Latinos, jurors may sub-
consciously minimize the harm suffered by the victim and may
be more willing to view the defendant's use of force as reason-
able than if the victim were perceived to be an "average"
American.
Whether racial stereotypes about the victim actually influ-
ence verdicts in self-defense cases is difficult to prove empiri-
cally. The universe of self-defense cases resulting in acquittals
is elusive because the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment prevents reversal of an acquittal." Acquittals in
self-defense cases, like acquittals in other cases, generally are
not appealed, and consequently are not reported in the case re-
porters. Only acquittals in high-publicity cases end up on the
printed pages of newspapers and magazines.
Because reasonableness is the touchstone of self-defense
jurisprudence, this paper examines the impact of racial stereo-
types on the reasonableness requirement in self-defense doc-
trine in an effort to confront the larger question of how to
10. But see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING
VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 6 (1995) (criticizing the American crimi-
nal justice system for betraying its purported solidarity with victims of crime);
Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 421
(1988) (demonstrating that "Itjhe meaning of victimhood in our society is con-
structed by a dominant culture that often displays difficulty conceiving that
important harms can come in varieties unlikely to afflict its members").
11. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides, "nor shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
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minimize the influence of racial stereotypes leading to bias in
criminal justice decisionmaking.'2 This Article adds to the le-
gal landscape in three ways. First, in examining self-defense
doctrine, this Article focuses on substantive criminal law, as
opposed to criminal procedure. Most race-based legal scholar-
ship focuses on race and criminal procedure, rather than on
race and substantive criminal law. 3 Second, this Article looks
at how racial stereotypes about the victim might influence le-
gal decisionmaking, in contrast to the more common focus on
the defendant. 4 Finally, discussions about race are often bi-
nary, centering on the Black-White dichotomy, while ignoring
other non-Whites (i.e., non-Black racial minorities) who also
face stigma and racial discrimination in the United States.'"
This Article abandons the Black-White paradigm in favor of a
multi-layered examination of how racial stereotyping of African
12. This Article was inspired by Jody Armour's 1994 article on race and
self-defense, which proposes an instrumentalist reading of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to deal with the problem of racial bias in self-defense cases involv-
ing African American victims. Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Rea-
sonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 781 (1994). Armour and other scholars have addressed questions re-
garding race and self-defense. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence
of Reasonableness, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 798, 815 (1991) (opining that we are
willing to convict racist subway killers while acquitting battered women who
kill their abusers because of our social assessment of the consequences of the
defendant's error in judgment); Shirley Sagawa, A Hard Case for Feminists:
People v. Goetz, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 253, 272 (1987) (arguing that "Ir]ace
should not be considered... [because] [a]llowing the race of Black victims to
stand as a proxy for certain stereotyped characteristics promotes not fairness,
but injustice"). This Article, however, provides additional insight into the
problem of race and self-defense by examining how racial stereotypes about
other non-Whites, such as Asian Americans and Latinos, might affect the rea-
sonableness determination. The proposals suggested in this Article are also
unique.
13. Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Tran-
scending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2231, 2232 (1993).
14. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 2-3 (describing the shift of what
Fletcher calls "the political trial" from the previous focus on the defendant to
the current focus on the victim).
15. See Chang, supra note 4, at 1247 (observing that Asian Americans
suffer from discrimination as Asian Americans and not just generically as
persons of color); Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible
People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965, 967-70 (1995) (commenting on the depiction of
the Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King verdict as a largely Black and
White phenomenon in which significant Latino aspects of the event appeared
as merely peripheral); Neil Gotanda, Book Review: "Other Non-Whites" in
American Legal History: A Review of JUSTICE AT WAR, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1186, 1188 (1985) (suggesting that the attached stigma of "foreignness" par-
tially explains the exclusion of "other non-Whites" from legal discourse).
1996] 373
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Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos may influence legal
decisionmaking about self-defense. This is neither an exclu-
sively White problem (i.e., Whites are not the only people who
are influenced by racial stereotypes about Blacks, Asian
Americans, and Latinos) nor an exclusively interracial prob-
lem. It includes intraracial crimes, such as Black-on-Black
crimes, as well as other color-on-color crimes, such as Asian-on-
Black crimes.
Part I discusses traditional self-defense doctrine (also
known as perfect self-defense), including the debate over
whether an objective or subjective standard of reasonableness
should be employed. Although it recognizes that objective
standards do not necessarily lead to neutral and unbiased de-
cisions, Part I nevertheless concludes that either an objective
or a hybrid subjectivized-objective standard of reasonableness
in self-defense cases is preferable to a purely subjective stan-
dard which would permit the racially biased motivations of the
defendant to control the outcome.
Part II examines ways in which socially constructed
stereotypes about Blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos might
influence jurors in self-defense and other cases. While recog-
nizing that socially constructed images of race are not merely
single-dimensional, but are influenced by race, class, and gen-
der, this Article selectively examines only a few stereotypes
that pertain to Black, Asian American, and Latino men; it does
so not because stereotypes about others, such as Jews, gays,
women, and Whites are unimportant, but because of space
limitations. Additionally, the selected stereotypes highlight
the different ways in which stereotyping can influence deci-
sionmaking in self-defense cases. Part II concludes that self-
defense doctrine does not adequately address the potential for
racial stereotypes to affect the reasonableness determination.
Part III explores ways in which the risk of racial stereo-
types influencing the reasonableness determination in self-
defense cases might be reduced. Two tentative proposals are
examined in this Part. The first, clarification of the act-belief
distinction, is a reform that applies across the board both in
cases in which race is transparently relevant and those in
which race is not apparently relevant. This reform suggests
that in states in which the standard jury instructions on self-
defense require the jury to find only that the defendant's beliefs
were honest and reasonable, jury instructions should be clari-
fied to make explicit that both the defendant's beliefs and her
[Vol. 81:367
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actions must be reasonable in order to acquit a defendant on
self-defense grounds. This doctrinal reconstruction is not a
radical reform; it merely makes explicit that which is already
required. Nevertheless, clarification of the act-belief distinc-
tion is significant and necessary. Even when race is not an is-
sue, jurors in self-defense cases tend to conflate the belief and
action requirements. This problem may be accentuated when
there is a racial component to the case. 16 Requiring jurors to
find that the defendant's beliefs and actions were reasonable
ensures that jurors do not confound the different elements of
self-defense. It also requires jurors who, because of racial
stereotypes, might be inclined to view the defendant's beliefs as
reasonable, and thus assume that the defendant's actions were
also reasonable, to address separately the reasonableness of
the defendant's beliefs and the reasonableness of his actions.
7
In recognition of the need for gradations of criminal liabil-
ity that reflect differing degrees of culpability, Part Ill pro-
poses a new two-tiered approach to self-defense that gives
meaning to the act-belief distinction. Under this approach,
which is similar to the imperfect self-defense doctrine's two-
tiered approach to liability, defendants who both (1) reasonably
believe in the need to use force in self-defense, and (2) act rea-
sonably in defending themselves should be acquitted. Defen-
dants who reasonably believe in the need to use self-defense,
but whose actions are unreasonable, may be convicted of man-
slaughter, a less serious offense than murder.
Second, to address more directly the problem of racial
stereotyping, a supplemental limiting instruction on racial
stereotypes is proposed. In any self-defense case in which ei-
16. Sometimes, focusing on racial problems forces us to scrutinize our le-
gal doctrines more carefully than we otherwise would. Such careful scrutiny
can highlight general flaws in the ways we approach problems. Careful ex-
amination of self-defense cases involving victims of color alerted the author to
the need for clarification of the act-belief distinction, a much-needed reform
that is applicable to all self-defense cases.
17. One might argue that racial stereotypes only affect beliefs, not ac-
tions. Stereotypes can affect beliefs and actions. Reliance on the stereotype
that Blacks are more violent and prone to criminality than others might cause
a person to believe that a particular Black person is prone to violence or
criminality. The stereotype might also cause a person to take action, such as
using deadly force against an approaching Black person much sooner than if
the person were White. The person who merely believes that a particular in-
nocent Black person is prone to violence but takes no action harming that
Black person is differently situated than the person who acts upon this belief
and uses deadly force against the innocent Black.
3751996]
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ther the parties or the judge feels it appropriate, the trial judge
should give the jury a supplemental limiting instruction advis-
ing the jury that racial stereotypes should not be relied upon to
support a finding that the defendant's use of deadly force was
reasonable. Under this second proposal, evidence regarding
race would still be admissible. The supplemental instruction
would merely clarify the inappropriateness of using racial
stereotypes as a proxy for danger. In conjunction with the
supplemental limiting instruction, attorneys could be encour-
aged to present arguments and evidence to the jury, illustrat-
ing how stereotypes influence perception and judgment.
This second proposal may be resisted by both liberals and
conservatives because it seems to undercut the principle of
equality through color-blindness."8 It is true that the proposed
limiting instruction purposely makes race salient (rather than
ignoring race or pretending racial differences do not exist) by
alerting jurors to the fact that racial stereotypes may operate
to create bias and unfair results. In asking jurors to treat de-
fendants and victims of color as they would treat White defen-
dants and victims, this race-conscious proposal furthers, rather
than undermines, the principles of fairness and equality.
This Article recognizes that it is unclear whether such a
limiting instruction would actually influence outcomes in self-
defense cases, given the fact that stereotypes are so well-
ingrained that they often operate beneath the surface on an
unconscious level. Recent research in social cognition, how-
ever, suggests that making race salient may encourage jurors
to suppress stereotype-driven responses in favor of non-
prejudiced beliefs.19 Moreover, a limiting instruction on racial
stereotypes would be worthwhile for its symbolic and educa-
tional value. The strong normative message such a limiting
18. Gary Peller, Notes Toward a Postmodern Nationalism, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1095, 1095-96 (discussing movement away from the discourse of "color-
blindness" and its concomitant insistence on the possibility of neutral social
practices, and towards a deeper understanding of the significance of racial
identity).
19. Jody Armour writes:
According to the [dissociation] model, for [low-prejudiced people]...
to resist falling into the discrimination habit, they repeatedly recall
their personal beliefs so that their social judgments become based on
these beliefs rather than the stereotypes. Reminding decisionmakers
of their personal beliefs, therefore, may help them to resist falling
unconsciously into the discrimination habit.
Armour, supra note 2, at 759-60. For a definition of "low-prejudiced," see in-
fra text accompanying note 96.
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instruction would convey would be significant because it would
reach not only jurors in self-defense cases, but all people in so-
ciety.
I. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
A. TRADITIONAL SELF-DEFENSE DOCTRINE
Under traditional self-defense doctrine, also known as per-
fect self-defense," a defendant who is not the aggressor in an
encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of force
against another person if she honestly and reasonably believes
that: (1) she is in imminent or immediate danger of unlawful
bodily harm from her adversary, and (2) the use of such force is
necessary to avoid such danger.21 Traditional self-defense doc-
trine includes a necessity requirement (the defendant must
have honestly and reasonably believed it was necessary to use
the amount of force used),22 an imminence requirement (the de-
fendant must have honestly and reasonably believed that an
unlawful attack was imminent),23 and a proportionality re-
quirement (the defendant may use only that amount of force
which is not excessive in relation to the threatened force; this
20. In most jurisdictions, "perfect" self-defense requires an honest and
reasonable belief, and leads to complete acquittal. This is in contrast to what
is known as the "imperfect" self-defense doctrine in which a murder charge
may be mitigated to a manslaughter charge if the defendant's belief in the
need to use deadly force and/or the imminence of the threat was honest, but
not reasonable. See, e.g., In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994).
Some jurisdictions, however, permit acquittal on the ground of self-
defense based solely on a finding that the defendant's belief was honest. State
v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990) ("In Ohio, to prove self-defense, it
must be established that the person asserting this defense had 'a bona fide
belief that he [or she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
and that his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of
such force.'" (quoting State v. Robbins, 388 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ohio 1979))).
21. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.031 (West
1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611 (1986); Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119,
1121 (Alaska 1984); Sanchez v. People, 820 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Colo. 1991) (en
banc); State v. Cramer, 841 P.2d 1111, 1117 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Landry, 381 So. 2d 462, 467 (La. 1980); State v. Martinez, 622 P.2d 1041, 1043
(N.M. 1981); People v. Wesley, 563 N.E.2d 21, 24 (N.Y. 1990); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 5.7, at 649
(1986).
22. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 21, at 653-55 (explaining and pro-
viding examples of necessity requirement).
23. See id. at 655-57 (explaining and providing examples of imminence
requirement).
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generally means the defendant may use deadly force24 only
against deadly force and may not use deadly force against non-
deadly force).2 5
Traditionally, reasonableness in self-defense cases was
defined by reference to a reasonable man.26 Today, several ju-
risdictions have adopted a reasonable person standard." At
24. "Deadly force" is defined differently in different jurisdictions. A stan-
dard definition of "deadly force" is force likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 18.03[A], at 201
(2d ed. 1995).
25. Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce explain the proportionality
requirement as follows:
It is a rule of law that deadly force may not be used to defend against
nondeadly force, but that nondeadly force may be used to defend
against any unlawful force endangering the person, provided the
force so used is not unreasonable under all the circumstances. In
such a case, if the only threat was with obviously nondeadly force and
the jury finds that the defendant used deadly force to defend against
it, the inquiry should go no farther. The instruction will be that the
defendant is guilty upon such a finding. If the jury finds that the de-
fendant used only nondeadly force in his defense, a further finding is
necessary; namely, whether the force thus used was reasonable un-
der the circumstances. And if the finding is that defendant used no
more force than a reasonable person would have used in a similar
situation, the verdict should be not guilty.
ROLLIN M. PERKINs & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW § 4, at 1116 (Harry
W. Jones ed., 3d ed. 1982).
26. See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable
Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 435, 444-45 (1981) (exposing flaws in the reasonable man
standard).
27. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 (West 1989) ("[A] person is
justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to
the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immedi-
ately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of
unlawful physical force.") (emphasis added); CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West
1988) (describing the sufficiency of the fear needed for justifiable homicide as
"sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person") (emphasis added); Wetta
v. State, 456 S.E.2d 696, 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) ("To establish a plea of self-
defense, the defendant must show, if circumstances were such as to excite
fears of a reasonable person, that his safety is in danger.") (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 707 (1996); State v. Ricks, 894 P.2d 191, 194-95 (Kan.
1995) (holding that the standard is "whether a reasonable person in defen-
dant's circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary")
(emphasis added); Lentz v. State, 604 So. 2d 243, 246 (Miss. 1992) ("[A] killing
is justified if the person who kills did so under circumstances which would
lead a reasonable person under similar circumstances to conclude she was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.") (emphasis added); State v.
Abeyta, 901 P.2d 164, 170 (N.M. 1995) (noting that the standard is whether "a
reasonable person in the same circumstances would have reacted similarly")
(emphasis added); State v. Williams, 467 S.E.2d 392, 394 (N.C. 1996) (noting
that "perfect self-defense excuses a killing when at the time of the killing...
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least one court has held that if the defendant is a woman, the
reasonableness of her beliefs should be measured against those
of the reasonable woman.2 8 In some jurisdictions, the defen-
dant must retreat before using deadly force if she can do so in
complete safety.29
The belief requirement in self-defense doctrine is twofold.
The defendant's belief in the need to use force in self-defense
must be both honest and reasonable. It is generally agreed
defendant's belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a per-
son of ordinary firmness") (emphasis added); State v. Rios, 499 N.W.2d 906,
910 (S.D. 1993) ("The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully
use in defense of himself is limited by what a reasonable person in the same
situation . . . would believe to be necessary.") (emphasis added); State v.
Bergeson, 824 P.2d 515, 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) ("[Tlhese subjective beliefs
must be such that a reasonable person considering only the circumstances
known to the defendant at the time would also have entertained them.")
(emphasis added).
28. See Gentry v. State, 441 S.E.2d 249, 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (noting
that the trial court used the reasonable woman standard in instructing thejury on defendant's self-defense claim). In other areas of the law, namely sex-
ual harassment cases, courts have also adopted a reasonable woman standard
in lieu of a reasonable person standard. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable woman standard in a hostile
environment sexual harassment case involving a woman plaintiff). In 1993,
the United States Supreme Court avoided the opportunity to clarify whether
the appropriate standard of reasonableness in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases was a "reasonable person" or a "reasonable woman" stan-
dard. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993). As law pro-
fessor Caroline Forell points out:
Although the Court uses the term "reasonable person" in describing
the objective standard, the Court did not discuss whether the objec-
tive standard must be the "reasonable person" standard. Although
the Harris trial court applied the "reasonable woman" standard, the
Supreme Court's Harris opinion does not mention, much less analyze,
whether that standard is either permissible or impermissible under
Title VII. Therefore, the form of the objective test remains unre-
solved.
Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 769, 790 (arguing that courts should employ a reasonable woman
standard in civil cases in which a woman claims a sexually related injury); cf.
Robert Unikel, Comment, 'Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable
Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 326, 349-70(1992) (criticizing the reasonable woman standard).
29. See State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884-85 (N.J. 1961) (agreeing with
the retreat rule's underlying theory that there is no necessity to kill in self-
defense if deadly force could have been avoided by retreat); State v. Charles,
647 P.2d 897, 901 (Or. 1982) (embracing the retreat rule as part of the larger
concept of necessity). Even in "retreat jurisdictions," one need not retreat if
one is attacked in one's home. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(b)(1) (1975); Gainer
v. State, 391 A.2d 856, 860 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); State v. Marsh, 593
N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
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that an honest belief in the need for self-defense exemplifies a
subjective standard. A defendant honestly believes in the need
to use self-defense if she actually believes it is necessary to use
self-defense.30 There is less agreement on what it means to
have a reasonable belief. Some academics support a subjective
standard of reasonableness, 31 while others support an objective
standard of reasonableness. Many jurisdictions have compro-
mised by employing a hybrid subjectivized-objective reasonable
person standard. Endorsing an objective standard of reason-
ableness does not mean that an actor is relieved of liability
whenever she acts in an objectively reasonable way without re-
gard to her subjective culpability. IfA shoots B under circum-
stances in which a reasonable person would have felt it neces-
sary to shoot in self-defense, but A did not know that B was
about to shoot A, A's claim of self-defense will be unsuccessful
even though objectively reasonable.32 Self-defense generally is
30. Recently, the California Supreme Court opined that using the term
"honest" to describe the defendants belief in the need to use self-defense is
problematic. A belief can be genuine or actual, or it can be nonexistent. It is
difficult, however, to characterize a belief as "dishonest." See In re Christian
S., 872 P.2d 574, 576 (Cal. 1994) (substituting the term "actual" in place of
"honest" to better reflect the meaning of the subjective standard).
31. Few states have adopted a subjective standard of reasonableness in
self-defense doctrine. North Dakota is one such state. In North Dakota, the
proper standard that is to be applied in self-defense cases is as follows:
[A] defendant's conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably cau-
tious person might or might not do or consider necessary to do under
the like circumstances, but what he himself in good faith honestly
believed and had reasonable ground to believe was necessary for him
to do to protect himself from apprehended death or great bodily in-
jury.
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983). To some extent, it is a
misnomer to call a subjective standard a standard of reasonableness since it
merely requires that the defendant honestly believed it was reasonable to act
in self-defense.
32. George Fletcher poses a similar hypothetical in which a physician is
about to inject air into a patient's veins with the intent to kill the patient.
The patient, unaware of the doctor's intentions, desires to kill the doctor. As
the doctor stands over him with the needle poised, the patient grabs the doc-
tor and begins to choke him. George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the
Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293, 299 (1975).
Fletcher suggests that the patient, who lacks a subjective belief in the need to
defend himself, would not be exculpated on the ground of self-defense unless
one were to adhere to a moral forfeiture theory of self-defense, a theory which
Fletcher himself finds problematic. See id. at 320 (opining that "objective
manifestations of self-defense are not sufficient to bar conviction"). But see
Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm As a Prerequisite
for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 289 (1975) (arguing that justifi-
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not available to one who uses deadly force without an honest
belief in the necessity of using such force to protect against animminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.
1. The Objective-Subjective Debate
Under traditional self-defense doctrine, the meaning of
reasonableness depends on whether one utilizes an objective or
subjective standard of reasonableness. The question of whether
an objective or a subjective standard of reasonableness should
be used is part of a larger debate about whether criminal liabil-
ity should be based upon an objective or subjective model. An
objective model views social harm, in the form of bad conduct
or bad results, as the linchpin of criminal liability.33 A subjec-
tive model, in contrast, views culpability as the central defin-
ing feature of criminal liability.34
The objective-subjective debate also reflects an even broader
debate about whether the criminal law should adhere to a non-
instrumentalist approach that focuses on an actor's culpability
or an instrumentalist approach that utilizes the criminal law
to achieve broader social ends.35 Existing criminal law encom-
cation defenses should be available even to those who lack knowledge of the
justifying circumstances).
33. See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Re-
sponsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 827, 831 n.21 (1977) ("Te objective model authorizes criminal liability
whenever the individual's conduct has threatened or harmed social interests
protected by the criminal law without regard to the actor's subjective culpabil-
ity."); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the
Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 61, 79 (1984) ("The linchpin of the criminal law is harm in the form of
bad results or bad conduct.").
34. See Arenella, supra note 33, at 831 n.21 ("The subjective model of li-
ability imposes criminal sanctions on an individual who voluntarily violated a
legal obligation which he could have obeyed."); see also Larry Alexander,
Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuES 1, 30 (1994) (arguing
that the defendant's culpability, rather than the causation of harm, is central
in criminal law).
35. See Armour, supra note 12, at 801-02 (discussing instrumentalist and
non-instrumentalist approaches to criminal liability). The term "instrumen-
talist" has many meanings. George Fletcher, for example, uses the term to
describe a theory of criminal liability that focuses both on whether the rule in
question serves the purposes of criminal punishment and on the actor's cul-
pability, in contrast to what Fletcher calls legalist theory which views harm as
a prerequisite to criminal liability. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 304-05. One
can further distinguish between instrumentalist theory, which measures the
validity of a legal rule in terms of whether it serves the broader interests of
society, and non-instrumentalist theory, which focuses on culpability as the
central defining feature of the criminal law. See Armour, supra note 12, at
1996]
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passes both approaches. In embracing the general rule that
voluntary action is not criminal unless accompanied by mens
rea, or a guilty mind, the criminal law recognizes the impor-
tance of assigning blame to culpable parties.
In other respects, the criminal law follows an instrumen-
talist approach. For example, the law imposes a reasonable-
ness requirement on provocation claims at least in part for in-
strumental reasons. 6 Even if the actor was actually provoked
into a heat of passion and acted before he cooled off, he will not
receive the benefit of mitigation unless the reasonable person
would have also been provoked into a heat of passion and not
cooled off. In punishing provoked killers who act unreasonably
as intentional murderers, the law sends a message that unrea-
sonable provoked killings are wrongful.37
Any time the criminal law imposes a reasonableness re-
quirement, one might argue that it is favoring an instrumen-
talist approach, or an approach that uses law to achieve social
purposes, over a model of liability that focuses exclusively on
the actor's subjective state of mind.38 In general, a necessity
814 (asserting that, ultimately, a non-instrumentalist approach to equal pro-
tection is unjust).
36. Provocation doctrine also serves the non-instrumental or culpability-
focused goal of differentiating between more and less serious crimes based on
the offender's culpability. Joshua Dressier, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill
"Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the
"Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 751 (1995).
In receiving a manslaughter conviction rather than a murder conviction or
complete acquittal, the provoked killer is punished less than the intentional
murderer but more than the completely nonculpable killer.
37. Similarly, strict liability crimes serve broad social purposes, such as
deterring socially undesirable behavior and encouraging socially desirable be-
havior. DRESSLER, supra note 24, §§ 11.02[B], 11.03[A], at 127-28. A person
who commits a strict liability offense by engaging in prohibited behavior or by
causing the prohibited harm may be held criminally liable even if the actor
acted without intent, awareness, or even negligence. Id. § 11.03[C], at 127.
Mistake of law claims are generally disallowed for instrumental reasons. Id. §
13.01[B][4], at 149. Even if the actor did not know she was breaking the law,
her ignorance of the law is no excuse. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 21, §
5.1(a), at 406. This is because the law seeks to encourage people to learn the
law. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 181(b)(1), at 374
n.3 (1984) (discussing the individual's duty to find out what his/her legal obli-
gations are). The "ignorance of the law is no excuse" rule provides the addi-
tional social benefit of discouraging false claims of ignorance. DRESSLER, su-
pra note 24, § 13.01[B][3], at 149.
38. This is not to suggest that utilization of a reasonableness requirement
eliminates concerns with culpability. When a person acts unreasonably, she is
also acting culpably. A reasonableness standard is instrumentalist in nature
because it does not determine criminal liability by exclusive reliance on the
defendant's subjective beliefs. See Armour, supra note 12, at 785 n.12
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defense will not succeed no matter how sincere the actor's be-
lief in the need to violate the law to avoid a greater harm if his
belief is not reasonable. A duress defense will not succeed no
matter how sincere the actor's belief in the need to violate the
law in order to avoid death or bodily injury unless the reason-
able person in the actor's situation would have acted similarly.
Likewise, a claim of self-defense will not succeed no matter
how sincere the defendant's belief in the need to use deadly
force if a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not
have acted similarly. In each of these situations, a reasonable-
ness requirement is imposed to encourage adherence to societal
norms. The reasonable person standard, which is supposed to
reflect these societal norms, is implemented to provide incen-
tives for people to act in socially desirable ways.
A number of critical race and feminist legal scholars have
criticized the use of purportedly objective standards on the
ground that such standards are not truly neutral and unbi-
ased. Kimberl6 Crenshaw and Gary Peller, for example, ob-
serve that seemingly neutral and objective standards such as
the concepts of reasonable force and equal protection are medi-
ated through narratives of racial power.39 According to Cren-
shaw and Peller, the Simi Valley jury's acquittal of the four
police officers who brutally beat Rodney King and then claimed
they justifiably used reasonable force, should not be under-
stood as an aberrational act of jury nullification, but rather as
a reflection of the dominant ideological paradigm that obscures
the way race is experienced by African Americans and other
people of color in this society.4"
Dolores Donovan and Stephanie Wildman have criticized
use of the reasonable man standard in battered women self-
(defining the term "instrumentalist" as a conception of legal liability that fo-
cuses on the "future welfare of society in general," rather than on "the past
actions of specific parties"); see also id. at 801 (explaining that a "non-
instrumentalist" approach "focuses exclusively on the personal culpability of
the individual defendant, without regard for any social implications beyond
the boundaries of the immediate case"). A reasonableness requirement holds
the defendant to a higher standard, one that expects conformity to social
norms. See id. at 815 ("According to the instrumentalist view, the law should
seek to alter the maze and retrain individuals by formulating rules that pre-
vent the stigmatization of blacks, reflect the community's moral aspirations of
racial equality, and help eradicate racial discrimination.").
39. KimberlM Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, in
READING RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING 56, 63-64 (Robert Gooding-
Williams ed., 1993) [hereinafter READING RODNEY KING].
40. Id.
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defense cases because the standard ignores the social reality
that each human being is a unique individual and, when
strictly applied, precludes consideration of relevant circum-
stances particular to the individual case.4' Donovan and
Wildman observe that when a battered woman kills her abu-
sive husband, use of an objective reasonable man standard
might preclude reliance on the fact that a woman who has been
repeatedly beaten by her husband would fear death or serious
bodily injury if her husband advanced towards her during a
quarrel.42
Similarly, Richard Delgado has criticized use of objective
standards such as the reasonable man standard on the ground
that objective standards reflect the norms of the dominant cul-
ture and exclude the values of other groups in society.43 In
41. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 26, at 462-67 (examining the per-
petuation of social inequities by legal abstractions that ignore reality); see also
CYNTHIA K GILLEPSIE, JUSTIFIABLE HoMICIDE: BATrERED WOMEN, SELF-
DEFENSE, AND THE LAw 189 (1989) ("I believe that a subjective standard of
reasonableness or a purely subjective standard of bona fide belief in the need
for acting in self-defense is much more fair to women defendants."); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 639-40 (1980) (advocating a more
individualized approach to the reasonable man standard in self-defense doc-
trine). But cf Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 459
(1991) (arguing that current self-defense law adequately encompasses subjec-
tive perceptions of the battered woman defendant).
42. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 26, at 445-46. Many jurisdictions
have responded to such criticism by permitting expert testimony regarding
battered woman syndrome and allowing evidence regarding the battered
woman defendant's experiences of being beaten by her partner. See Linda L.
Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereo-
types: The African American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome,
1995 Wis. L. REV. 1003, 1005 n.7 (citing cases permitting expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Chang-
ing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Bat-
tering, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 213, 219 n.27 (1992) (noting that most appel-
late courts admit expert testimony on battered woman syndrome). When
consideration of such evidence is limited to assessing the honesty, but not the
reasonableness, of the defendant's beliefs, the original objection to an objec-
tive standard remains. For example, before 1996, California courts held that
battered woman syndrome evidence was probative of the honesty, but not the
reasonableness, of the battered woman's belief in the need to defend herself.
People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citing People v.
Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)), overruled by People v.
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996). In 1996, the California Supreme Court
held that battered woman syndrome evidence is also relevant to the reason-
ableness of the battered woman's beliefs. Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 10.
43. Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L.
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criminal law, this problem may surface when a defendant from
a different culture is denied the opportunity to explain why his
actions were reasonable under the traditions of his culture be-
cause his behavior does not conform to the customs and tradi-
tions of American culture." Courts disagree about whether
and to what extent cultural evidence may be admitted at a
criminal trial.4 5
While a subjective approach has certain appeal, adopting a
subjective standard of reasonableness, i.e., one that views as
reasonable those beliefs which the defendant sincerely thinks
are reasonable,46 is problematic for several reasons. A subjec-
tive standard of reasonableness ignores the harm caused by a
defendant's acts, allowing a defendant's subjective belief in the
need to use self-defense to outweigh all other considerations.
Subjectivists might justify such a result by arguing that the
harm caused by a defendant's acts is irrelevant. If, for exam-
ple, one shoots at another person and misses, a subjectivist
might argue that one deserves to be punished to the same ex-
tent as if one killed the other person because all that matters
are acts that one can control.47 The social harm caused by the
defendant's acts, however, is not completely irrelevant. The
criminal law recognizes that there is a difference between one
REV. 813, 818 (1992) ("Powerful actors... want objective standards applied to
them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and
their culture.").
44. See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Femi-
nist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal
Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 41-43 (1995) (discussing the tension between
feminists who argue that admissibility of cultural evidence in cases involving
male violence against women reinforces patriarchal norms and condones such
violence, and multiculturalists who advocate use of cultural information to
counteract the unfairness of applying the dominant culture's legal standards
to defendants from other cultures); Let Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture:
Asian Women and the 'Cultural Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 91-97
(1994) (discussing ways in which recognition of the cultural defense can harm
immigrant women of color); see also Carlos Villarreal, Culture in Lawmaking:
A Chicano Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1193, 1238 (1991) (discussing a
proposal to allow a cultural defense in cases in which the crime "is confined to
voluntary participants within the defendanfs culture").
45. Maguigan, supra note 44, at 69-86 (discussing cases in which courts
allowed cultural evidence and cases in which courts refused to allow such evi-
dence).
46. See, e.g., State v. Simon, 646 P.2d 1119, 1121-22 (Kan. 1982) (holding
that trial court erred in instructing the jury to apply a purely subjective stan-
dard of reasonableness).
47. See generally Alexander, supra note 34 (arguing that, for purposes of
the criminal law, the culpability of the defendant is more significant than the
harm caused by the defendant's actions).
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who intends to kill but fails (the attempted murderer) and one
who intends to kill and succeeds (the murderer) by assigning
different punishments to attempts and completed crimes.
48
A subjective standard of reasonableness might also be
criticized for allowing people to set their own standards govern-
ing the permissible use of force. A defendant who acts in an
idiosyncratic manner can escape liability under a subjective
standard if she sincerely believes it is reasonable to act in self-
defense, even if the very manner in which she acts indicates a
failure to conform her conduct to the most basic standards. As
the high court of New York explained in rejecting a purely
subjective approach to reasonableness:
We cannot... allow the perpetrator of a serious crime to go free
simply because that person believed his actions were reasonable and
necessary to prevent some perceived harm. To completely exonerate
... an individual, no matter how aberrational or bizarre his thought
patterns, would allow citizens to set their own standards for the
permissible use of force. It would also allow a legally competent de-
fendant suffering from delusions to kill or perform acts of violence
with impunity, contrary to fundamental principles of justice and
criminal law.
49
Under a subjective standard of reasonableness, if a defen-
dant honestly but erroneously believes persons of a particular
racial group are peculiarly susceptible to aggressive conduct,
and acts on this belief by using deadly force against members
of this racial group whenever he encounters them, the defen-
dant may be acquitted.5' A subjective standard is also trouble-
some because of its potential for fraudulent claims. For in-
stance, many people were troubled by the ease with which the
Menendez brothers were able to convince several jurors in
their first trial that they honestly believed their parents were
about to kill them simply by testifying that they were afraid of
their parents because of past abuse.51 The fact that the broth-
48. See DRESSLER, supra note 24, § 27.02[C], at 348-49 (discussing pun-
ishment of attempts).
49. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. 1986).
50. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 18.06[A], at 213
(1987).
51. Alan Abrahamson, Menendez Tells of Fear Before Slaying Parents,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at Al; Alan Abrahamson, Lyle Menendez Tells
Court of Sexual Abuse by Mother, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1993, at B1; Alan
Abrahamson, Tearful Lyle Menendez Says Fear Led to Slayings, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1993, at A21.
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ers' claims of past abuse did not surface until right before the
trial did not help to alleviate such discomfort. 2
Objectivists support the position that a defendant's belief
is reasonable if and only if the hypothetical reasonable person
would have held a similar belief.5 3 Under an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness, the defendant's beliefs are measured
against the beliefs of a hypothetical reasonable person of
"ordinary intelligence, temperament, and physical and mental
attributes."54 In most jurisdictions, though, the standard used
is more accurately described as a hybrid subjectivized-objective
standard. Most courts are willing to allow juries to infuse
physical characteristics of the defendant, such as height,
weight, and even physical disabilities, into the reasonable per-
son standard, thereby subjectivizing an otherwise purely ob-
jective standard.56
52. See Gail Diane Cox, Abuse Excuse: Success Grows, NAT L.J., May 9,
1994, at A26 ("[T]he fact that the abuse angle was late in coming and it was
uncorroborated ... has created great skepticism."); Mary Jane Stevenson, De-
fense Offers New Theory in Menendez Case, L.A. DAILY J., July 20, 1993, at 1
(reporting on new defense theory offered during the pretrial hearing that the
brothers killed their parents in self-defense because of past abuse). In a tape-
recorded therapy session months after they shot their parents, Lyle and Erik
Menendez never mentioned sexual abuse or self-defense. Alan Abrahamson,
Tape Could Undermine Key Menendez Claims, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1993, at
Al.
53. See, e.g., People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921-22 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) ("California law expresses the criterion for [the] evaluation [of the de-
fendant's assertedly defensive acts] in the objective terms of whether a rea-
sonable person, as opposed to the defendant, would have believed and acted as
the defendant did."), overruled by People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996);
People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (same), overruled
by Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 10.
54. DRESSLER, supra note 24, § 18.05, at 202; see also 2 FRANCIS WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 127, at 184 (15th ed. 1994) ("According to some courts, the
reasonableness of a defendanfs belief in the need to take life is measured not
by the standards of a coward, but by those of a person of ordinary firmness
and reason.").
55. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 51-52 (N.Y. 1986) ("[A] de-
termination of reasonableness must be based on the 'circumstances' facing de-
fendant or his 'situation.'") (citation omitted); see also Nadine Ilansky, Bern-
hard Goetz: A "Reasonable Man" : A Look at New York's Justification Defense,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 1149, 1152-53 (1988) (noting that the high court of New
York established a hybrid objective and subjective standard of reasonableness
in the Goetz case).
56. See, e.g., People v. Matthews, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 335 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a blind and hearing-impaired defendant claiming self-
defense was entitled to be held to the standard of a reasonable blind and
hearing-impaired person as opposed to that of a reasonable person with nor-
mal eyesight and hearing); Rodriguez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. Ct.
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An objective standard may be problematic for reasons
other than those noted above. A jurisdiction which requires an
honest and objectively reasonable belief in the need to act in
self-defense may not adequately recognize differences in cul-
pability. In a jurisdiction that does not recognize the doctrine
of imperfect self-defense,57 if a defendant honestly but unrea-
sonably believes she is being attacked and uses deadly force
against her perceived attacker, the defendant is criminally li-
able to the same extent as an intentional killer.58 The result is
an all-or-nothing approach that does not differentiate between
varying degrees of culpability.59 The defendant either succeeds
in persuading the jury of the reasonableness of her beliefs and
is acquitted, or fails and is convicted of murder.6 0
Some might object to the objective standard of reasonable-
ness because of the anomalous situation that results when an
actor's beliefs are unreasonable but ultimately accurate. Gen-
App. 1982) (holding that the relative weight, size, and strength of a defendant
claiming self-defense compared with that of his victim are matters that may
be considered in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's actions),
affd, 710 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); cf. State v. Cramer, 841 P.2d
1111, 1118 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a jury considering a self-defense
claim need not be advised to employ an objective test based on the "reasonably
prudent battered woman"; rather, the correct standard was whether a rea-
sonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have perceived self-
defense as necessary). Incorporating the physical characteristics of the de-
fendant into the hypothetical reasonable person can have a great influence on
the outcome of the reasonableness inquiry. If the defendant is an eighty-
pound, five-foot-tall woman with one arm and her attacker is a six-foot-tall
man weighing two hundred pounds, the defendant's fears might well be con-
sidered reasonable if the reasonable person is defined as the reasonable
eighty-pound, five-foot-tall woman with one arm. If, on the other hand, the
reasonable person is defined as the reasonable able-bodied man, the defen-
dant's fears might not be considered reasonable.
57. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the imperfect self-defense doctrine).
58. See Richard Singer, The Goetz Case Revives Issue of Self-Defense
Standards, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1986, at 7 (discussing problems in application of
traditional self-defense doctrine).
59. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 54 (1988) (describing all-or-nothing problem
with traditional self-defense doctrine); Kenneth W. Simmons, Self-Defense,
Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1179, 1187 (1989)(reviewing Fletcher's A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on
Trial, supra).
60. Jurisdictions wishing to retain an objective standard of reasonable-
ness have addressed this concern by recognizing what is known as the imper-
fect self-defense doctrine in which a defendant who honestly but unreasonably
believes in the need for self-defense is convicted of manslaughter rather than
murder. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the imperfect self-defense doctrine at
greater length).
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erally, if the defendant's beliefs were honest and correct, but
unreasonable, then self-defense is not available. This is be-
cause an objective standard requires a reasonable, though not
necessarily correct, belief to exculpate. In contrast, a defen-
dant whose beliefs are honest and reasonable, but mistaken
(i.e., the perceived attacker in fact was not about to kill or seri-
ously injure the defendant), is exculpated under normal self-
defense rules. The accuracy or inaccuracy of the defendant's
beliefs is irrelevant under a model of self-defense which re-
quires reasonableness. This objection, however, is not so much
a criticism of the objective standard of reasonableness as a
complaint about the role of mistake in traditional self-defense
doctrine. Even under a subjective standard of reasonableness,
the accuracy or inaccuracy of the defendant's subjective belief
is generally considered irrelevant. As long as the defendant
honestly or sincerely feared imminent death or serious bodily
injury, the defendant is exculpated even if the defendant's be-
lief was completely mistaken.
An objective standard of reasonableness might also be
criticized for focusing too heavily on what the average or ordi-
nary person, rightly or wrongly, would think or do. The ordi-
nary person might act in undesirable ways. She might use
deadly force against a Black man to protect herself against an
imagined threat even though she would not do so if the person
she was attacking was White. The ordinary man might become
enraged enough to kill another man he thinks is trying to
sexually proposition him.6 The criminal law might discourage
such behavior by clarifying that the reasonable man is neither
a racist nor a homophobic person.62 This, however, does not
solve the problem because both people who fear Blacks and
men who become enraged by nonviolent homosexual advances
might be motivated, not by hatred or bigotry, but by the normal
human process of categorization, of which stereotyping is a
61. See Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The
Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133, 134-35
(1992) (describing use of the "nonviolent homosexual advance" as provocation
sufficient to mitigate a murder to a manslaughter). But cf Dressier, supra
note 36, at 757 (stating that the Ordinary Reasonable Man is not homophobic
or racist).
62. Most self-defense jury instructions do not clarify that the reasonable
man is not a racist nor a homophobic person. See infra notes 404 & 424 and
accompanying text (listing several states' model jury instructions on self-
defense).
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part.63 It is unclear whether the concern that an objective
standard of reasonableness perpetuates the less than desirable
views of the majority can be addressed without eliminating the
reasonable person standard. Part IIH briefly discusses one way
of addressing this problem without eliminating the reason-
ableness standard by making more explicit the normative na-
ture of the reasonableness inquiry and broadening the focus
beyond a positivist or descriptive model (what would the ordi-
nary person actually do) to include a normative inquiry (what
should the reasonable person do).
The objective-subjective debate reflects another tension in
the criminal law regarding the question whether the law
should lead or follow. This question is linked to the justifica-
tion-excuse distinction. To the extent the law recognizes harm-
ful behavior as justified action, it sends a message that such
behavior is not wrongful, but right action.' When behavior is
excused, the law recognizes the behavior as wrongful, but does
not assign blame to the actor because he is considered noncul-
pable.65 In recognizing excuse defenses, the law recognizes
that people may act in socially undesirable ways, yet not de-
serve punishment. The law accepts the inevitable shortcom-
ings of human beings who cannot always act in ideal ways.
An extended discussion on justifications and excuses is be-
yond the scope of this Article. The distinction, however, is
worth noting because whether one thinks of self-defense as a
justification or an excuse may influence one's views on whether
the law should require people to overcome their inclination to
act in certain ways in response to racial stereotypes or whether
the law should accept the shortcomings of ordinary people who
may use deadly force in response to what they mistakenly per-
ceive to be an imminent threat. The fact that self-defense can
be viewed either as an excuse or a justification depending on
the circumstances makes this larger question a difficult one.66
63. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cogni-
tive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-90 (1995) (explaining human tendency to catego-
rize).
64. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) ("A
justification speaks to the rightness of an act."); Dressier, supra note 33, at 66,
68 n.37 (1984) (elaborating on the distinction between justifications and ex-
cuses).
65. FLETCHER, supra note 64, at 759 ("[A]n excuse [speaks] to whether
the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act.").
66. George Fletcher, for example, believes putative self-defense claims,
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If one thinks of self-defense as a justification, one should sup-
port the view that the law of self-defense should encourage
normatively correct behavior. If one thinks of self-defense as
an excuse, one might prefer a subjective standard of reason-
ableness that places emphasis on the actor's individual blame-
worthiness. An objective standard of reasonableness that at-
tempts to encourage adherence to social norms of behavior
reflects a law-should-lead approach, while a subjective stan-
dard of reasonableness that gives more weight to the actor's
subjective beliefs reflects a law-should-follow approach. De-
spite debate between academics on this point, self-defense is
generally considered a justification defense.67 This suggests
that requiring individuals to overcome prejudice arising out of
reliance on racial stereotypes may be appropriate because
killings in self-defense are supposed to constitute socially ac-
ceptable or right actions.
B. ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE TRADITIONAL SELF-DEFENSE
DOCTRiNE
1. The Model Penal Code Approach to Self-Defense
The Model Penal Code, drafted in 1962, attempted to
improve traditional self-defense doctrine by recognizing the dif-
ferences in culpability among: (1) defendants who honestly,
non-negligently, and non-recklessly believe in the need for self-
defense; (2) defendants who honestly but recklessly believe in
the need for self-defense; and (3) defendants who honestly but
negligently believe in the need for self-defense. The Model Pe-
nal Code gives a defendant a complete defense to an inten-
tional crime of violence when the defendant honestly believes
her use of deadly or nondeadly force against another person
was immediately necessary to protect herself against the use of
i.e., claims in which the defendant reasonably but mistakenly believes in the
need to use self-defense, should be treated as excuses rather than justifica-
tions. FLETCHER, supra note 64, at 762-67. But see Dressier, supra note 33,
at 92-93 (critiquing Fletcher's mistake thesis); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplex-
ing Borders of Justifwcation and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897, 1897 (1984)
(noting that some defenses such as self-defense and duress contain justifica-
tory and excuse characteristics); Thomas Morawetz, Reconstructing the
Criminal Defenses: The Significance of Justification, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 277, 287-88 (1986) (noting that genuine self-defense claims constitute
justifications while putative self-defense and claims of reasonable mistake of
fact are excuses).
67. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 21, § 5.7, at 649-51.
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unlawful force by that person.6 8 There is no reasonableness re-
quirement per se.69 If, however, the defendant was reckless or
negligent in believing that the use of force was necessary, the
defendant can be held liable for an offense for which reckless-
ness or negligence suffices to establish culpability." In other
words, if a defendant's belief in the need to use self-defense
was honest but unreasonable (due to recklessness or negli-
gence), then the defendant would not be guilty of murder,
which requires purpose or knowledge,71 but might be guilty of
manslaughter or negligent homicide if recklessness or negli-
gence is sufficient to establish culpability for these lesser of-
fenses. 72
68. Section 3.04 of the Model Penal Code, entitled "Use of Force in Self-
Protection," provides:
(1) Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of the Person. Subject to
the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes
that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the
present occasion.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
69. Id.
70. Section 3.09 of the Model Penal Code, entitled "Mistake of Law as to
Unlawfulness of Force or Legality of Arrest; Reckless or Negligent Use of
Otherwise Justifiable Force; Reckless or Negligent Injury or Risk of Injury to
Innocent Persons," provides:
(2) When the actor believes that the use of force upon or toward the
person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such
belief would establish a justification under Sections 3.03 to 3.08 but
the actor is reckless or negligent in having such belief or in acquiring
or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief that is material to the
justifiability of his use of force, the justification afforded by those
Sections is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which
recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability.
Id. § 3.09.
71. Id. § 210.2.
72. At least two states, Delaware and Kentucky, appear to follow the ap-
proach taken in section 3.04 of the Model Penal Code in requiring that the de-
fendant asserting self-defense have only an actual or honest belief in the need
to use force against the victim. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (1995); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (Michie 1990). But see Coleman v. State, 320 A.2d 740,
743 (Del. 1974) (noting that, although the former objective test of what a rea-
sonable man would have believed has been supplanted by the subjective test
of what the defendant actually believed, the jury may consider what a reason-
able man in the defendant's circumstances would have believed as one factor
to be considered with all other factors). Kentucky also follows the approach of
section 3.09 of the Model Penal Code. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.120 (Michie
1990) (disallowing the justification if the defendant is wanton or reckless in
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The Model Penal Code approach addresses the failure of
traditional self-defense doctrine to recognize differing levels of
culpability, but it, too, is not perfect. When the defendant is
accused of killing another person, the Model Penal Code ap-
proach works because most jurisdictions recognize differing
degrees of homicide with differing mens rea requirements.
Murder generally requires an intent to kill, an intent to com-
mit serious bodily injury, or gross recklessness coupled with an
extreme indifference to human life.73 If a defendant in a juris-
diction which follows the Model Penal Code's approach to self-
defense honestly, but recklessly or negligently, believes that
deadly force is necessary, the defendant will not be guilty of
murder but may be guilty of manslaughter or negligent homi-
believing the use of force is necessary and has been charged with an offense
for which wantonness or recklessness suffices to establish culpability).
The Nebraska and Pennsylvania statutes on self-defense appear at first
glance to follow the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409
(1995) ("[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on
the present occasion.") (emphasis added); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (West
Supp. 1995) (Official Comment-1972) ("This section is derived from Section
3.04 of the Model Penal Code, and makes no substantial change in existing
law."). However, both Nebraska and Pennsylvania require that the defen-
dant's belief be reasonable as well as honest. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 501 (1983)
(defining "believes" or "belief' as "reasonably believes" or "reasonable belief');
State v. White, 543 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Neb. 1996) ("[I]n order to successfully
assert the claim of self-defense, one must have both a reasonable and goodfaith belief in the necessity of using deadly force.") (emphasis added); Com-
monwealth v. Harris, 665 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. 1995) ("In order to establish
self-defense in this situation where appellant used deadly force upon another,
it must be shown that... the actor must have reasonably believed that he was
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and that there was a ne-
cessity to use such force.") (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590
A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. 1991) ("In order to prevail on a theory of self-defense, the
defendant must establish that (a) he reasonably believed that he was in immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury.") (emphasis added). Hawaii,
too, appears at first glance to follow the Model Penal Code in requiring only
an honest or actual belief. HAW. REv. STAT. § 703-304 (1993) ("[T]he use of
force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary.") (emphasis added). Hawaii, however,
also requires that the defendant's belief must have been reasonable, not
merely honest. HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-300 (1993) (defining the term
"believes" as meaning "reasonably believes").
73. See, e.g., State v. Gilliam, 541 A.2d 309, 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW § 59, at 428-29 (1972)); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 610 A.2d 1042, 1052
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, § 59, at 428-29); State
v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 60 n.1 (Utah 1978) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
5-203 (1953)).
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cide, lesser homicides which generally require only a reckless
or negligent state of mind.74
The Model Penal Code approach does not operate quite as
well if the substantive crime does not include a lesser crime
with a lesser mens rea equal to the mental state possessed by
the defendant at the time he committed the offenseY.7  For ex-
ample, the crime of attempted murder generally requires that
the defendant had the purpose or intent to bring about the
death of the victim. 76 A defendant in a Model Penal Code ju-
risdiction who shoots another in the honest but negligent belief
that the shooting is necessary to protect against deadly force
would not be guilty of attempted murder '(because his honest
belief in the need to use self-defense would provide him with a
complete defense to attempted murder, an offense which re-
quires proof of a specific intent to kill) nor would he be guilty of
any lesser attempted homicide (because there is no such thing
as a negligent attempt). Unlike the defendant who kills with
the honest but negligent belief that the killing is necessary to
protect against death or serious bodily injury, who can at least
be found guilty of negligent homicide, the defendant who
wounds with a negligent belief cannot be convicted of any
lesser crime if no lesser crime with a mens rea of negligence
74. McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 518, 526 (Ky. 1994) (noting
that, if the jury believes the defendant wantonly or recklessly perceived a
need for self-protection where none existed, the defendant may be convicted of
manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide, but not murder). In
Kentucky, a defendant who kills while wantonly or recklessly perceiving a
need for self-defense may not be convicted of intentional murder nor may he
be convicted of wanton murder (also known as depraved heart murder) be-
cause wantonness or recklessness does not suffice to establish culpability for
either type of murder. Id. at 525. Intentional murder requires an intent to
kill, and wanton murder requires an extreme indifference to human life in
addition to wantonness. Id.
75. FLETCHER, supra note 59, at 55.
76. Attempt crimes require an intent to bring about the particular result
described by the target offense. Miguel Angel Mendez, A Sisphean Task: The
Common Law Approach to Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 410 (1994)
("Attempts are comprised of two elements. One element, a mental one, con-
sists in the offender's desire to bring about the harm the criminal law pro-
scribed. The other, a physical one, consists of the conduct the offender under-
takes in the hope of causing the harm."). Thus, for example, "attempted
murder requires an intent to bring about that result described by the crime of
murder (i.e., the death of another)." Gilliam, 541 A.2d at 311 (quoting
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 73, § 59, at 428-29); see also Anderson, 610 A.2d
at 1052 (discussing difference between attempted aggravated assault and at-
tempted murder-one requires a specific intent to commit serious bodily in-
jury and the other requires a specific intent to kill).
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exists.77 Even in jurisdictions that recognize offenses such as
reckless endangerment and assault, such offenses often require
a mens rea of recklessness .7  Some might argue that this re-
sult is fine since the defendant who honestly but negligently
attempts to kill and fails has not committed a social harm (no
one has died) and does not have the culpable mental state re-
quired to be guilty of attempted murder (no intent to kill un-
lawfully given his honest belief in the need for self-defense).
The problem is that this negligent defendant, who may not be
completely blameless, 9 completely escapes blame under the
Model Penal Code scheme.
80
2. Imperfect Self-Defense Doctrine
Another attempt to improve traditional self-defense doc-
trine is reflected in the adoption by numerous jurisdictions of
the "imperfect self-defense" doctrine." Under this doctrine, if
77. FLETCHER, supra note 59, at 55.
78. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1987) ("A person is
guilty of assault in the first degree when.., he recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes se-
rious physical injury to another person") (emphasis added); id. § 120.25 ("A
person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under cir-
cumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly en-
gages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.")
(emphasis added); People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 706-09 (N.Y. 1983)
(describing the mental state required for proving the crime of reckless endan-
germent); People v. Tocco, 525 N.Y.S.2d 137, 140-41 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1988) (discussing mental state required for reckless endangerment in the first
degree).
79. Social harm need not be tangible in order to exist. "Swinging a fist at
a person may not injure him as intended, but it may cause an apprehension of
injury that is itself a harm." Robinson, supra note 32, at 268.
80. If the defendant were reckless, as opposed to negligent, he might be
liable for reckless endangerment. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962). Reck-
less endangerment is a misdemeanor. Id.
81. See, e.g., In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 577, 580 (Cal. 1994) (holding
that, although the California Penal Code Amendments eliminated the dimin-
ished capacity defense, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense remains intact);
State v. Griblin, 753 P.2d 843, 843 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988) (requiring a jury in-
struction regarding the lesser degree crime in second-degree murder if the
jury could reasonably have believed victim was the original aggressor); Shan-
non v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Ky. 1988) (allowing the imperfect
justification in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.120 (Michie 1990)); State v. Grant,
418 A.2d 154, 156 (Me. 1980) (stating that the trial court instructed the jury
on "imperfect self-defense" according to ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 101);
State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 771 (Md. 1984) (recognizing partial defense
of "imperfect" self-defense in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1957)); State v.
Arias, 847 P.2d 327, 327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that "defendant was
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the defendant honestly but unreasonably believed in the need
to use deadly force to protect against an imminent threat of
deadly force, the defendant may be liable for manslaughter as
opposed to murder.82 The honest but unreasonable belief al-
lows mitigation of the charge from murder to manslaughter os-
tensibly because the malice aforethought required for murder
is absent.83
The imperfect self-defense doctrine might be criticized be-
cause it enables untruthful defendants to avoid punishment for
what amounts to murder if they credibly claim they believed
they needed to use deadly force to protect against an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily injury. The imperfect self-
defense killer, however, does not completely escape the conse-
quences of his actions since imperfect self-defense is only a
partial defense that mitigates the offense from murder to
manslaughter. Nonetheless, the doctrine is problematic be-
cause it allows unscrupulous defendants to manipulate the as-
sessment of their culpability by providing an after-the-fact jus-
tification for murder. For example, many people believed the
entitled to instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-
defense"); State v. Irby, 439 S.E.2d 226, 230-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (setting
forth the definitions of "perfect" and "imperfect" self-defense); Commonwealth
v. Tilley, 595 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa. 1991) (providing for "unreasonable belief" vol-
untary manslaughter pursuant to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503(b)); Semaire v.
State, 612 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (setting forth the requisites
for justifiable use of force); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 21, § 5.7, at 649
(discussing elements of self-defense).
82. DRESSLER, supra note 24, § 18.04, at 207. The doctrine is called
"imperfect" self-defense in contrast to "perfect" self-defense because the de-
fendant's belief need not be both honest and reasonable; it need only be honest
for the defendant to receive the mitigation from murder to manslaughter. See
Christian S., 872 P.2d at 575. In some jurisdictions, such as Michigan, the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense does not turn on the honesty of the defen-
dant's belief, but applies if the defendant would have had the right to use
force in self-defense if he had not been the initial aggressor. People v. Deason,
384 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
83. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 575. In fact, however, malice aforethought
is most likely present in cases where the defendant uses deadly force in the
honest belief that such force is necessary to defend against an imminent at-
tack. Malice aforethought is a legal term of art that is satisfied by the pres-
ence of an intent to kill, an intent to commit serious bodily injury (in some ju-
risdictions), or gross recklessness and extreme indifference to the value of
human life. DRESSLER, supra note 24, § 31.02[B][2], at 468. A defendant who
shoots another in the belief that the other was about to attack him usually
intends to kill or at least seriously injure his presumed attacker. Because of
this, the absence of malice aforethought justification for the imperfect self-
defense doctrine (as well as for perfect self-defense) is at least confusing and
perhaps even misguided.
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Menendez brothers manufactured an after-the-fact abuse de-
fense. The brothers' claim that they were sexually and physi-
cally abused by their father did not surface until right before
their first trial.
8 4
The Menendez brothers' case highlights the profound con-
sequences of an imperfect self-defense instruction. At the first
trial, Judge Stanley Weisberg refused to give a jury instruction
on perfect self-defense on the ground that it was not reasonable
for the defendants to have believed they were in imminent
danger from their parents at the time of the shooting, but al-
lowed an instruction on imperfect self-defense.8" Both juries
deadlocked when some jurors accepted the brothers' claims of
imperfect self-defense and voted for manslaughter convictions
while other jurors rejected these claims and voted for murder;
Judge Weisberg declared mistrials in both cases.86 At the
brothers' retrial, Judge Weisberg ruled that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support a jury instruction on imperfect self-
defense.87  Subsequently, the brothers were found guilty of
first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without pa-
role.88
While both the Model Penal Code approach to self-defense
and the imperfect self-defense doctrine may provide some
positive improvement on traditional self-defense doctrine, nei-
ther adequately addresses problems of ambiguity with the rea-
sonableness determination. What constitutes a reasonable be-
lief in the need to use self-defense and who the reasonable
person is remains undefined. It is unclear to jurors whether
they can rely on assumptions about members of the victim's
racial group to support a finding that the defendant's fear of
the victim was reasonable because the jury instructions on self-
84. See supra note 52 (stating that the delay in offering an abuse defense
"created great skepticism").
85. Alan Abrahamson, Menendezes' Self-Defense Claim Hurt, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 1993, at Bl.
86. Alan Abrahamson, Mistrial Declared in Case Against Erik Menendez,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1994, at Al; Norma Meyer, Second Menendez Case Is a
Mistrial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al.
87. Martin Berg, Defense Claim in Menendez Much Debated, L.A. DAILY
J., Feb. 22, 1996, at 1; Ann W. O'Neill, Judge Deals Blow to Defense in Me-
nendez Case, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1996, at Bl.
88. Martin Berg, Brothers Face Tough Odds in Any Appeal, L.A. DAILY J.,
Mar. 21, 1996, at 1; Martin Berg, After 2 Trials, Brothers Get Life in Prison,
L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 18, 1996, at 1.
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defense do not address this issue.89 If jurors are influenced by
racial stereotypes to find that the defendant acted reasonably,
the Model Penal Code's reckless or negligent offense solution
and the imperfect self-defense doctrine's mitigation from mur-
der to manslaughter will not be utilized. Moreover, both the
Model Penal Code approach and the imperfect self-defense doc-
trine, like traditional perfect self-defense doctrine, ignore the
significant distinction between beliefs and acts encompassed in
self-defense jurisprudence.
II. RACE AND REASONABLENESS
This Part examines ways in which racial stereotypes about
the defendant or victim may influence legal decisionmaking.
Traditionally, scholars and people in general equated the
terms "stereotypes" and "prejudice." ° Recently, scholars have
began to distinguish the two concepts. Under the current view,
"stereotypes" constitute well-learned sets of associations
among groups that result in automatic, gut-level responses."
Stereotypes are correlational constructs, reflected in state-
ments such as "Blacks are athletic," "Hawaiians are friendly,"
'Women are emotional."92  Stereotypes correlate membership
in a particular group (e.g., Blacks, Hawaiians, women) with
particular traits (e.g., athleticism, friendliness, emotional-
ism).3
89. Sagawa, supra note 12, at 257 (noting that the objective reasonable
man test "does not determine clearly whether Goetz's fear of attack by Black
male teenagers is a characteristic of the reasonable man").
90. See Armour, supra note 2, at 738 (noting the longstanding tradition of
equating stereotypes and prejudice); Krieger, supra note 63, at 1187 (noting
that, until the 1970s, stereotypes were understood as rationalizations of
prejudice). Even Gordon Allport, one of the leading social psychologists of the
Twentieth Century defined both terms by referring to beliefs. Allport defined
the term "stereotype" as "an exaggerated belief associated with a category"
and defined the term "prejudice" as an attitude of favor or disfavor related to
an over-generalized (and therefore erroneous) belief. GORDON W. ALLPORT,
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 6-7, 191 (1979) (emphasis added).
91. Armour, supra note 2, at 741. Stereotyping is simply a form of cate-
gorization engaged in by all people, not just prejudiced ones. Krieger, supra
note 63, at 1187-88.
92. Krieger, supra note 63, at 1195.
93. Stereotypes represent a phenomenon called an "illusory correlation"
when they reflect a correlation between two things which, in reality, (1) are
not correlated; (2) are correlated to a lesser extent than reported; or (3) are
correlated in the opposite direction from that which is reported. Id.
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"Prejudice," in contrast, is defined as one's set of personal
beliefs which may or may not be congruent with the stereotypes
one has learned. 94 A person may be either a "high-prejudiced"
or a "low-prejudiced" individual. These terms of art regarding
degrees of prejudice are defined in relation to stereotypes. If
one's personal beliefs about a particular group of people are
congruent with the stereotypes about that group, one is consid-
ered "high-prejudiced."95 If one's personal beliefs about a par-
ticular group of people are not necessarily congruent with the
stereotypes about that group, one is considered "low-preju-
diced."96
Recognizing the distinction between stereotypes and
prejudice is useful because doing so reveals the possibility of
disassociating one's automatic stereotype-congruent responses
from one's controlled personal beliefs.97 Making racial stereo-
types salient in criminal trials through limiting jury instruc-
tions may encourage low-prejudiced jurors (i.e., jurors whose
personal beliefs are inconsistent with the stereotype at issue)
to decide cases in accordance with their egalitarian-congruent
personal beliefs rather than their stereotype-congruent re-
sponses. 98
In self-defense cases, racial stereotypes about either the
defendant or the victim can influence the reasonableness de-
termination in different ways. For example, we all tend to as-
sociate certain characteristics with particular racial groups. If
the defendant or victim belongs to a racial group whose mem-
bers are perceived as dangerous or violent criminals, jurors
may perceive ambiguous actions of the actor to be more hostile
or violent than they actually are. Additionally, we tend to em-
phasize the positive attributes of others who are perceived to
94. Armour, supra note 2, at 742.
95. Id.
96. Id. It is theoretically possible that a person's beliefs might be incon-
gruent with the stereotypes, and that the term "low-prejudiced" would not be
an appropriate label to describe that person. For example, it is possible
(though not probable) that a person could believe all Blacks are lousy athletes.
Even though this belief is not congruent with the stereotype that Blacks are
good athletes, calling the person "low-prejudiced" is inappropriate. The per-
son is prejudiced in a manner inconsistent with the stereotype. Given the
pervasiveness of stereotypical images which are reproduced in the media and
in everyday conversations, the likelihood of someone actually believing that
all Blacks are lousy athletes is small. Nonetheless, the hypothetical reveals a
problem in the definition.
97. See id. (describing disassociation model).
98. Id.
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be more like ourselves while focusing on the negative traits in
people we perceive to be different from us.9 In general, people
tend to value those who are like them, or perceived to be like
them, more than others who are perceived to be different. 0
For instance, if the victim belongs to a racial group whose
members are associated with foreignness or immigrant status,
jurors may subconsciously minimize the harm suffered by the
victim and may be more willing to view the defendant's use of
force as reasonable than they would otherwise.
Fact finding is a difficult task, even when race is not an is-
sue. First-hand observation is no guarantee that people will
reach the same conclusion about the observed events.'0' In
criminal cases, jurors do not observe the alleged criminal con-
duct first hand. Instead, they learn the facts through eye-
witness testimony and other circumstantial evidence. Factual
disagreement results from the different lenses through which
we view the world. One's interpretation of the facts is influ-
enced by one's background and experience. Recent research on
cognitive theory suggests that "decision-makers actively con-
struct representations of the trial evidence based on their prior
expectations about what constitutes an adequate explanation
of the litigated event .... [T]hese representations, rather than
the original 'raw' evidence, form the basis of the jurors' final
decision." 02
When race is a consideration, fact finding can be even
more difficult. Race, to a large extent, is a product of social
construction. 0 3  Our thoughts and beliefs about race are
99. See generally Krieger, supra note 63.
100. Id.
101. In a University of San Diego undergraduate class on research meth-
ods in political science, political science professor Michael Pfau conducted the
following experiment to demonstrate that reasonable people do not always
agree on the facts. First, Pfau turned out the lights. Next, he approached a
closed door, looked around cautiously as if checking to see that no one was
around, took something from his pocket, then tried several times to open an
apparently locked door before finally opening it. Pfau asked his students to
report what they saw. One student said she saw a would-be burglar trying to
break into a house. Another said she saw a drunk person having difficulty
opening the door to his home. Yet another said she saw a person opening a
door.
102. Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J.
405, 462 (1995).
103. A variety of different conceptions of "race" have been espoused. Bi-
ologists have used the term "race" to distinguish groups of human beings by
referring to differences in physical traits, such as skin color, hair, and facial
features. See Roy L. Brooks, Race As an Under-Inclusive and Over-Inclusive
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shaped by social influences and personal experiences. To say
that race is socially constructed, though, is "not to say that race
is a useless idea in talking about American society or respond-
ing to social needs."0 4 In self-defense cases involving defen-
dants or victims of color, race or, to be more precise, racial
stereotypes, may influence our assessment of whether the de-
fendant's use of force against the victim was reasonable. This
Part selectively examines only a few of the numerous stereo-
types about Blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos, those which
might directly or indirectly influence juror determinations of
reasonableness in self-defense cases.
The existence of the Black-as-criminal stereotype, dis-
cussed in Part H.A, is supported by social science studies
showing that people tend to view the behavior of Blacks as
more hostile or aggressive than the same behavior conducted
by Whites. Actual cases also illustrate the pervasiveness of
Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POLY REP. 9, 10-11 n.10 (1994) (citing ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BLACK AMERICA 711 (W. Augustus Low & Virgil A. Clift eds.,
1981)) (discussing biological, political, and sociological definitions of race); see
also Ian Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994)
(noting that the most widely accepted view of race is "biological race," i.e., the
view "that there exist natural, physical divisions among humans that are he-
reditary"). "The biological definition of race is imprecise, however, because an
individual may have some characteristics (e.g., skin color) that place her in
one racial group, and other features (e.g., eye color and hair texture) that
place her in another racial group." Brooks, supra, at 11 n.10. Even a biologi-
cal conception of race that refers to invisible physical traits, such as genes,
rather than outwardly visible physical traits, is problematic because "patterns
of variation in skin color are independent of those found in other genes." Id.
Sociologists, like biologists, traditionally define race "by the phenotypical dif-
ferences-differences in facial features, skin color, hair, and so on-between
human, social, or more precisely, ethnic groups." Id. at 10.
Recently, legal and other academics have challenged biological and socio-
logical conceptions of race, asserting that race is a product of social construc-
tion, not genetics. Ian Haney-Lopez explains, "Race must be viewed as a social
construction. That is, human interaction rather than natural differentiation
must be seen as the source and continued basis for racial categorization."
Haney-Lopez, supra, at 27; see also HANEY-LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 9-19, 111-
53 (examining the social and legal origins of White racial identity); MICHAEL
OMI & HOwARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 55 (2d ed. 1994) (defining race as a "complex of social
meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle").
Trying to define race is not within the scope of this Article and has been
done better by others. Therefore, I do not attempt to carve out a theory of
race here. For purposes of this Article, I ascribe to the view that race, at least
in part, is socially constructed.
104. Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits
of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 307 (1995).
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this stereotype. The Bernhard Goetz case is used to illustrate
how the Black-as-criminal stereotype may have influenced one
jury to return a verdict of acquittal in a racially charged case
involving a White defendant who claimed he shot at four Black
victims in self-defense.
With respect to stereotypes about Asian Americans and
Latino/as, there is a striking paucity of social science research
on the existence of such stereotypes and the influence such
stereotypes might have on jurors. Just as race-based legal
scholarship focuses on the Black-White paradigm to the exclu-
sion of other non-Black minorities, the social science research
also largely ignores Asian American and Latino/a interests. To
fill the void, Parts II.B and I1.C draw upon actual cases to il-
lustrate how stereotypes about Asian Americans and Latino/as
might influence juror perceptions of reasonableness in self-
defense cases.
A. THE BLACK-As-CRIMINAL STEREOTYPE
Despite the abolition of slavery, passage of the Civil Rights
Act, and other positive changes in the law following the Civil
Rights Movement, many African Americans today still suffer
from discrimination based on race.10 5 Over time, as society has
publicly denounced racism, overt racial prejudice appears to
have declined." 6 Negative stereotypes of African Americans,
105. Socioeconomic disparity between Blacks and Whites is as pronounced
today as it was in the 1970s. ROY L. BROOKs, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?
A STRATEGY FOR RAcIAL EQUALITY (forthcoming 1996).
106. Overt racial prejudice may appear to have declined because racism
has become more covert or subtle. See Erick L. Hill & Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Nul-
lification Instructions and Juror Guilt Ratings: An Examination of Modern
Racism, 16 CONTEMP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 6, 6 (1992) (noting that legal and politi-
cal changes in the 1960s which made overt displays of racism unlawful and
immoral have led to what a number of researchers call an era of "respectable
racism" or "subtle racism," in which racist tendencies are only expressed in
situations which are ambiguous enough to allow for non-racist interpreta-
tions). On the other hand, there may be less racial prejudice today than there
was 40 years ago. Jody Armour states:
This view of prejudice as inevitable and ubiquitous, however, does not
square with the survey literature on racial attitudes indicating that
prejudice has been declining steadily over the past 40 years ....
[According to one series of reports on attitudes of White Americans
toward Black Americans,] 'there has been a continuous increase in
the percent of whites who favor equal treatment for blacks in all ar-
eas of American society' since 1942.
Armour, supra note 2, at 739; cf T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in
Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 329
(1992) (arguing that race discrimination remains a "serious problem" in
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however, still persist. One of the stereotypes most often ap-
plied to African American males is that they are more danger-
ous, more prone to violence, and more likely to be criminals or
gang members than other members of society.107 Adeno Addis
has aptly observed that crime has "become a metaphor to de-
scribe young black men. 1 8 Although the Black-as-criminal
stereotype is mostly a gendered concept that applies to Black
men, Black women have also suffered from the perception that
they are untrustworthy, criminal, or dangerous.
10 9
American society, a fact that must be recognized in constitutional adjudica-
tion).
107. See Adeno Addis, 'Hell Man, They Did Invent Us":" The Mass Media,
Law, and African Americans, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 523, 555 (1993) ("The image of
young black males conveyed by the mainstream media is one associated with'
drugs, crime, and violence."); Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REV.
2253, 2263 (1993) (noting that "quite often the media, especially television,
uses the picture of young black men to illustrate a point about the pervasive-
ness of crime and drug abuse in the society"); Aleinikoff, supra note 106, at
332 (noting that a 1990 survey of 1,372 U.S. households, conducted by Tom W.
Smith at the University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center, found
that more than 50% of the Whites surveyed thought Blacks were "less intelli-
gent, less hard-working, more violence-prone, and less patriotic than
[W]hites"); Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1301, 1335-39 (1995) (urging criminal defense attorneys to refrain from using
racialized narratives of Black deviance and defiance in defense of their Black
clients because of the potential degradation of the Black community from the
use of such narratives); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black
Crime, White Fears--On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503,
512 (1994) (noting that Blacks are often depicted as "violent muggers and
burglars"); Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic
Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67
TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1992 nn.40 & 42 (1993) (noting that fostering broadcast
media diversity "may be essential to dismantling this country's stereotypes,
such as that 'Black men are criminals,' especially since the media frequently
reports the color of crime suspects only when they are Black"); Johnson, supra
note 1, at 1751 (noting that often the image of African Americans is "more
violent and more criminal than Whites"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race,
and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1948 (1993) ("[O]ur society views
race as an important, if not determinative, factor in identifying criminals.");
see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in Ameri-
can Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1262-67 (1992) (describing other stereotypical images
of the African American throughout American history).
108. Addis, Recycling in Hell, supra note 107, at 2263.
109. Taunya Banks, a Black woman law professor at the University of
Maryland, recounts the following incident:
One Saturday afternoon I entered an elevator in a luxury con-
dominium in downtown Philadelphia with four other Black women
law professors. We were leaving the apartment of another Black
woman law professor. The elevator was large and spacious. A few
floors later, the door opened and a White woman in her late fifties
peered in, let out a muffled cry of surprise, stepped back and let the
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The Black-as-criminal stereotype may cause people to per-
ceive ambiguously hostile acts (i.e., acts that can be perceived
as either violent or nonviolent) as violent when a Black person
door close without getting on. Several floors later the elevator
stopped again, and the doors opened to reveal yet another White
middle-aged woman, who also decided not to get on.
Following the first incident we looked at each other somewhat
puzzled. After the second incident we laughed in disbelief belatedly,
belatedly realizing that the two women seemed afraid to get on an
elevator in a luxury condominium with five well-dressed Black
women in their thirties and forties. Our laughter, the nervous laugh
Blacks often express when faced with the blatant or unconscious ra-
cism of White America, masked our shock and hurt.
The elevator incident is yet another reminder that no matter how
well-educated, well-dressed, or financially secure, we are Black first
and thus still undesirable 'others" to too many White Americans. It
reminds me that no matter what my accomplishments, I am still per-
ceived as less than equal-and even dangerous!
Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law
Professor, 6 BERKELEYWOMEN'S L.J. 46, 49-50 (1990-1991) (emphasis added).
Patricia Williams, a Black woman law professor at Columbia University,
recounts a similar experience:
Buzzers are big in New York City. Favored particularly by
smaller stores and boutiques, merchants throughout the city have in-
stalled them as screening devices to reduce the incidence of robbery.
When the buzzer sounds, if the face at the door looks "desirable," the
door is unlocked. If the face is that of an "undesirable," the door
stays locked. Predictably, the issue of undesirability has revealed it-
self to be primarily a racial determination. Although the buzzer sys-
tem was controversial at first, even civil rights organizations have
backed down in the face of arguments that the system is a "necessary
evil," that it is a "mere inconvenience" compared to the risks of being
murdered, that discrimination is not as bad as assault, and that in
any event, it is not all blacks who are barred, just "17-year-old black
males wearing running shoes and hooded sweatshirts."
Two Saturdays before Christmas, I saw a sweater that I wanted
to purchase for my mother. I pressed my brown face to the store
window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance. A narrow-
eyed white youth who looked barely seventeen, wearing tennis
sneakers and feasting on bubble gum, glared at me, evaluating me for
signs that would pit me against the limits of his social understanding.
After about five seconds, he mouthed, "We're closed," and blew pink
rubber at me. It was one o'clock in the afternoon. There were several
white people in the store who appeared to be shopping for things for
their mothers.
... [That salesperson's] refusal to let me into the store was an
outward manifestation of his never having let someone like me into
the realm of his reality. He had no connection, no compassion, no
remorse, no reference to me, and no desire to acknowledge me even
at the estranged level of arms' length transactor. He saw me only as
one who would take his money and therefore could not conceive that I
was there to give him money.
Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Finger-
pointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 127-28
(1987) (emphasis added).
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engages in these acts and non-violent when a non-Black person
engages in the same acts."' Birt Duncan tested this hypothe-
sis on 104 White undergraduate students at the University of
California at Irvine."' Subjects observed two people involved
in a heated argument which resulted in one shoving the
other."2 Just after the shove, the subjects were asked to rate
the behavior of the person who shoved the other person. 13 The
subjects were randomly assigned to one of four experimental
conditions: Black shover/White victim, White shover/Black vic-
tim, Black shover/Black victim, and White shover/White vic-
tim. 114
Duncan found that when the person shoving was a Black
person and the person being shoved was White, 75% of the
110. People of all races seem to be influenced by the Black-as-criminal
stereotype. Black taxicab drivers, for example, often refuse to pick up Black
men. African American attorney Gilbert Gordon relates an all too common
experience:
In the year 1990, ifI hail a cab, particularly after six o'clock, there's a
good chance the cabbie's going to be concerned that I want to take
him in [sic] a black area and he doesn't want to go there. I don't have
the duty to explain, "Im not like those kind of people you're thinking
about." Im a lawyer. I have money. Why should I bare my soul?
He's just a guy trying to make a living and rm just a guy trying to get
home, and we ought to have something in common. But he's not go-
ing to give me that chance. If he sees somebody white standing on
the corner, he'll go to him. Even a black cabdriver will do that.
Fear's the big thing.
Jami Floyd, The Other Box: Intersectionality and the O.J. Simpson Trial, 6
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 241, 253 n.39 (1995) (emphasis added) (quoting RACE:
How BLACKS AND WHITES THINK AND FEEL ABOUT THE AMERICAN OBSESSION
301 (Studs Terkel ed., 1992)); see also Armour, supra note 12, at 816 (recounting
a similar experience). But cf Loren Page Ambinder, Note, Dispelling the
Myth of Rationality: Racial Discrimination in Taxicab Service and the Effi-
cacy of Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 342, 365
(1996) (pointing out that many of the minority cabdrivers in Washington, D.C.
and New York City are not African Americans, but ethnic immigrants who
may not identify with the African American struggle).
Fear of black crime is so pervasive that the Reverend Jesse Jackson, a
leader in the African American community, has acknowledged, "There is
nothing more painful to me at this stage in my life than to walk down the
street and hear footsteps and start thinking about robbery... [tjhen look
around and see somebody white and feel relieved." Mary A. Johnson, Crime:
New Frontier-Jesse Jackson Calls It Top Civil-Rights Issue, Cmi. SUN-TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 4.
111. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of In-
tergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limit of Stereotyping of Blacks, 4 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 590, 592 (1976).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 593.
114. Id.
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subjects thought the shove constituted "violent" behavior, while
only 6% characterized the shove as "playing around."'15 When
subjects observed the same events with a White person as the
shover and a Black person as the victim, only 17% character-
ized the White person's shove as "violent," while 42% described
the White person's shove as "playing around.""l6 Duncan con-
cluded that the threshold for labeling an act as violent was
significantly lower when subjects viewed a Black person com-
mitting the act than when subjects viewed a White person
committing the same act.'
In 1980, H. Andrew Sagar and Janet Ward Schofield con-
ducted a similar study, testing whether Black as well as White
children perceive ambiguously aggressive behavior by Blacks
as more violent or aggressive than similar behavior by
Whites."18 Sagar and Schofield, expanding on Duncan's study
which only tested reactions to ambiguously hostile behavior,
also examined whether clearly non-aggressive behavior by
Blacks also triggered the Black-as-violent stereotype.1 19 They
found that both Black and White children tended to rate rela-
tively innocuous behavior by Blacks as more threatening than
similar behavior by Whites. 20
These studies suggest that stereotypes about Blacks as
violent or dangerous people influence perception and judgment.
As Birt Duncan observed,
If this finding is so readily available for college subjects, its gener-
alizability to other subject populations can be expected to be even
more dramatic. One may be tempted to ask, in the real world where
violence is a fact of life, have Blacks been the victims of mislabeling
or errors in cases where there was a "reasonable doubt" (i.e., low per-
ceptual threshold acts)?' 21
One example of how the Black-as-criminal stereotype can
influence perception and judgment occurred recently in San
Francisco, California. On August 23, 1995, Louis Waldron, a
22-year-old Black college student, was involved in an alterca-
tion with Patrick Hourican, a 33-year-old White Irish Ameri-
115. Id. at 595.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 596.
118. H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral
Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive
Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 592-93 (1980).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 596.
121. Duncan, supra note 111, at 597.
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can construction worker, stemming from Hourican's refusal to
pay for damage he caused to Waldron's car." Hourican had
ridden his bicycle past Waldron's car and knocked off the side
view mirror. 23 Waldron chased after Hourican. 24 When Wal-
dron caught up with Hourican, Hourican punched Waldron and
then left. 125 Ten minutes later, Waldron caught up with Houri-
can again and demanded money for the mirror.126 According to
Waldron, Hourican used a racial epithet against Waldron and
refused to pay for the mirror he broke. 127  Waldron then
punched Hourican in the face. 128 Hourican fell, hit his head on
the pavement, and died two days later.129 Former San Fran-
cisco District Attorney Arlo Smith charged Waldron, who had
never before been arrested or convicted of a crime, with first-
degree murder.130
The first-degree murder charge seemed excessive in light
of the fact that the decedent Hourican initiated the confronta-
tion by knocking the side mirror off Waldron's car and throw-
ing the first punch. Many believed race-specifically, the fact
that Waldron was Black and Hourican was White-influenced
the charging decision.' 3 ' John Runfola, Waldron's attorney,
commented, "If the person who died in this case-and who had
28 misdemeanors and three felony contacts with police-had
been African American, and if the person who punched him
was [W]hite, I'm not sure that person would have been charged
at all." 2 The racial nature of the Waldron case was high-
122. Charges Reduced in Deadly Fight of a Single Punch, S.D. UNION
TRIB., Feb. 3, 1996, at A3 [hereinafter Charges Reduced]; Richard Cole, Fatal
S.F. Dispute Reflects Racial and Political Divisions, S.D. UNION TRIB., Jan.
29, 1996, at A3; Nina Schuyler, Hallinan Gets High Marks for Decision in
High-Profile Case, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 4.
123. Cole, supra note 122, at A3.
124. Schuyler, supra note 122, at 4.
125. Id. A passenger in Waldron's car jumped out and stole Hourican's
bike. Id.
126. Id.
127. Cole, supra note 122, at A3.
128. Schuyler, supra note 122, at 4.
129. Cole, supra note 122, at A3.
130. Charges Reduced, supra note 122, at A3. Then Mayor Frank Jordan,
of Irish descent and campaigning against Willie Brown, an African American
politician who is the current Mayor of San Francisco, pleaded for witnesses
against Waldron to step forward. Cole, supra note 122, at A3.
131. Schuyler, supra note 122, at 4.
132. Cole, supra note 122, at A3. In February 1996, Terence Hallinan, who
replaced Arlo Smith as San Francisco's District Attorney, asked Judge David
Allen to reduce the first-degree murder charge filed against Waldron to invol-
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lighted by the fact that just two months before Hourican's
death, a man died after he was punched once outside a popular
bar in San Francisco.133 Both the person who threw the punch
and the victim were White, and the White man who threw the
punch was never charged.
134
The Black-as-criminal stereotype is so deeply entrenched
in American culture that false claims of Black criminality are
made and, in many cases, readily believed. In 1989, Carol Stu-
art, who was seven months pregnant at the time, was shot and
killed in an inner-city neighborhood of Boston, Massachu-
setts. "'35 Carol's husband, Charles Stuart, told police that a
Black man had abducted them at gunpoint, robbed the couple,
and then shot Carol in the head and Charles in the abdomen.' 36
Police arrested William Bennett, a Black man who had spent
most of his life in trouble with the law and had served two
terms in prison for threatening and shooting police officers. 37
untary manslaughter. Id. In July 1996, Waldron agreed to plead guilty to in-
voluntary manslaughter. Plea Bargain in Manslaughter, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 19, 1996, at A4. In exchange, prosecutors agreed to drop two charges of
felony assault with a deadly weapon. Id.
133. Cole, supra note 122, at A3; Seth Rosenfeld & Dennis J. Opatrny, 2
Deaths Clouded by Race, Ties to Police, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 15, 1995, at Al.
134. Rosenfeld & Opatrny, supra note 133, at Al.
135. Killing of Pregnant Woman Stirs Outrage, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1989,
at A20.
136. Id. Carol Stuart died that night after her son, Christopher, was de-
livered prematurely by Cesarean section. Boston Mourns Pregnant Woman
Killed by Robber, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989, at A25. The baby died two weeks
later. Massachusetts: Baby Born to Victim of Shooting Dies, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1989, at A27. More than one hundred police officers went to the inner-city
neighborhood where the shooting had occurred and randomly searched young
Black men, looking for the gun used to shoot the Stuarts. Karen Tumulty,
Wife Killing Puts Boston in Worst Racial Crisis in Years, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10,
1990, at Al. During the four days following the shooting, it was estimated
there were more than 150 stop-and-frisk searches in the neighborhood each
day. Jim Naughton, The Murder That Ravaged Boston: Revelations About the
Stuart Deaths Leave the City Awash in Recriminations, WASH. POST, Jan. 8,
1990, at B1. Black men throughout the city complained of public strip
searches and repeated interrogations by police. Id. "I got stopped three times
one night just walking from here to my apartment," said a clerk at an expen-
sive hotel. Id. "We [Black men] were all suspects." Id.
137. Tumulty, supra note 136, at Al. "Several witnesses testified against
Bennett before a specially-convened grand jury." Naughton, supra note 136,
at B1. One person claimed to have seen Bennett carrying a gun and jewelry
in the area where the shooting took place on the night of October 23rd. Id.
Another said Bennett had admitted to the shooting. Id. It was not until po-
lice pulled from the river a gun with registration numbers matching a pistol
reportedly stolen from the shop where Charles Stuart worked that Stuares
brother Matthew came forward and confessed that he had played a part in
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Later, Charles Stuart admitted to a family member that he
killed his wife for the insurance money; Stuart then committed
suicide."'
Charles Stuart's false claim that a Black man murdered
his wife is not the only case of its kind.139 In 1992, Jesse An-
derson claimed two Black men attacked his wife by stabbing
her in the face and neck.14 ° Anderson was later convicted of
first-degree murder.41' In 1994, Susan Smith told police that a
Black man took her car at gunpoint and kidnapped her two
young boys.' Smith later confessed to pushing her car into a
lake and watching it sink with her two young children
strapped inside, and was convicted of first-degree murder.
143
Social cognition theorists would explain the willingness of
many Americans to accept Charles Stuart's, Jesse Anderson's,
and Susan Smith's claims that a Black man committed the
violent criminal acts they themselves committed as a natural
function of the human need to categorize in order to make
sense of experience. 144 Stuart, Anderson, and Smith, con-
sciously or subconsciously, relied on the Black-as-criminal
Carol Stuart's death. Id. Matthew told police that Charles killed his preg-
nant wife and Matthew helped him get rid of the murder weapon. Id.
138. Massachusetts: Pistol in Pregnant Wife's Death Sought, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1990, at A3. The Stuart case illustrates the deep-rooted nature of the
"Black-as-criminal" stereotype. The police and the public were quick to be-
lieve Charles Stuart's claim that a Black man shot his wife. JOE R. FEAGIN &
HERNAN VERA, WRITE RAcIsM 62-70 (1995) ("Charles Stuart counted on the
strong presumption among powerful whites that a white businessperson
would be telling the truth in his account of a black male attacking a white
woman, even though his story was full of obvious inconsistencies."). Had the
police been a bit more skeptical of Stuart's story, they might have discovered
earlier that Stuart had taken out several large life insurance policies on his
wife, had previously plotted with his brother to kill his wife, and had been
having an affair with another woman, giving Stuart plenty of motivation to
kill his wife. Tumulty, supra note 136, at Al.
139. For additional examples of false claims of Black criminality, see
Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71
IND. L.J. 593, 596-99 (1996).
140. Isabel Wilkerson, Police Charge Man Who Said Blacks Stabbed Wife,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1992, at A14.
141. Wisconsin Man Gets Life for Killing Wife in Fake Attack, Cm1. TRIB.
(Evening Update), Sept. 29, 1992, at 2.
142. Eric Harrison, S. Carolina Case of Deceptions Also a Case of Percep-
tions: A Mother's Tale of Carjacker Is Now Seen as Another Example of Vilify-
ing Black Men, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1994, at A27.
143. Life Term Given Mother Who Drowned 2 Sons, L.A. TIMEs, July 30,
1995, at A6.
144. See Krieger, supra note 63, at 1187-88 (describing work of social cog-
nition psychologists).
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stereotype when they falsely accused Black men of committing
these crimes. At some level, Stuart, Anderson, and Smith
knew that others would be most likely to believe their false
claims if they attributed their crimes to Black men.
To justify the fear of Blacks as criminals, many people
point to statistics which show that Blacks are arrested and
convicted of crime far more often than Whites. In 1990, the
Sentencing Project published a report entitled Young Black
Men and the Criminal Justice System: A Growing National
Problem.'45 The report found that on any given day in 1989,
23% of Black men between the ages of twenty to twenty-nine
were in prison, on probation or parole, or in some way con-
nected with the criminal justice system. 4 6 Five years later, the
Sentencing Project updated its study, reporting that "as of
1994, 30.2% of African American males in the age group 20-29
were under criminal justice control-prison, jail, probation, or
parole-on any given day."4 '
While these statistics appear at first glance to provide
support for some people's conclusion that it is reasonable to
fear all Black men because there is a one-in-three chance that
any given Black man is a criminal, and thus violent and dan-
gerous, an accurate reading of the report casts doubt on such a
proposition. According to the Sentencing Project, "The typical
African American male in the criminal justice system is not a
violent offender."'48 The large number of African American
males connected with the criminal justice system is largely due
to the "War on Drugs" and increased law enforcement of drug
crimes. 149 Moreover, the statistics only show that 30% of Black
men in their 20s are connected with the criminal justice sys-
145. MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM (1990).
146. Id. at 2-3.
147. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG
BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIvE YEARS LATER 3
(1995). A report issued by the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice indi-
cates that statistics in California are even worse. According to a recent study,
39% of California's African American men in their 20s were in prison, jail, or
on probation in 1995. Greg Krikorian, Study Questions Justice System's Ra-
cial Fairness, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at Al.
148. MAUER & HULING, supra note 147, at 14 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 9; see also David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protec-
tion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1289-90 (1995) (discussing the disparate impact
of severe crack cocaine penalties on Black crack offenders versus White pow-
der cocaine offenders).
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tem, presumably a much smaller population than 30% of all
Black men.
The Sentencing Project also reports that contrary to com-
mon expectations, "the majority of arrestees for violent offenses
are white."5 ' The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR) for 1993 confirms this. According to the
1993 UCR, 52.6% of arrestees for violent crime were White,
while only 45.7% were Black.'51 In 1994, the percentage of
White arrestees for violent crime went up to 53.4% and the
percentage of Black arrestees for violent crime declined to
44.7%.152 Given that Whites constitute 82.9% of the population
in the United States,153 it is not surprising that Whites would
constitute a majority of those arrested for violent crimes. The
fact that Blacks constitute approximately 12% of the popula-
tion,'54 but almost half of those arrested for violent crimes
(44.7%), is disturbingly disproportionate. Some people might
interpret such statistics as supporting the view that it is rea-
sonable to fear Blacks because they constitute a disproportion-
ate number of violent crime arrestees. This view, however, at-
tributes the criminality of some Blacks to the entire Black
population. When the total number of Blacks arrested for vio-
lent offenses is compared to the total number of Blacks in
America, only a small percentage of the Black population are
arrested for violent crimes. In 1991, for example, Blacks ar-
rested for violent crimes comprised less than 1% of the total
Black population and less than 1.7% of the Black male popula-
tion.'55 In 1994, Blacks arrested for violent crime still com-
150. MAUER & HULING, supra note 147, at 14 (emphasis added); see also
Delgado, supra note 107, at 547 (noting that more human lives are lost each
year due to corporate action as opposed to street crime).
151. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 235 (1993) [hereinafter
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].
152. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 235 (1994).
153. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (1995) [hereinafter STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT].
154. Id.
155. Armour, supra note 12, at 791 (citing ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A
PRIVILEGED CLASS 94 (1993)). Ellis Cose explains:
It is true, as Koch indicates, that blacks account for about 45 percent
of those arrested for America's violent crimes. But it is not true that
most black males are vicious. FBI statistics show that blacks were
arrested 245,437 times in 1991 for murder, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault. The country's total population then was just un-
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prised less than 1% of the total Black population and only
1.86% of the total Black male population.
1 56
It is not reasonable to attribute the criminality of a few
Blacks to the entire Black population or even the entire Black
male population. The illogic of the statistical argument in
support of the Black-as-criminal stereotype becomes apparent
if one considers using a similar argument to support an all-
men-are-criminal stereotype:
According to the FBI Uniform Crime Report, in 1990, men, re-
gardless of age, were arrested for violent crimes at levels that
dwarfed the numbers for women. Men twenty-five to thirty-four
der 249 million, including nearly 31 million blacks and roughly 15
million black males. If we assume that each arrest represents the
apprehension of a separate individual, blacks arrested for violent
crimes made up less than I percent of the black population in 1991-
and just under 1.7 percent of the black male population (less, in fact,
since the aggregate figure of 245,437 includes crimes committed by
females). In other words, less than one-tenth of a percent of the
population-not 6 percent-is committing 45 percent of violent
crimes.
COSE, supra, at 94 (emphasis in original); see also Erika L. Johnson, "A Men-
ace to Society": The Use of Criminal Profiles and Its Effects on Black Males,
38 How. L.J. 629, 634 (1995) (pointing out that Blacks arrested for street
crimes constitute only a small fraction of the Black population; approximately
97.9% of the national population of Blacks are not arrested for criminal activ-
ity).
156. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 288,133 Blacks
were arrested for violent crimes in 1994. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra
note 151, at 235. According to the Bureau of the Census, the total Black
population in the United States in 1994 was 32,672,000, and the total Black
male population was 15,491,000. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 153, at
21. 288,133 divided by 32,672,000 equals .00881895 (or .88%). 288,133 di-
vided by 15,491,000 equals .0186 (or 1.86%).
Racial discrimination by police officers in choosing whom to arrest may
exaggerate the differences between Blacks and Whites arrested for violent
crimes. Armour, supra note 12, at 792 (citing Developments in the Law-Race
and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1473, 1508 (1988)). Many schol-
ars, however, have concluded that differences in racial patterns of offending
constitute the principal reason why Blacks are arrested in greater numbers
than Whites. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 3 (1995) (discussing the interaction between race
and crime). These scholars believe that racial bias by police officers and other
government officials is not the major factor leading to disproportionate arrest
patterns. Id.
The race of the defendant may also influence the judges who sentence of-
fenders. A computer analysis of all 1992 and 1993 federal court convictions
found that Black defendants on average receive sentences 10% longer than
similarly situated White defendants. Laura Frank, Equal Crime, but Not
Equal Time, THE TENNESSEAN, Sept. 24, 1995, at IA. In some federal dis-
tricts, Black defendants' sentences were up to 40% longer than similarly situ-
ated White defendants. Id.
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years old were seven times as likely as women in the same age
bracket to be arrested for murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggra-
vated assault. Those from thirty-five to forty-four were seven to
eight times as likely to land in jail, and those over sixty-five were
nearly fifteen times as likely.
If one applies [the argument that it is reasonable to fear Blacks
over Whites because Blacks are arrested for violent crimes at rates
greater than Whites] to those statistics, one would expect discrimi-.
nation against men to be much more prevalent than discrimination
against women. One would expect that until such time as the male
crime rate is made to equal the female crime rate, society would treat
men as objects of fear and horror.
To state the argument in these terms is to suggest exactly how
ridiculous it is. Yet it is the kind of absurd argument that extremely
intelligent people make with perfectly straight faces when discussing
the treatment of blacks. And it feeds on the oft-unstated assumption
that blacks are still on probation-that unlike white men, who are
demonstrably more dangerous than white women (and even more
dangerous than black women), blacks are not necessarily granted a
presumption of innocence, competence, or even complete humanity.
57
Ultimately, the use of statistics is problematic because
statistics can be manipulated either to support or refute the
claim that it is reasonable to fear Blacks. While it is more
common to hear the statistical argument in support of the
claim that it is reasonable to fear a Black person, a statistical
argument can also be made that it is unreasonable to fear a
Black person. Which statistical argument is more persuasive
may depend more on the reader's own biases than on the ac-
tual validity of the statistical argument. This is because indi-
viduals often "credit only those statistics and images which
confirm their preexisting biases." 58
According to government statistics, a White person is more
than four times as likely to be killed by another White person
than by a Black person. 59 These statistics might be inter-
preted to support the argument that it is more reasonable for a
White person to fear being killed by another White person than
157. COSE, supra note 155, at 72.
158. Armour, supra note 12, at 791.
159. In 1993, 4,686 Whites were convicted of murdering White victims
while only 849 Blacks were convicted of murdering White victims. UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS, supra note 151, at 17 (Table 2.8 - Victim/Offender Relation-
ship by Race and Sex, 1993 [Single Victim/Single Offender]). About 80% of all
crimes of violence occur among persons of the same race. Randall Kennedy,
The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARv.
L. REV. 1255, 1255 n.2 (1994).
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to fear being killed by a Black person. The "more than four
times as likely" statistic, however, does not separate out homi-
cides between people who know one another, arising out of do-
mestic violence, love triangles, business deals gone bad, and
other unfortunate situations, from stranger-on-stranger homi-
cides. Such separation may be necessary before one can draw
any inferences either for or against the argument. Addition-
ally, the use of statistics to support or refute claims of reason-
ableness in self-defense cases involving Black male victims is
of little help because people in situations of perceived danger
often do not act in reliance on statistics, but instead respond to
deeply ingrained racial stereotypes.
The fear of Black-on-White violence is reinforced by inci-
dents such as the Reginald Denny beating in which several
Black men pulled a White truck driver from his truck and bru-
tally beat him during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. 6° It is im-
portant, however, to keep in mind that hate crimes are not just
Black-on-White incidents. Ellis Cose reminds us that when
hate crimes occur, it is more often Whites who attack Blacks
(and other minorities) than Blacks who attack Whites:
In 1992, the FBI published its first tabulation ever of "hate crime of-
fenses," covering cases of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, simple as-
sault, intimidation, and vandalism, as reported by local law enforce-
ment agencies for 1991. In instances where the perpetrator's race
was recorded, 65 percent of assailants were believed to be white, 29
percent to be black, and less than 3 percent to belong to "multiracial"
groups. Conversely, of those thought to be targeted because of race,
57 percent were black and 30 percent were white. In other words
(calculating from statistics that are admittedly flawed since many lo-
calities did not keep good records, and adjusting for the fact that the
white population is almost seven times the size of the black popula-
tion), any particular black person is thirteen times more likely to be
the victim of a so-called bias crime than any particular white per-
son. 161
Despite these statistics, the fear of Black criminality is so
pervasive that many well-intentioned people empathize with
the White woman who crosses the street when she sees a Black
man coming her way even if she were to continue walking on
the same side of the street if the man were White,' 62 and the
160. Ellis Cose, Racism Is Its Own Crime: Blaming Entire Race for the
Sins of a Few, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 2, 1994, at 1J.
161. COSE, supra note 155, at 108-09.
162. Suzanna Sherry expresses this sentiment in the following response:
[Aleinikofis] description of the young black man who felt resentful
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taxi driver who passes up the Black man waiting for a ride and
picks up the White man on the next block. 163 Having concern
for one's physical safety does not mean one is a bad person.'
64
What drives many to empathize with the woman who crosses
the street and the taxi driver who refuses to pick up Black pas-
sengers may be bias in perception resulting from racial stereo-
types such as the Black-as-criminal stereotype. Similar racial
filtering might cause some individuals to use deadly force on
non-culpable Black persons when they would not react simi-
larly to non-Black persons.
Without trivializing the stigma that comes from being re-
peatedly snubbed, it is important to recognize the difference
between attempting to avoid perceived danger by crossing the
street and using deadly force to kill someone. The rationality
or accuracy of the factual judgment may be the same in both
situations, but the social consequences or costs of error in the
when a white woman with a baby crossed the street to avoid him
naturally invites a comparison: he fears for his emotional well-being,
but she fears for her physical safety. I, at least, would rather be
snubbed than raped.
Suzanna Sherry, The Forgotten Victims, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 375 (1992)
(emphasis added). Implicit in the emphasized statement is the belief that a
Black man would rape. The Black-as-criminal stereotype persuades Sherry
and others to view the hypothetical rape as a virtual certainty. This is not to
criticize women who take precautions when walking alone, but Sherry has
made a leap by equating the fact of being snubbed with the possibility of being
raped.
163. Jody Armour recounts his own experience in this regard:
Two years ago, I attended a meeting in Washington, D.C., for the
American Association of Law Schools. After a series of meetings that
ran into the evening, I tried to hail a cab to return to my hotel. Al-
though several of my white colleagues were picked up immediately, I
nearly got tennis elbow trying to flag down a taxi. I eventually had to
prevail upon one of my white colleagues to hail a cab for me. It came
as no surprise, therefore, when I later learned that a lawsuit had
been filed against three D.C. cab companies for refusing to stop for
blacks.
When I related my experience to colleagues and students, I found
that many felt deep ambivalence about the issue: On the one hand,
they understood my frustration, but, on the other, they (and 1) also
felt sympathy for the cabdrivers, many of whom live in constant fear
of violence.
Armour, supra note 12, at 816 (emphasis added).
164. I do not use the word "racist" here because of its confusing meanings.
Many people think of racism as bigotry and racists as people who believe they
are better than others because of their race. Traditional views of racism rely
on the assumption that racial bias must be conscious and intentional. Today,
social cognition theorists recognize that people can be racially biased without
consciousness or intent. Krieger, supra note 63, at 1188 ("Stereotypes... op-
erate beyond [the] reach of the decisionmaker['s] self-awareness.").
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two situations are strikingly different. 6 5 This difference sug-
gests the importance of examining whether racial stereotypes
influence jurors to find reasonableness in self-defense cases.
The Bernhard Goetz case is a useful vehicle to explore this
question.
On December 22, 1984, at about 1:00 p.m., Troy Canty,
Darryl Cabey, James Ramseur, and Barry Allen, four Black
youths, boarded an express subway train in the Bronx. 66 The
four youths rode together in the rear portion of one of the cars
of the train.1 6  Bernhard Goetz, a White man, boarded the
same car a little later and sat down on a bench near the rear
section. 6 8 Goetz was carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol
loaded with five rounds of ammunition and concealed in a
waistband holster.' 69
Canty, accompanied by Allen, approached Goetz and said,
"Give me five dollars."170 Neither Canty nor any of the other
youths displayed a weapon. 17 ' Goetz responded by standing
165. In his forthcoming book, Jody Armour uses the example of a pet-
owner chaining his pet Rottweiler to a tree in a fenced-in backyard. In the
first situation, pet-owner's wife asks pet-owner whether the dog is chained.
Pet-owner personally hooked the chain to the dog's collar three hours earlier
and responds affirmatively. If pet-owner's claim that the dog is chained is in-
correct, the consequences of error are insubstantial. "[Ilf [the dog] is not still
chained, he will roam the backyard all night, strategically squirting urine on
lawn chairs and fixtures in service of his territorial instincts. It takes fifteen
minutes the following morning for me to retrace his steps and hose down all
that he has marked-a chore I do not relish but cannot honestly characterize
as more than an inconvenience." JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND
REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 63
(forthcoming 1997) (draft on file with author). In the second situation, the
pet-owner's sister's one-year-old infant wants to play in an area of the back-
yard beyond the reach of the chain. If sister asks pet-owner whether Rott-
weiler is chained, it would not be reasonable for pet-owner to claim (without
checking) that the dog is chained even though the statistical risk of error in
pet-owner's factual judgment that the dog is chained, i.e., the accuracy of his
factual judgment about the dog, is the same in both situations. What is dif-
ferent is that the costs of error in the second situation (the life of pet-owner's
niece) far exceed the costs of error in the first (minor inconvenience). Id. at
63-64.
166. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986); FLETCHER, supra note
59, at 1-3.
167. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Although none of the youths displayed any weapons at this time, the
two youths who did not ask Goetz for money, Ramseur and Cabey, did have
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up, pulling out his handgun, and firing it rapidly at the four
youths."2 Noticing that Cabey seemed to be unhurt, Goetz
walked up to him and said, "You seem to be all right, here's
another," then fired his last bullet at Cabey173 This last bullet
severed Cabey's spinal cord, paralyzing him permanently. 74
Later, Goetz would admit, "[I]f I had had more [bullets], I
would have shot them again, and again, and again."17 5
After the shooting, Goetz fled. 7 6 Interestingly, while flight
is usually considered evidence of guilt,7 7 Goetz's flight did not
seem to affect his popularity with a large segment of the
American people. Complete strangers called Goetz a subway
hero, an average man-on-the-street citizen who had coura-
geously stood up to the bad guys. 78 Goetz was reconstructed as
screwdrivers inside their coats which they said were to be used to break into
the coin boxes of video machines. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 44.
174. Id.; Subway Shooting Suspect Agrees to Return to N.Y., L.A. TIMEs,
Jan. 2, 1985, at A2 (noting that Cabey was paralyzed from the waist down)
[hereinafter Subway Shooting].
175. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44.
176. LILLIAN B. RUBIN, QUIET RAGE: BERNIE GOETZ IN A TIME OF MADNEsS
101 (1986).
177. As an intuitive matter, many people feel that flight is evidence of
guilt. Commentators criticized prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson case for not
presenting evidence of the Bronco chase in which Simpson appeared to be
fleeing from justice. See, e.g., Michael D. Harris, DA Discusses Decisions in
Simpson Case, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 12, 1995, at 1. At a news conference follow-
ing the verdict, District Attorney, Gil Garcetti, fielded questions about why
the prosecution did not present evidence of Simpson's flight, especially in light
of the fact that thousands of dollars, a passport, and a disguise were found in
Simpson's Ford Bronco; Garcetti claimed the evidence was ambiguous and did
not necessarily indicate flight. Id. In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621
(1991), a case involving a Black youth suspected of criminal activity when he
ran upon seeing police officers, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, echoed
the sentiment that flight is evidence of guilt by suggesting that flight might
provide a police officer with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot:
That it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men
who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-
evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense. See
Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee when no man pursueth."). We do not
decide that point here, but rely entirely upon the State's concession
[that Officer Pertoso did not have the "reasonable suspicion" required
to justify stopping Hodari].
Id. at 623 n.1. Flight from police does not necessarily indicate guilt. See
Maclin, supra note 9, at 276 (discussing alternative reasons why a Black man
might flee from police, such as not wanting to drop his pants in public or not
wanting to be roughed up by the police).
178. Bob Greene, N.Y. Subway Attack Speaks for Nation, CmH. TRIB., Jan.
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the true victim while the four Black youths were constructed as
menacing criminals who had threatened Goetz. 17 9
On December 31, 1984, Goetz surrendered himself to the
police. 8 ° Goetz admitted that when he shot at the youths, he
was certain none of them had a gun, but claimed he could tell
from the smile on one of the youth's faces that the youths
wanted to "play with me."18 Goetz admitted that he intended
to kill the youths, telling police:
When I saw what they intended for me, my intention was worse than
shooting. My intention was to do anything I could do to hurt them.
My intention... I know this sounds horrible, but my intention was to
murder them, to hurt them, to make them suffer as much as possi-
ble.'8
2
At his trial for assault, attempted murder, reckless endan-
germent and illegal possession of a weapon, Goetz claimed he
acted in self-defense.'83 The jury found Goetz not guilty on all
8, 1995, § 5, at 1 ("New York's police set up a telephone hotline so that citizens
could provide tips about the shooter's identity; instead, the phone line was
flooded with citizens praising [Goetz], even saying that he should run for
mayor."); Subway Shooting, supra note 174, at A2 (noting that one graffiti
artist scrawled, "Power to the Vigilante! N.Y. Loves Ya!" on a wall).
179. None of Goetz's victims displayed a weapon either before or during
the incident. FLETCHER, supra note 59, at 3. George Fletcher observes that
the press and the public's willingness to accept a rumor of "sharpened screw-
drivers" reflected widespread support for Goetz. Id. It also reflected the ease
with which the Black-as-criminal stereotype influences what people are will-
ing to believe. Fletcher explains:
The Times reported the day after the shooting that two of the victims
were found with screwdrivers in their jackets. There was no sugges-
tion that they were "sharpened." Somehow, however, the story got
abroad that the screwdrivers were sharpened weapons rather than
merely tools for opening sealed metal boxes. On the "Donahue" show,
a week after the event, the discussion was of "sharpened" screwdriv-
ers. In an article in the Times surveying the first week's events, the
writer reports the supposed fact: "three of the youths were found to
be carrying sharpened screwdrivers." Some journalists resist[ed] the
popular rumor that the screwdrivers were specially prepared weap-
ons of assault. On the whole, however, the press and the public
want[ed] to believe the worst about the subway victims.
Id.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Joseph R. Tybor, Message of Fear: Goetz's Acquittal Reflects American
Beliefs, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1987, § 4, at 1. Goetz also admitted that he had
been illegally carrying a gun. FLETCHER, supra note 59, at 3.
182. Tybor, supra note 181, at 1.
183. MARK LESLY, SUBWAY GUNMAN: A JURoR's AccouNT OF THE
BERNHARD GOETZ TRIAL at vii-ix, 34 (1988) (providing language of the consoli-
dated indictments numbers 476 and 1914 of 1985 of the State and County of
New York and noting Goetz's claim of self-defense).
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of the charges except illegal possession of a weapon."'
As a textbook criminal law hypothetical, Goetz's self-
defense claim should have been rejected for several reasons.
First, under New York law, a defendant is justified in using de-
fensive physical force only if he honestly and reasonably be-
lieved two things: (1) that his assailant was attacking or was
about to attack him (i.e., an attack was imminent), and (2) that
the use of physical force was necessary to defend himself.18 5
Even though Goetz may have subjectively feared an attack,
and even if his fear seemed reasonable to him, a strong argu-
ment can be made that it was not objectively reasonable for
Goetz to believe that he was under threat of imminent death or
great bodily harm. Neither of the two youths who approached
Goetz displayed a weapon, and neither made any menacing
movement suggesting an imminent physical attack. An even
stronger argument can be made that it was not necessary for
Goetz to shoot at the youths to defend himself. Goetz could
have chosen less violent means of resolving the conflict. He
could have said "No" to the youths' demand for money. He also
could have moved to another section of the subway car-
perhaps even another car altogether. Goetz might have given
the youths something less than the five dollars they requested.
Or, Goetz could have warned the youths not to bother him by
showing them his gun (not shooting it), and then he could have
walked away. Instead, Goetz's immediate response was to fire
upon the youths, endangering the lives of the youths and eve-
ryone else in that subway car.
Second, Goetz's use of a loaded gun was not proportionate
to the threatened harm. Goetz admitted that he was certain
that none of the youths had a gun, yet he chose to shoot them.
Under New York law, deadly force is not an appropriate re-
sponse unless the defendant reasonably believes that such
deadly force is necessary to defend himself from the imminent
use of deadly physical force against him and that he cannot re-
treat. 18 6 Here, Goetz's use of deadly force was inappropriate
because Goetz was responding to a verbal request for five dol-
lars, a request unaccompanied by any show of force, movement,
or other indication of an imminent unlawful deadly attack.
Goetz admitted that he knew none of the youths had a gun.
184. Id. at xiii.
185. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEWYORK § 35.15(2)(a) (1989).
186. Id. § 35.00, at 848.
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Therefore, he could not have reasonably believed it was neces-
sary to use deadly force to protect against deadly force.
Third, one who does not reasonably believe that he is being
attacked, but strikes first anyway, is the initial aggressor and
loses all right to avail himself of the self-defense doctrine un-
less he withdraws from the encounter and effectively commu-
nicates his withdrawal to the other person.87 If Goetz did not
reasonably believe he was being attacked, his use of a loaded
gun in response to a request for five dollars made him the ini-
tial aggressor. As an aggressor, Goetz did not have the right to
use deadly force in self-defense.
Finally, Goetz admitted his intent was to murder the
youths, to hurt them, and make them suffer as much as possi-
ble. Far from constituting self-defense, Goetz's act of shooting
the youths with the intent to kill them fits the textbook defini-
tion of attempted murder.
Some who commented on the Goetz case believed race was
not a significant factor leading to the verdict. 88 Yet, whether
the jurors were conscious of it or not, race probably influenced
the jury's perception of whether Goetz acted reasonably."89 Re-
187. Id. at 846.
188. For example, George Fletcher, a law professor who observed the Goetz
trial, commented:
As the prosecution of Bernhard Goetz unfolded, it became clear to me
that this was a case in which the theory of criminal law was indis-
pensable to a proper understanding of what was going on. For many,
the pending trial of Bernhard Goetz loomed as a struggle between
black and white, between crime victims and the law-enforcement es-
tablishment. For me, the trial presented itself rather as a gripping
realization of moral and theoretical questions that have long been on
my agenda.
FLETCHER, supra note 59, at ix-x (emphasis added); see also LESLY, supra note
183, at xvii-xviii (explaining that his purpose in writing a book about the Go-
etz trial was to explain why race was not a factor in the jury's decision).
It appears that Fletcher has modified his views on this subject since
writing A Crime of Self-Defense. See Sam Roberts, Exploring Laws and the
Legacy of the Goetz Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1989, at B1 (noting that in his
book, Fletcher seemed to believe race did not influence Goetz, but now
Fletcher believes race was important); Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense,
Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1179, 1199 (1989) (book
review) (noting that Fletcher, in interviews since the publication of his book
on the Goetz case, has suggested he is now more inclined to believe race was a
factor motivating public reaction to the case).
189. Joshua Dressler notes, "[RIacism was probably a factor in the 'subway
vigilante case,' People v. Goetz, in which the jury acquitted the defendant, a
white man, of attempted murder of four black teenagers because the man
feared they were about to rob him when one or two of them requested five
dollars from him on a subway." Dressler, supra note 36, at 759.
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consider the reasonableness of Goetz's actions in a hypothetical
with a Black Goetz and four White youths on an elevator.
Patricia Williams illustrates the difference race can make in
the following race-switching vignette:
A lone black man was riding in an elevator in a busy downtown de-
partment store. The elevator stopped on the third floor, and a crowd
of noisy white high school students got on. The black man took out a
gun, shot as many of them as he could, before the doors opened on
the first floor and the rest fled for their lives. The black man later
explained to the police that he could tell from the "body language" of
the students, from their "shiny eyes and big smiles," that they
wanted to "play with him, like a cat plays with a mouse." Further-
more, the black man explained, one of the youths had tried to pan-
handle money from him and another asked him "how are you?"....
His intention, he confessed, was to murder the high school stu-
dents. " '
Few people would find that the Black man in Professor
Williams's vignette acted reasonably even though the facts of
this vignette, with minor alterations, were excerpted from Go-
etz's videotaped confession.19' Few people would rush to the
Black man's defense and call him a "hero" for shooting the
White youths, yet Goetz was viewed as a hero for trying to kill
four Black youths who asked him for money. 19 2
Williams's race-switching vignette might be criticized for
not mirroring precisely the circumstances of the Goetz case. It
is not clear that crime occurs as often on elevators in busy
downtown department stores as it does on the New York sub-
way. An elevator ride is likely to be shorter than any subway
ride between subway stops, and thus it might be more reason-
able for a person on a subway than for one on an elevator to
190. PATRICIAWILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 76 (1991).
191. Id.
192. Stephen Carter points out:
The public knew the skin colors of everyone involved. If one knows in
advance that black people tend to be transgressors and white people
tend to be victims, it is fairly simple to sort out who's who once the
participants are identified by race. The short of it is that the story of
the subway car as perceived by Mr. Goetz's public--the choice of
transgressor, the choice of victim--might have been starkly different
had Mr. Goetz been black and the others white, and had Mr. Goetz
cried "self-defense" while the others insisted that when he pulled the
gun, they had been minding their own business. For in that event, a
public with no real knowledge of the facts other than the stories told
by the participants and the skin colors of the shooter and his victims
would not have raced at once to Mr. Goetz's defense. But his victims
happened to be black, and the rush was on.
Carter, supra note 10, at 425-26 (emphasis added).
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believe there is no other recourse but to use deadly force in
self-defense. Nonetheless, race-switching, especially if the only
facts that are modified are the races of the parties, can be a
useful vehicle to test whether racial stereotypes have influ-
enced one's assumptions about a given case.
The interesting thing about the Goetz case is that race was
never explicitly mentioned during the trial. Perhaps if the ra-
cial nature of the case had been made salient during the trial,
the jury might have come to a different conclusion.193 Instead,
Barry Slotnick, Goetz's attorney, appealed to the Black-as-
criminal stereotype in a subtle, almost covert, manner. In his
opening statement, Slotnick referred to the victims as
"savages," "predators," "vultures," and the "gang of four," 94
conjuring up images of gang members preying on society. Ad-
ditionally, Slotnick cleverly played the race card when he re-
created the subway shooting using four young Black men from
the Guardian Angels to play the victims.
The covert appeal to racial bias came out most dramatically in the re-
creation of the shooting, played out while Joseph Quirk was testify-
ing. The defendant called in four props to stand in for the four vic-
tims Canty, Allen, Ramseur, and Cabey. The nominal purpose of the
demonstration was to show the way in which each bullet entered the
body of each victim. The defense's real purpose, however, was to re-
create for the jury, as dramatically as possible, the scene that Goetz
encountered when four young black passengers began to surround
him. For that reason Barry Slotnick asked the Guardian Angels to
send him the four young black men to act as the props in the demon-
stration. In came the four young black Guardian Angels, fit and
muscular, dressed in T-shirts, to play the parts of the four victims in
a courtroom minidrama. 195
193. See Armour, supra note 2, at 765-66 (discussing the impact of racial
prejudice).
194. See FLETCHER, supra note 59, at 102 (noting that Goetz's attorney
used racial stereotypes to Goetz's advantage).
195. Id. at 206-07. Similar appeals to the Black-as-criminal stereotype
were made during the first Rodney King trial in which four White police offi-
cers were acquitted of assaulting a Black man even though the prosecution
had a videotape of the brutal beating. Sheri Lynn Johnson points out that
even though Officer Koon did not explicitly refer to race, his characterizations
of King "resonate[d] with images of black people as criminal." Johnson, supra
note 1, at 1747. For example, Koon testified that King was "very buffed out"
or muscular, and that he thought this meant King was an ex-con. Id. Koon
further testified that he attributed King's unusual strength and insensitivity
to pain to the use of the illegal drug PCP. Id.
Just as Barry Slotnick referred to the four Black victims as "savages,"
"predators," and "vultures," Officer Koon also referred to Rodney King as
animal-like or subhuman. He testified that King "gave out a bear-like yell,"
[Vol. 81:367422
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In the Goetz case, the jury instructions, which did not
mention race or racial stereotypes, did not reduce the chances
that the race of the victims might prejudice the jurors in Go-
etz's favor.1 96 If the jurors were inclined to perceive the actions
of the four Black youths as hostile or violent, at least in part
because the youths were Black, they were allowed to rely on
these stereotype-driven feelings. If the jurors were inclined to
empathize more with Goetz than his victims because of racial
affinity, the jury instructions did nothing to discourage such
racially selective empathy.1 97
Additionally, the jury instructions did not clearly distin-
guish between beliefs that are reasonable and conduct that is
reasonable. 98 The jurors may have imagined themselves in
Goetz's situation and felt that they too would have been afraid
of four Black youths asking them for five dollars. Apprehen-
sion of some speculative future bodily harm, however, is not
sufficient to acquit a defendant on self-defense grounds. Both
the defendant's beliefs and actions must have been reasonable.
B. THE ASIAN-As-FOREIGNER AND OTHER STEREOTYPES
Most discussions on the subject of race and the American
criminal justice system have focused on the Black-White
paradigm. 199 Such focus may be justified because of the history
of slavery and the current discrimination practiced against
and "groaned like a wounded animal." Id. at 1753. Officer Powell typed a
computer message shortly before the beating in which he described an earlier
incident involving Blacks as "right out of 'Gorillas in the Mist.'" Id. Officer
Powell denied that he saw Rodney King as a non-human, but when the prose-
cutor asked, "He wasn't an animal, was he?" Powell responded, "No, just act-
ing like one.'" Id.; see also Patricia Williams, The Rules of the Game, in
READING RODNEY KING, supra note 39, at 51, 53 (reminding us of the
"repeated descriptions of Rodney King as a bear, and of his groans as bear-
like").
196. CRJMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEW YORK, § 35.15(2)(a) (1989).
197. The Goetz jury was composed of ten Whites and two Blacks. Otto
Friedrich, "Not Guilty," TIME, June 29, 1987, at 10. Even though there were
two Black jurors on the case, this fact alone could not guarantee fair consid-
eration of the facts. Some legal scholars believe at least three jurors of the
same race as the defendant are needed to ensure a fair trial. See, e.g., John-
son, supra note 9, at 1698 (discussing the impact of the jury's racial composi-
tion). Others have noted that internalized racism may cause some African
Americans to devalue Black lives--either those of others or their own. Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 694 (1995).
198. See supra notes 185-87 (citing relevant New York jury instructions).
199. Chang, supra note 4, at 1265.
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Blacks in this country."0 Nonetheless, because of this focus,
issues concerning other non-Whites tend to be overlooked.20 '
This is unfortunate because other non-Whites are also subject
to socially constructed notions about race.
1. The Asian-as-Model-Minority
The ways in which Asian Americans have been socially
constructed in American society are contradictory. While ra-
cial representations of Blacks are largely negative,20 2 Asian
Americans have been racially represented in conflicting ways.
For example, Asian Americans appear to benefit from the
model minority stereotype that seems to have become the pre-
dominant image in the 1990s. Under the Asian-as-model-
minority stereotype, Asian Americans are perceived as smart,
hard-working, law-abiding, and respectful of authority.20 3 This
200. See COSE, supra note 155 (describing incidents in which Blacks suffer
discrimination); Addis, Recycling in Hell, supra note 107, at 2256-57 nn.ll-13
(listing studies on racial discrimination against Blacks); Ian Ayres, Fair Driv-
ing: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 817, 897 (1991) (offering empirical evidence that retail car dealerships
consistently offer substantially better prices on identical cars to White men
than they do to Black men, Black women, and White women).
201. Chang, supra note 4, at 1267; see also Neil Gotanda, Asian American
Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1095-96 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed.,
1992) (observing that Asian Americans, unlike African Americans, are gen-
erally viewed as foreigners rather than American citizens); Gotanda, supra
note 15, at 1188 (noting that traditional discrimination issues focus on
Blacks); Perea, supra note 15, at 990 (concluding that "Latinos are made in-
visible and foreign... in several contexts: in the reporting of significant ra-
cial events, in the bookstores, in the historical conception of America as a
white and English-speaking nation, and in the operation of the 'national ori-
gin' concept . . . despite [their] longtime presence, substance, and citizen-
ship").
202. In this Article, I discuss only one of the negative images of Blacks in
American society-that of the African American as a violent, dangerous
criminal. Other negative stereotypes include the notion that Blacks are men-
tally inferior, lazy, and sub-human. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 107,
at 1261-67 (describing other stereotypical images of the African American
throughout American history); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1750-60 (discussing
racial imagery in the courtroom). "Positive" images of Blacks (e.g., Blacks as
good dancers, athletes, and musicians) are demeaning to the extent that they
imply that Blacks are competent only in these limited ways.
203. See Pat K Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their
Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 24 (1994) ("'Model minority' conveys the
belief that Asian Americans, through their hard work, intelligence, and em-
phasis on education and achievement have been successful in American soci-
ety."); Cho, supra note 7, at 4 ("Model minority mythology hails Asian Ameri-
cans as examples of success who have advanced because of putative cultural
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stereotype may have operated to benefit a Korean American
woman store owner who shot and killed a fifteen-year-old Afri-
can American girl, claimed she acted in self-defense, and was
placed on probation, serving no jail time.
On March 16, 1991, Soon Ja Du, a Korean American
woman who owned and operated a liquor store in Los Angeles
with her husband, shot and killed Latasha Harlins, a fifteen-
year-old African American girl, after a dispute over a bottle of
orange juice.2  Harlins had entered the store, gone to the sec-
tion where the orange juice was shelved, selected a bottle of or-
ange juice, and placed it in her backpack. °5 Harlins then ap-
proached the counter with two dollars visible in her hand.20 6
The bottle of orange juice, which cost only $1.79, was also par-
tially visible from the backpack.2 7 Du confronted Harlins and
accused her of trying to steal the orange juice. After a verbal
(Du called Harlins a "bitch)20 and physical (Du pulled on
Harlins sweater and Harlins hit Du in the eye twice with her
fist) altercation,2 9 Harlins put the orange juice on the counter.
As Harlins turned to leave, Du reached under the counter and
pulled out a .38 caliber revolver.210 Du then shot Harlins in
the back of the head from a distance of about three feet, killing
Harlins instantly.21' At trial, Du claimed she shot Harlins in
self-defense.21
2
Although Du was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter,
which indicates that the jury rejected her claim of self-defense,
the sentencing judge imposed an extraordinarily lenient sen-
traits such as diligence, thriftiness, and self sufficiency."). Of course, not all
Asian Americans are smart, hard-working, and respectful of authority, which
is why the "model minority stereotype" has been called "the model minority
myth." Asian Americans are hardly a homogenous group. The group called
Asian Americans includes Americans of Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino de-
scent who have been in the United States for generations, as well as recent
immigrants from Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand.
204. People v. Superior Court (Soon Ja Du), 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 186-87
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that Judge Karlins did not abuse her sentencing
discretion in placing defendant Soon Ja Du on probation).
205. Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself: Deconstruct-
ing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL.
L. REV. 15, 88 n.364 (1993) (citing Soon Ja Du, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179-80).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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tence. By using a firearm in the commission of a crime, Du
was presumptively ineligible for probation under California
Penal Code section 1203(e)(2).213 Nonetheless, Judge Joyce
Karlin suspended execution of Du's prison sentence and placed
Du on probation for five years without imposing any jail time
as a condition of probation. Professor Neil Gotanda has aptly
observed that Judge Karln's sentencing colloquy suggests
Karlin relied on positive stereotypes about Korean Americans
and negative stereotypes about Blacks in deciding Du's sen-
tence." 4 Judge Karlin described Du as a dutiful mother who
was tending the store that day "to shield her son from repeated
robberies."215 In contrast, Judge Karlin portrayed Latasha
Harlins, the victim, as a criminal associated with gangs and
gang theft.216 Notably, Judge Karlin ignored several positive
facts about Harlins. As the Court of Appeals noted:
The probation report also reveals that Latasha had suffered many
painful experiences during her life, including the violent death of her
mother. Latasha lived with her extended family (her grandmother,
younger brother and sister, aunt, uncle and niece) in what the proba-
tion officer described as "a clean, attractively furnished three-
bedroom apartment" in South Central Los Angeles. Latasha had
been an honor student at Bret Hart Junior High School, from which
she had graduated the previous spring. Although she was making
only average grades in high school, she had promised that she would
bring her grades up to her former standard. Latasha was involved in
activities at a youth center as an assistant cheerleader, a member of
the drill team and a summer junior camp counselor. She was a good
athlete and an active church member.217
The Soon Ja Du case illustrates how the model minority
stereotype can benefit some Asian Americans. What is often
overlooked, however, is the fact that the positive attributes of
the model minority stereotype (e.g., intelligent, hard-working,
law-abiding) are linked with corresponding negative attributes
(e.g., lacking personality, unfairly competitive, clannish, un-
willing to assimilate, rigidly rule-bound). Frank Wu observes:
In the [model minority] stereotype, every positive element is matched
to a negative counterpart. To be intelligent is to lack personality. To
be hard-working is to be unfairly competitive. To be family-oriented
213. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(e)(2) (West 1988).
214. Neil Gotanda, Re-Producing the Model Minority Stereotype: Judge
Joyce Karlin's Sentencing Colloquy in People v. Soon Ja Du, in REVIEWING
ASIAN AMERIcA: LOcATNG DIVERSITY 87 (Wendy L. Ng et al. eds., 1995).
215. Id. at 89.
216. Id.
217. People v. Superior Court (Soon Ja Du), 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 184 n.7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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is to be clannish, "too ethnic," and unwilling to assimilate. To be law-
abiding is to be rigidly rule-bound, tied to traditions in the homeland,
unappreciative of democracy and free expression.
218
In times of economic uncertainty, resentment against
Asian Americans seems to increase, perhaps because of the
perception that "model" Asian Americans take away valuable
job opportunities from other Americans.219 Reactions to the
218. Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Af-
firmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 240-41 (1995) (emphasis
added).
219. See Chang, supra note 4, at 1253 ("Violence stems from, and is caus-
ally related to, anti-Asian feelings that arise during times of economic hard-
ship and the resurgence of nativism."); Jerry Kang, Note, Racial Violence
Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1935 (1993) ("[T]he mis-
perception that Asian Americans steal valuable employment opportunities
remains."). Hate crimes against Asian Americans are increasing. Anti-Asian
Violence: Oversight Hearing, Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights,
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); NATIONAL ASIAN
PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL CONSORTIUM, AUDIT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST ASIAN
PACIFIC AMERICANS: ANTI-ASIAN VIOLENCE, A NATIONAL PROBLEM 1 (1994)
(noting a 35% increase in the reported incidents of anti-Asian violence in 1994
over the number reported in 1993); K. Connie Kang, Hate Crimes Against
Asians in Southland Rose in 1995, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at A3 (noting
that reported cases of anti-Asian violence in 1995 in Southern California in-
creased nearly 80%); cf Kang, supra, at 1926-29 (noting that "Asian Ameri-
cans are frequently victimized by violent crime" and that "in cities such as
Philadelphia and Boston, Asian Americans suffer a higher per capita rate of
hate crimes than any other racial minority").
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic place this tendency to blame the
Asians in historical context:
In the middle years of the nineteenth century, Chinese were wel-
comed into the land for their labor: They were needed to operate the
mines, build railroads, and carry out other physical tasks necessary
to the country's development. The industrious immigrants soon,
however, began to surpass white American workers. They opened
small businesses, succeeded in making profitable mines that others
had abandoned. Not surprisingly, Chinese became the scapegoats for
the 1870s Depression. Unionists and writers exaggerated negative
traits thought associated with them--opium smoking, gambling-and
succeeded in having anti-Chinese legislation enacted. By 1882 public
sentiment had been mobilized sufficiently so that Congress was able
to pass an Exclusion Act, which reduced the number of Chinese in the
U.S. from 105,000 in 1880 to 65,000 in 1908.
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 107, at 1270-71.
Resentment against Asian Americans manifests itself not only in hate
crimes but also in adverse action against Asian Americans in public education.
In 1984, the University of California at Berkeley adopted an admissions policy
which raised the requisite verbal score on the SAT to 400. Grace W. Tsuang,
Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities, 98
YALE L.J. 659, 674 (1989). The new policy was not publicly announced, but
when Asian American groups noticed a sharp decline in the number of newly
enrolled Asian Americans (from 1,303 in 1983 to 1,031 in 1984-a 20.9% drop
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Los Angeles riots of 1992 following the Simi Valley jury's ac-
quittal of the four White police officers who brutally beat Afri-
can American Rodney King reflected conflicting sentiments of
sympathy for and resentment against the Korean Americans
caught up in the destruction. On the one hand, Korean Ameri-
can store owners were constructed oppositionally to African
American and Latino looters as unfortunate victims of the riots
and looting.220 On the other hand, Korean Americans were por-
trayed as property-loving, gun-toting store owners who valued
material possessions over human life.22" '
in one year), they suspected Berkeley had raised the SAT verbal score re-
quirement to limit the number of Asian immigrant admissions. Id. at 673-74.
For many Asian immigrants and first generation Asian Americans, English is
a second language. Because of this, Asian immigrant applicants on average
score lower than non-Asian immigrant applicants on the verbal portion of the
SAT. Initially, the Chancellor denied the existence of a minimum verbal
score. Id. at 674. Finally, under pressure from the Asian American commu-
nity, the Chancellor admitted that such a policy had been adopted in 1984, but
was withdrawn after a brief period. Id.
Given today's difficult job market, it is not surprising that efforts to re-
strict immigration (both legal and illegal), arising out of the perception that
Asian immigrants and other minorities are taking over the country, and ef-
forts to eliminate affirmative action have popular support. Many perceive af-
firmative action as unfairly benefiting Asian Americans who supposedly do
not need affirmative action, or as unfairly disadvantaging Asian Americans
whose enrollments are limited to accommodate other minorities. Gabriel Chin
et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of
Justice (A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action), 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
(forthcoming Feb. 1997) (manuscript at 17, on file with author).
220. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of Afri-
can American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles,"
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (1993).
221. The film "Sa-I-Gu" by Christine Choy illustrates that media images of
Korean Americans during the Los Angeles riots focused on property-
protective Korean Americans atop store rooftops with firearms and ignored
the substantial numbers of Korean Americans who were killed during the ri-
ots. For an excellent analysis of the multi-layered portrayals of Korean
Americans caught in the Los Angeles riots, see Sumi K. Cho, Korean Ameri-
cans vs. African Americans: Conflict and Construction, in READING RODNEY
KING, supra note 39, at 196.
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2. The Asian-as-Foreigner
Fear of the foreign is sometimes a black streak that runs through
America's political culture. We see instances of [this] when it involves
hate crimes, not necessarily directed at black Americans, but at for-
eign Americans.
-Mike McCurry
White House Press Secretary
222
It is almost oxymoronic to speak of foreign Americans, yet
the term "foreign American" conveys meaning-Asian Ameri-
cans and Latinos. Many Americans associate Asian Americans
with foreignness.223 The person who asks an Asian American
"Where are you from?" usually expects a response like "Japan"
(or China or Korea)-not "Texas" (or Ohio or Northern Cali-
fornia).224 This focus on the Asian in Asian American is deep-
rooted. During World War H, when the United States was at
war with Japan, hostility toward Japan was extended to all
persons of Japanese ancestry. From 1942 to 1945, Japanese
Americans were incarcerated in internment camps because of
222. John Marelius, Clinton Issues Call for Healing, S.D. UNION TRIB.,
June 11, 1996, at Al.
223. There is some basis in reality for the "Asian-as-foreigner" stereotype
since two-thirds of Asians in this country were born outside the United
States. Joseph R. Meisenheimer H, How Do Immigrants Fare in the U.S. La-
bor Market?, U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR STATIsTICs, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Dec. 1,
1992, at 4. A recent study by the UCLA Asian American Studies Center,
however, reports that Asian immigrants are just as likely as immigrants of
European ancestry to become U.S. citizens and actually have a higher rate of
naturalization than European immigrants because more naturalized Europe-
ans return to their homelands than naturalized Asians. K, Connie Kang,
Asians Lead U.S. Immigrants in Naturalization, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at
Al.
224. Pat Chew recounts the following:
When people first meet me, it is not unusual for them to com-
ment, "You speak so well, you don't have an accent," intending their
observation to be a compliment. "Where are you from?" they con-
tinue, expecting my response to be a more foreign and exotic place
than Texas or Pennsylvania.
A tall red-haired, causally dressed gentlemen that I didn't know
recently knocked on my office door. "Yes?" I greeted. "Sorry to inter-
rupt you," he stammered. "I was visiting the law school and I saw
the name on your door, and old family friends are named 'Chew,' and
I thought you might be related, but," he paused, "I can see rIm wrong.
They're American."
Chew, supra note 203, at 33.
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their Japanese heritage.225 The internment took place even
though there was no evidence that Americans of Japanese de-
scent were disloyal to the United States.226 Even though the
United States was at war with Germany and Italy, as well as
with Japan, persons of German and Italian ancestry were not
similarly incarcerated. 227
The Asian-as-foreigner stereotype is evident today, though
it has taken on more subtle forms. During the O.J. Simpson
trial, much of the racial joking in the case was directed at two
Asian Americans associated with the case.228 The Honorable
Lance Ito, the judge who presided over the trial, and criminal-
ist Dennis Fung, two Asian Americans who speak articulately
and without a noticeable accent, were portrayed as bumbling,
heavily-accented Asians who could barely speak English by
radio station disc jockeys, publishing houses, and even a
United States senator.229 During the Simpson trial, the his-
torical impulse to mock others on the basis of racial difference
was fulfilled by poking fun at the Asian Americans associated
with the trial, constructing them as Asians with heavy accents
characteristic of the Asian-as-foreigner stereotype. 230
225. Lorraine K Bannai & Dale Minami, Internment During World War H
and Litigations, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
201, at 755, 757-58.
226. Chew, supra note 203, at 37; see also Eric K Yamamoto, Korematsu
Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and
Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security
Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 12-19 (1986) (dis-
cussing lack of evidence of disloyalty to the United States by Japanese Ameri-
cans).
227. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 61, 70 n.38 (1988) ("Whereas immigrants from Germany and Italy re-
mained at liberty during the war, American citizens as well as resident aliens
of Japanese descent living on the West Coast were excluded from this area
and interned in camps in remote areas of the West."); see also Yamamoto, su-
pra note 226, at 14 (noting that Asian Americans presented no more of a
threat to national security than did "German, Italian and communistic por-
tions of the United States population").
228. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian
Americans in a Society Obsessed with O.J., 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 172
(1995).
229. Id. at 175, 181-83, 187, 191-92, 193-94, 199.
230. In 1989, similar evidence of the "Asian-as-foreigner" stereotype sur-
faced when Bruce Yamashita, a third generation Japanese American, was
subjected to racial harassment by Marine training officers at Marine Officer
Candidate School. One staff sergeant, either unaware or unwilling to accept
that Yamashita's country was the United States, told Yamashita on the first
day of school, "We don't want your kind around here-go back to your coun-
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Sometimes the Asian-as-foreigner stereotype takes on
more ominous manifestations. In 1982, Vincent Chin, a Chi-
nese American, was beaten to death with a baseball bat by
Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, two White Detroit autowork-
ers. Before killing Chin, Ebens and Nitz, illustrating the all-
too-common confusion between Chinese Americans and Japa-
nese Americans and between Asian Americans and Asian na-
tionals, called Chin a "Nip."231 They also accused Chin of con-
tributing to the loss of jobs in the automobile industry, yelling
"It's because of you little mother fuckers that we're out of
work."232 They pled guilty to manslaughter and were each sen-
tenced to three years of probation and fined $3,780.233 When
discussing the no jail time sentence that he imposed on the two
men, the judge explained, "Had it been a brutal murder, those
fellows would be in jail now."2 34 It is unclear what led the
try!" Landing on a Beach of Prejudice: Marines Admit Errors in the Outra-
geous Case of Bruce Yamashita, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1994, at B6 [hereinafter
Beach of Prejudice]; Art Pine, Marines Pin Bars on Man They Dismissed, L.A.
TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1994, at A4. Another asked Yamashita why he had not joined
the Japanese army. Beach of Prejudice, supra, at B6; Pine, supra, at A4. Ya-
mashita was routinely called "Toyota" and "Honda," names of Japanese auto-
mobile companies. Pine, supra, at A4.
231. Chin and a group of friends were at Fancy Pants, a Detroit strip bar,
celebrating Chin's upcoming marriage. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d
1422, 1427 (6th Cir. 1986). Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz were sitting di-
rectly across the elevated dance floor from Chin and his friends. Ebens made
a few racial remarks about Chin, calling him a "Nip" and making remarks
about foreign car imports. Id. The word "Nip," derived from the word
"Nippon" which means "Japan" in Japanese, is a derogatory word used to re-
fer to people of Japanese ancestry. It was used extensively during World War
II to refer to the Japanese enemy. Lee, supra note 228, at 192. Ebens then
yelled out, "Its because of you little mother fuckers that we're out of work."
Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1427. Chin got out of his chair and walked up to Ebens.
Id. A scuffle ensued and Chin, Ebens, and their friends were removed from
the bar. Id. at 1427-28. Chin challenged Ebens to finish the fight outside. Id.
at 1428. Ebens went to Nitz's car and removed a baseball bat from the hatch-
back. Id. Chin fled and Ebens and Nitz chased him. Id. Ebens and Nitz fi-
nally caught up with Chin, and Ebens struck Chin several times with the
baseball bat, causing Chin to fall to the ground. Id. Chin died four days later.
ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE U.S. SINCE
1850 at 342 (1988). Ebens remembers waking up the morning after the mur-
der feeling like a "jerk," not because he had just caused the death of another
human being, but because it was Father's Day and he was in jail, rather than
with his family. Dana Sachs, The Murderer Next Door, MOTHER JONES,
July/August 1989, at 54; "WHO KILLED VINCENT CHIN?" (a film by Renee Ta-
jima and Christine Choy).
232. Sachs, supra note 231, at 54; "WHO KILLED VINCENT CHIN?", supra
note 231.
233. Chang, supra note 4, at 1252.
234. Sachs, supra note 231, at 54.
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judge to think the baseball bat beating was not a brutal mur-
der, yet the judge was not alone in his sentiments. Friends of
Ebens and Nitz claimed the beating was just an accident,235 de-
spite the fact that witnesses reported that Ebens swung the
baseball bat at Chin's head as if he were hitting a home run,
Chin's skull was fractured in several places, and police officers
who arrived on the scene said pieces of Chin's brain were splat-
tered all over the sidewalk.236
Because of the confusion between Asian Americans and
Asian nationals, symptomatic of the Asian-as-foreigner stereo-
type, the killing of Yoshihiro Hattori, a Japanese foreign ex-
change student, by Rodney Peairs, a Louisiana homeowner
who claimed he acted in self-defense and was acquitted, has
special significance for both Asian nationals and Asian Ameri-
cans. On October 17, 1992, two sixteen-year-old high school
students, Yoshihiro Hattori and Webb Haymaker were looking
for a Halloween party in the suburbs of Baton Rouge, Louisi-
ana when they came to the home of Rodney and Bonnie Peairs
and rang the doorbell .23  The Peairs's home was decorated for
Halloween and was only a few doors away from the correct
house.2 18 Hattori was dressed as the character played by John
Travolta in "Saturday Night Fever," wearing a white tuxedo
jacket and carrying a small camera.239 No one answered the
front door, but the boys heard the clinking of window blinds
coming from the rear of the carport area.24 ° The boys walked
around the house in that direction. 241 A moment later, Bonnie
Peairs opened the door.242 Webb Haymaker started to say,
"We're here for the party."2 43 When Yoshi came around the
corner to join Webb, Mrs. Peairs slammed the door and
235. "WHO KILLED VINCENT CHIN?", supra note 231.
236. Id.
237. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1993,
at A10.
238. Japanese Youth Killed Seeking Costume Party, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 20,
1992, at A18.
239. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," supra note 237, at A10; Man
Who Shot Japanese Student Said He Was Terrified, REUTERS, LTD., Sept. 13,
1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuters File.
240. Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 509, 511 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 512.
243. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," supra note 237, at A10
(describing the encounter between Haymaker and Mrs. Peairs).
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screamed for her husband to get the gun.2" Without asking
any questions, Rodney Peairs went to the bedroom and
grabbed a laser-scoped .44 magnum Smith and Wesson, one of
a number of guns Peairs owned.245
The two boys had walked away from the house and were
on the sidewalk about ten yards from the house when Peairs
rushed out of the house and into the carport area.246 The car-
port light was on and a street light was located in front of the
house, illuminating the carport and sidewalk area.247 Hattori,
the Japanese exchange student, turned and approached Peairs,
smiling apologetically and explaining, "We're here for the
party," in heavily accented English.248 Rather than explaining
to Hattori that he had the wrong house, Peairs pointed his gun
at Hattori and shouted the word "freeze."249 Hattori, who did
not understand the English word "freeze," continued to ap-
proach Peairs.2 50  Peairs fired one shot at Hattori's chest.2 5 1
Hattori collapsed and died on the spot.2 52 The entire incident-
from the time Peairs opened the door to the time he fired his
gun at Hattori-took place in approximately three seconds.253
Peairs was charged with manslaughter.2 4 At trial, Peairs's
attorney argued that Peairs shot Hattori because he honestly
244. Id.; Telephone Interview with Richard Haymaker, Webb Haymaker's
father (Mar. 14, 1996).
245. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," supra note 237, at A10;
Feared Japanese Teen-ager, Slaying Suspect Says, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1993,
at A23 [hereinafter Feared Japanese Teen-ager]; Homeowner Testifies in Shoot-
ing Death of Japanese Exchange Student, U.P.I., May 22, 1993, at 1, available
in LExIS, News Library, UPI file [hereinafter Homeowner Testifies].
246. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," supra note 237, at A10; Gun
Crazy, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A22; see infra note 263 (noting that, fol-
lowing the shooting, Peairs told police he was sorry he ever stepped out the
door).
247. Homeowner Testifies, supra note 245, at 2.
248. Witness: Slain Japanese Student Was No Threat, REUTERS, LTD. (B.C.
Cycle), Sept. 12, 1994, at 1, available in LExIS, News Library, Wires File
[hereinafter Witness].
249. Id.
250. Feared Japanese Teen-ager, supra note 245, at A23. Hattori had re-
cently lost a contact lens and may not have seen the gun in Peairs's hand. Ac-
quittal in Doorstep Killing of Japanese Student, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1993, at
Al [hereinafter Acquittal].
251. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," supra note 237, at A10.
252. Witness, supra note 248, at 1.
253. Homeowner Testifies, supra note 245, at 1. Hattori was holding a
camera in one hand. It is unlikely that he was pointing his camera at Peairs
the way one would point a gun if one were intending to shoot it.
254. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," supra note 237, at A10.
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and reasonably believed the unarmed Hattori was about to kill
or seriously harm him. 55 The judge instructed the jury that in
order to acquit Peairs on the ground of self-defense, the jury
needed to find that Peairs reasonably believed he was in immi-
nent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm
and that the killing was necessary to save himself from that
danger. 6 After little more than three hours of deliberating,
the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.257 Spectators in the
courtroom responded to the verdict with applause.258  In con-
trast to the public's outrage at the perceived shortness of the
deliberation process in the O.J. Simpson case when jurors in
that case reached a verdict in less than four hours, there was
little if any public outrage at the three hours of deliberation
and resulting acquittal in the Peairs case.
The not guilty verdict is legally defensible in a narrow con-
text. Peairs claimed he believed Hattori was armed, and it is
conceivable that Peairs mistook the camera in Hattori's handfor a gun. 259 When Hattori failed to stop after Peairs yelled
"Freeze!" it might have been reasonable for Peairs to have be-
lieved Hattori was about to attack him--especially if one be-
lieves Peairs's testimony at trial that he said "Stop" several
times before firing (a claim disputed by Webb Haymaker).26 °
One has the right to use deadly force to protect oneself against
255. Id.
256. In Louisiana, a homicide is justifiable "[w]hen committed in self-
defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of los-
ing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to
save himself from that danger" or
[wihen committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling ... against a
person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwell-
ig... or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling... and
the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that the use
of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the in-
truder to leave the premises.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:20(1), 14:20(4) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
257. Rogers Worthington, Guest's Death Sends LSU Professor on Mission,
THE NEW ORLEANs TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Sept. 25, 1994, at A20.
258. George Yoshinaga, Applauding a Killer? It Defies Decency, L-A.
TIMES, June 14, 1993, at B12; Teresa Watanabe, Japanese Angered by U.S.
Acquittal of Student's Killer, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A4.
259. Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 509, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1995). This argu-
ment, however, is undermined by the fact that Peairs admitted in his civil
trial testimony that he did not see a gun, knife, stick, or club in Hattori's
hand. Id. It appears that this fact did not come out at the criminal trial.
260. See Worthington, supra note 257, at A20 (suggesting that Peairs
changed his story to claim that he, in fact, yelled "Stop" several times).
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what one reasonably believes to be deadly force. As Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated, "Detached reflection can-
not be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."261
On the other hand, a guilty verdict would have been le-
gally defensible as well. On the issue of whether Peairs acted
with the intent to kill or seriously injure Hattori, several facts
suggest that Peairs acted with such purpose. 26 2 On the issue of
whether Peairs acted reasonably in self-defense, several facts
suggest Peairs acted hastily and unreasonably. Rather than
calling the police, looking outside the window to see what was
outside, or even asking his wife why she was screaming, Peairs
immediately went to his bedroom closet, grabbed a loaded gun,
and went to the carport area to confront the boys outside.263 At
that time, the boys were in the process of leaving the prem-
ises.2" Peairs easily could have avoided any confrontation by
261. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
262. At trial, Peairs testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q. Once you got to the bedroom, you had to go to a little effort to ob-
tain the gun, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell the Jury exactly what you did; where was the gun located?
A. In the top of the closet. There are two closets on this wall, my
wife's and mine. There is a closet here. I opened the door, bifold
doors, reached in the top and got the suitcase down.
Q. What did you take out?
A. I took the suitcase down, and I laid it on my bed.
Q. And, after you laid it on your bed, what did you do with it?
A. I unlatched it.
Q. And, after you unlatched it, what did you do with it?
A. I pulled out the gun.
Testimony of Rodney Peairs at 39, State v. Peairs (May 22, 1993) (on file with
author).
263. There is some dispute as to whether or not Peairs came out of his
house to confront the youths. Webb Haymaker, Hattori's friend, testified that
Peairs was standing in front of the carport door when he shot Hattori. Testi-
mony of Webb Haymaker at 34, State v. Peairs (May 20, 1993) (on file with
author). Peairs testified on direct examination that he was standing in the
doorway of the carport door during the entire confrontation. Testimony of
Rodney Peairs at 18, State v. Peairs (May 22, 1993) (on file with author).
During cross-examination, Peairs acknowledged that, following the shooting,
he told police he was sorry he ever stepped out the door. Id. at 69.
264. Man Who Shot Japanese Student Said He Was Terrified, supra note
239, at 1. There is some question as to whether Peairs called out to the boys
or whether the noise from Peairs's cocking of his gun caused Hattori to turn
back. It appears, however, that Hattori heard something which made him be-
lieve they had located the correct house, turned back, and started walking to-
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permitting them to leave.2 65 Additionally, Peairs might have
chosen a less fatal course of action. Peairs could have fired a
warning shot or aimed for a less vital portion of Hattori's body.
Instead, Peairs, whose familiarity with guns might be assumed
since he had several other firearms in his house that night,
266
shot Hattori directly in the chest with his laser-scoped .44
magnum.267
The Peairs case is complicated by the fact that the racial
nature of the case was less obvious than that of the Goetz case.
While many Asian American groups felt the verdict was unjust
and racist,268 non-Asian Americans explained the verdict as
merely a tragic misunderstanding 69 or an unfortunate inci-
dent.270 Most people have overlooked the degree to which racial
stereotypes about Japanese people might have affected the
jury's interpretation of the facts and their determination that
Peairs acted reasonably.27'
wards Peairs. Telephone Interview with Richard Haymaker, Webb Hay-
maker's father (Mar. 14, 1996).
265. In a similar case, a defendant came out of his house with a gun and
warned the victim not to come back into his yard or he would kill him. How-
ever, the victim, who had been in the process of leaving the premises, re-
turned to the defendant's backyard with a wrench in his raised hand. As the
victim approached the defendant, defendant shot and killed the victim. At his
trial, the defendant claimed he acted in self-defense. The jury, however, re-
jected this claim and convicted him of manslaughter. The D.C. Circuit af-
firmed his conviction. United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1233, 1234,
1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
266. A newspaper article reported, "Peairs said he got his .44-caliber Mag-
num revolver, the most accessible gun at the time," and that he "also owns a
rifle, a double-barreled shotgun and two pellet guns." Feared Japanese Teen-
ager, supra note 245, at A23.
267. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as 'Scary," supra note 237, at A10.
268. See Japanese American Group Urges Investigation of Student's Death,
REUTERS, LTD. (North American), May 25, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File ("The slaying of a Japanese student who was clearly
unarmed raises questions of whether racial prejudice may have played a role
in what happened."); U.S. Civil Rights Inquiry Is Sought in Louisiana Slay-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at B7 (quoting the National Asian Pacific
American Legal Consortium, which noted that Peairs "called on the stereotype
of the 'out of control' Japanese").
269. Peter Applebome, Verdict in Death of Student Reverberates Across
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A14 ("[G]un proponents and many re-
searchers say they are not convinced the Louisiana case reflects anything
more than a tragic misunderstanding.").
270. Id.
271. Peairs's jury was composed of six men and six women, none of whom
were Asian American. Ten of the jurors were White and two were Black. Tim
Talley, Jury Selected; Opening Arguments Begin Today in Rodney Peairs
Trial, BATON ROUGE AiVOc., May 20, 1993, at 1A.
[Vol. 81:367
RACE AND SELF-DEFENSE
Just as the attorney representing Bernhard Goetz covertly
and effectively played the race card, Peairs's attorney subtly
and effectively appealed to prejudice against the Japanese
"enemy." Playing on the Asian-as-foreigner stereotype, which
was all the more readily believed in this case involving a true
Asian foreigner, Peairs's attorney told the jury that Hattori
was acting in a menacing, aggressive fashion, "like a stranger
invading someone's home turf."72 The use of language suggest-
ing an invasion of home turf is striking in light of the way
Japanese people have been viewed in this country. Histori-
cally, Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans have been
viewed as the enemy.273 In more recent times, the Japanese
have also been viewed as the enemy-the economic yellow peril
responsible for the loss of American jobs. Indicative of this
tendency to view Japan as the enemy, one writer, commenting
on Japanese outrage at the not guilty verdict in the Peairs
case, wrote: "America excels at overreaction to a singular oc-
currence; it's gratifying to witness our economic arch rival suf-
fer the same weakness. They've bloodied our nose enough in the
business markets of the world.... [Alt least Americans can see
hysteria is no less common in 'perfect Japan.'" 274 The notion of
foreignness embedded in this "invasion of home turf" language
was so subtle that this indirect reference to national origin
went unnoticed by the prosecution. 275
Bonnie Peairs's trial testimony is also significant. When
asked to describe Hattori, Mrs. Peairs responded, "I guess he
appeared Oriental. He could have been Mexican or what-
ever."2 6 Mrs. Peairs was unable to tell whether Hattori was
272. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy As "Scary," supra note 237, at A10.
273. The most egregious example of this occurred during World War II
when Japanese Americans were interned. Bannai & Minami, supra note 225,
at 757.
274. David D. Magnuson, There Are No Winers, THE HOUSTON CHRON.,
June 6, 1993, at 3 (emphasis added).
275. Interestingly, if Rodney Peairs, as the defendant, had been Japanese
and if the prosecutor made a similar remark about Peairs, the defense attor-
ney could have moved for a mistrial under a Louisiana statute providing for a
mistrial when
[A] remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by thejudge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in ar-
gument, refers directly or indirectly to... [riace, religion, color or na-
tional origin, if the remark or comment is not material and relevant
and might create prejudice against the defendant in the mind of the
jury.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 770(1) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
276. Testimony of Bonnie Peairs at 22, State v. Peairs (May 22, 1993) (on
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"Oriental" or "Mexican" or neither. All she knew was that Hat-
tori looked different, foreign.277 Her comment highlights the
way minorities are often lumped together as a homogenous
group outside the American community.
If Webb Haymaker had been the victim, it is unlikely that
the spectators in the courtroom would have responded with
applause to the not guilty verdict.278 If Haymaker, the boy
from the neighborhood, rather than Hattori, a foreigner from
Japan, had been the victim in this case, the defense would
have had a more difficult time portraying the victim as "a crazy
man,"279 "frightening,"280 or "scary,"28' terms used to describe
Hattori. If Haymaker had been the victim, the presence of
Haymaker's parents in the courtroom and in the community
would have made it much more difficult for the defense to paint
a credible picture of the victim as the bad guy. But Haymaker
was not the victim; Hattori, a Japanese foreigner, was the one
shot and killed.282
3. The Asian-as-Martial Artist
Another common belief about Asians and Asian Americans
is encompassed in the Asian-as-martial artist stereotype.
Many people assume that young Asian men know martial
file with author); Telephone Interview with Richard Haymaker, Webb Hay-
maker's father (Mar. 14, 1996).
277. Mrs. Peairs also knew that Hattori was a boy, not a man. On cross-
examination, Mrs. Peairs admitted that when she called "911" to report the
incident, she stated that a "boy" had been shot, despite only briefly glimpsing
Hattori. Homeowner Testifies, supra note 245, at 2.
278. See Yoshinaga, supra note 258, at B12 (noting that spectators in the
courtroom responded to the not-guilty verdict with applause).
279. Worthington, supra note 257, at A20.
280. Defense Depicts Japanese Boy as "Scary," supra note 237, at A10.
281. Id.
282. After Peairs's acquittal, Yosbihiro Hattori's parents filed a wrongful
death civil action against Rodney Peairs. Scott Medintz, A Criminal Acquit-
tal, but Civil Justice, AM. LAW. 43 (Nov. 1994). After a bench trial, Judge
William Brown ordered Peairs to pay Hattori's parents $653,000 in damages
and funeral costs. Id. The Hattoris offered to withdraw their lawsuit (and
release Peairs from the $653,000 civil judgment) if Peairs would give up the
gun he used to kill their son. Hattori's Parents to Ask Peairs for Gun Rather
Than $650,000, THE DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 2, 1994, at 1. The Hattoris ex-
plained that they sued Peairs not for the money, but to demonstrate that he
should be held responsible for their son's death. Id. Peairs refused the Hat-
toris' offer of settlement and appealed the civil judgment against him. Man
Refuses Money, N.Y. TIMEs, May 26, 1993, at A14. In 1995, a Louisiana appel-
late court affirmed the civil judgment against Peairs. Hattori v. Peairs, 662
So. 2d 509, 518 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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arts.283 In State v. Simon,214 the Asian-as-martial artist stereo-
type helped secure an acquittal for a man who shot his Chinese
neighbor and then claimed self-defense. Anthony Simon, an
elderly homeowner, shot his neighbor, Steffen Wong, a Chinese
man, as Wong was entering his own duplex.2"5 Simon was
charged with two counts of aggravated assault.286
At trial, Simon argued that he assumed, by virtue of
Wong's racial heritage, that Wong was an expert in the martial
arts.27 Simon claimed he was afraid of Wong and that heated
words had been exchanged between the two neighbors.288 Si-
mon also said he was fearful because more Orientals were
moving into the neighborhood and one had even expressed in-
terest in purchasing Simon's home.289 In addition to Simon's
testimony, the defense called a clinical psychologist who testi-
fied Simon was a psychological invalid who suffered from anxi-
ety neurosis.2 90 Defense counsel argued to the jury that the
evidence showed Simon reasonably believed Wong was an
imminent threat to him.
291
The jury acquitted Simon on all counts.292 Although the
instruction on self-defense given to the jury utilized a subjec-
tive standard of reasonableness, 293 the fact that the jury could
283. Lee, supra note 228, at 197 (discussing the Asian-as-martial artist
stereotype). The growing prevalence of Asian youth gangs has resulted in a
new Asian gang member profile, arising out of home invasion robberies and
caijackings committed by some youths of Asian descent, which too creates the
potential for ready acceptance of a self-defense claim. See IRVING A. SPERGEL,
THE YOUTH GANG PROBLEM: A COMMUNITY APPROACH 67-68, 138-40 (1995)
(discussing Asian and Pacific Island gangs); PATRICK Du PHUOC LONG, THE
DREAM SHATTERED: VIETNAMESE GANGs IN AMERICA 11 (1995) ("[Alccording
to federal investigators, Asian American criminal groups are growing faster
than any other.").
284. 646 P.2d 1119 (Kan. 1982).
285. Id. at 1121.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. The issue on appeal was whether "reasonableness" for self-defense
purposes should be determined by the jury using an objective or a subjective
standard. The trial judge had instructed the jury as follows: "A person is
justified in the use of force to defend himself against an aggressor's imminent
use of unlawful force to the extent it appears reasonable to him under the cir-
cumstances then existing." Id. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the
instruction given to the jury was an incorrect statement of the law and that
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find Simon's fear to be reasonable when it was quite clear that
his fear of Wong was based almost solely on a racial stereotype
is quite astounding. The Asian-as-martial artist stereotype
may have influenced jurors to sympathize with Simon's mis-
placed belief that because of Wong's Asian heritage, Wong
must have been a dangerous martial arts expert.294
Racial representations of Asian Americans, like the Asian-
as-foreigner and Asian-as-martial artist stereotypes, can have
a subtle, but far-reaching impact. Such racial representations
might influence legal decisionmakers to discount injuries suf-
fered by Asians and Asian Americans. The judge who sen-
tenced the men who killed Vincent Chin by beating him with a
baseball bat felt that what happened to Chin was not a brutal
murder295 even though Chin's brains were splattered all over
the sidewalk and his skull fractured in several places. 296
the jury should have been instructed that a "reasonable belief implies both a
belief and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable man to that
belief." Id. at 1122.
294. Another incident that illustrates the Asian-as-martial artist stereo-
type occurred on November 4, 1994, when Curtis Steiner, a twenty-five-year-
old man, attacked Chong San Cho, a forty-year-old Korean American who was
a graduate student at the University of Idaho. Jim Jacobs, Two Men Charged
in Nov. 4 Assault, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Nov. 22, 1994, at 5A. Steiner
knocked Cho to the ground and kicked Cho's leg hard enough to break it in
two places. As Steiner was stomping on Cho's leg, he laughed and asked Cho
either, "You know judo? You know judo?" or "Are you Judo? Are you Judo?"
Steiner's precise words are unclear. See Steve McClure, Investigation into UI
Attack Ends, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Nov. 15, 1994, at 1A; Steve
McClure, UI International Students Question Attack Motivation, Moscow-
PuLLMAN DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 1994, at 9A; Moscow Man Sentenced to Jail,
Fined for "Prank" Attack on U of I Student, IDAHO STATESMAN, Jan. 29, 1995,
at B3 [hereinafter Moscow Man Sentenced]. The prosecutor told Cho that his
assailant could not be charged with a felony because Cho's injuries were not
serious enough even though the attack, which broke Cho's leg in two places
and required three operations, left Cho with no feeling in two parts of his leg
and unable to move two of his toes. Jacobs, supra, at 5A.
Steiner pled guilty to misdemeanor battery and was sentenced to eight-
een days in jail plus restitution in the amount of $27,000 to repay Cho's medi-
cal bills. Moscow Man Sentenced, supra, at B3. Steiner claimed his attack on
Cho was just a stupid prank, and the media characterized the attack as a
prank. Id. Steiner further claimed that Cho's race had nothing to do with the
attack. Id. One can only wonder whether Steiner would have asked Cho "You
know Judo? You know Judo?" if Cho had not been Asian. Ironically, the only
thing Steiner could think of in the heat of the moment as he stomped on a Ko-
rean American man's foot was whether Cho knew judo, a Japanese martial
art.
295. See supra text accompanying note 234 (explaining the judge's view
that the men would be in jail had it been a brutal murder).
296. See supra text accompanying note 236 (detailing Chin's fatal injuries).
[Vol. 81:367
RACE AND SELF-DEFENSE
Likewise, the juries which acquitted Rodney Peairs and An-
thony Simon believed each defendant's claim of self-defense
297
even though it is difficult in hindsight to understand how the
jurors could find these defendants' beliefs and actions objec-
tively reasonable. Racial stereotypes about Asians as foreign-
ers, economic rivals, "gooks" we fought in Vietnam, "Japs" re-
sponsible for Pearl Harbor, "chinks" who take our jobs, not only
deindividualize, they also dehumanize Asian Americans. Ra-
cial representations might also influence legal decisionmakers
to accept more readily claims of self-defense by defendants who
kill Asian Americans, not necessarily because Asian Americans
are thought to be more violent or more dangerous than others
(although this may occur under the Asian-as-martial artist
stereotype), but because Asian and Asian American lives, seen
as foreign or outside the American community, are not valued
to the same extent as other lives.
C. THE LATINO-As-FOREIGNER AND LATINO-AS-CRIMINAL
STEREOTYPES
The stereotyping of Latinos and Latinas28 in American
culture has received relatively little attention in legal scholar-
ship.299 Notwithstanding the paucity of legal attention to La-
tino stereotypes, it is clear that Latino stereotypes are varied
and complex. Not all Latinos suffer from the same stereotypes
because some Latinos look like their White but non-Latino
counterparts, while other Latinos do not. The fair-skinned Cu-
ban in Florida who can pass as White may receive different
treatment than the dark-skinned Mexican American in the
Southwest.
Unfortunately, Latinos suffer from an aggregation of
negative stereotypes experienced by both African Americans
and Asian Americans. Perhaps most commonly, Latinos, like
Asian Americans, are perceived as foreigners, outsiders, or
immigrants. Kevin Johnson discusses how the Latino-as-
foreigner stereotype may have influenced a Capitol police se-
curity aide to accuse Congressman Luis Gutierrez, a Puerto Ri-
297. See supra text accompanying notes 257 & 292 (noting that, in the
Peairs and Simon cases, the juries found the defendants not guilty on the
ground of self-defense).
298. For explanation of the terms "Latino" and "Latina," see supra note 5.
299. This section discusses only a few of the many stereotypes about Lati-
nds. For additional discussion, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 107, at
1273-75 (describing various stereotypes of Mexican Americans).
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can American who was born in Chicago and is a United States
citizen, of presenting false congressional credentials.300 Leap-
ing to the conclusion that the Congressman was a foreigner af-
ter seeing his daughter and niece with two small Puerto Rican
flags, the security aide told Gutierrez that he should go back to
where he came from.310
The Latino-as-foreigner stereotype is particularly trouble-
some when it slides into the Latino-as-illegal immigrant
stereotype. In certain parts of the country, people commonly
associate brown-skinned persons who speak English with a
Spanish accent with illegal immigration, particularly if those
persons are unskilled or employed as domestic or menial labor-
ers.30 2 Even if the person speaks English without an accent,303
he or she may be subject to the illegal immigrant stereotype.
Like African Americans, Latinos suffer from a Latino-as-
criminal stereotype." The Latino-as-criminal stereotype often
300. Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal
Scholarship, 1 HARV. LATINO L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (draft on file with
author) (discussing the Latino-as-foreigner phenomenon as part of everyday
life for Latinos in the United States).
301. David Jackson & Paul de la Garza, Rep. Gutierrez Uncommon Target
of a Too Common Slur, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1996, § 1, at 1.
302. See Roberto Rodriguez & Patrisia Gonzales, Anti-Latino Stereotypes
Stir up Melting Pot of Hate, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at 15 (noting two
common stereotypes of Mexican Americans-that they are either illegal aliens
"stealing" American jobs or lazy and on welfare).
303. In alluding to English without an accent, I succumb to the "norm of
non-accent" when, in reality, we all speak with some kind of an accent. See
Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1361 (1991)
("Everyone has an accent, but when an employer refuses to hire a person 'With
an accent,' [that employer is] referring to a hidden norm of non-accent-a lin-
guistic impossibility, but a socially constructed reality.").
304. See Greene, supra note 107, at 1992 (positing that the news portrays
both Latinos and Blacks as key culprits in crimes ranging from drug traffick-
ing to street crime). In addition, Latinos are often associated with drug
crimes. Rose Marie Arce, Crime, Drugs and Stereotypes, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2,
1991, at 5 (indicating that many Latinos think that non-Latinos believe drugs
to be "creatures of Latino culture"). Robert Gangi, Executive Director of the
Correctional Association of New York, notes, "Iris striking that the majority of
the people who use and sell drugs are white, but 90 percent of the people ar-
rested are Black and Latino." Id. The Latino-as-drug-abuser stereotype con-
tradicts reports that "whites and Blacks are more likely than [Latinos] to have
ever used drugs." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 28 (1992). News stories about Co-
lombian drug cartels may feed this Latino-as-criminal stereotype. See id.
(noting that "there is no shortage of stories in the newspapers and on televi-
sion to feed this myth [that drugs are a creature of Latino culture]-stories
about Colombian drug cartels, Dominican money-laundering operations and
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affects young male Latinos who are assumed to be gang mem-
bers, particularly if they live in a low-income high-crime
neighborhood and wear baggy pants and T-shirts. °5 The La-
tino-as-criminal stereotype is linked to the Latino-as-illegalimmigrant stereotype because the undocumented are often
characterized as lawbreakers. °6 Another stereotype, the La-
tino-as-macho stereotype, casts Latinos as hot-tempered and
prone to violence. 07 When a Latino loses his temper, his out-
burst is often characterized as a cultural manifestation of
"machismo."308 The Latino-as-macho stereotype is gendered;
30 9
"macho" and "machismo" are terms used to describe males from
Latin American countries, not females.
310
The perception that young Latinos who dress a certain
way are dangerous criminal gang members who pose a threat
of serious bodily injury to those who confront them, coupled
with the notion that Latinos tend to be hot-blooded and prone
to violence, may contribute to the frequency with which homi-
cide and assault cases involving Latino victims are not prose-
cuted. In numerous instances, Latinos have been shot, beaten,
and/or killed by citizens or police officers claiming justifiable
use of deadly force under circumstances calling into question
whether the use of deadly force was truly warranted.31  In
Puerto Rican drug addicts"); Susan Ferriss, Study Shows Latinos Have Bad
TV Image, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 7, 1994, at A2 (reporting results of a study on
the media that found that Latino characters on prime time television are four
times more likely to be portrayed as gangsters, drug dealers and other crimi-
nals than are other ethnic groups).
305. Cf Robert Garcia, Crime of Justice: Latinos and Criminal Justice, 14
CmCANO-LATINo L. REV. 6, 13 (1994) (arguing that some people do not bother
to distinguish between gang members, undocumented Latinos, and other La-
tinos).
306. Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection
of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509,
1531 (1995) ("The parallel between criminal aliens and 'illegal aliens' is
strengthened by the fact that the undocumented are often characterized as
lawbreakers.").
307. Rivera, supra note 5, at 240.
308. See id. ("'Macho' is the accepted-and expected-single-word descrip-
tion synonymous with Latino men and male culture.").
309. Latinas (women residing in the United States who come from Latin
America) are stereotyped as either the familial good wife, sister, or mother or
as a sexual object. Id. at 240-41.
310. Id.
311. On August 28, 1991, a Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff shot David
Angel Ortiz, Jr., an unarmed fifteen-year-old Latino youth, in the lower back,
the ankle, and the back of the neck after a high-speed chase. Michele
Fuetsch, Deputies Shot Teen-Ager in Back, Lawyer Charges, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
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31, 1991, at B1. After exiting the car he was driving, Ortiz tried to run from
police. Richard A. Serrano, Deputy's Shot Hit Boy in Back of Neck, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at B4. According to witnesses, Ortiz stopped running
at the deputies' commands, but was shot when he did not turn around. Id.
Initially, sheriffs officials defended the shooting, claiming Ortiz was shot be-
cause he appeared to be reaching for a weapon in his waistband. Id. The Los
Angeles County Sheriffs Department later fired Deputy Sheriff Jose Bel-
mares for shooting Ortiz. Kenneth Reich, Slain Youth's Family Demands
Trial of Deputy in Shooting, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1992, at B3. However, a Los
Angeles county grand jury refused to indict Belmares. Sheryl Stolberg &
Richard Simon, Jury Refuses to Charge Deputies in 4 Killings, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1991, at Al. To date, no criminal prosecution has been brought
against Belmares for shooting the unarmed Ortiz in the back.
On July 29, 1994, Compton police officer Michael Jackson beat Felipe Sol-
tero, a seventeen-year-old Latino youth. Susan Moffat, Youth in Video Beat-
ing Sues for $10 Million, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at B1. The incident was
captured on home videotape by a neighbor who witnessed the confrontation.
Id. The tape shows the 180-pound Officer Jackson lunging at the 130-pound
5-foot-3-inch youth, then knocking the youth to the ground with a sudden
blow from the butt of his police baton to the youth's cheek. Richard Lee
Colvin & Shawn Hubler, Beating on Videotape is Investigated, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 1994, at B1. Bystanders can be heard screaming in the background as
the officer reared back and struck Soltero at least four times more before
dropping his knee into the back of the youth's neck to hold him down while
putting the youth in handcuffs. Id. One neighbor who witnessed the beating
said, "When he was hitting him with the baton I thought he was going to kill
him." Id. In his police report, Officer Jackson claimed he hit Soltero only af-
ter Soltero hit him first. Id. After investigating the incident, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office declined to file criminal charges against Of-
ficer Jackson, explaining that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute the
officer. Edward Boyer, Jr. & Eric Malnic, Officer Won't Be Charged in Beat-
ing, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at B1.
On July 9, 1995, Sheriffs deputies shot and killed Jesus Vargas Trejo, a
twenty-five-year-old Mexican national, as he lay face down in the doorway of a
home in Compton, California. Official Business: Suit Filed in Slaying by
Deputies, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1995, at B2. Sheriffs deputies claimed they
shot Vargas because he lunged for their guns, appeared to be armed, and fit
the description of a gunman in a Compton bar shooting earlier that evening.
Edmund Newton & Emily Adams, Slain Man's Girlfriend Denies He Lunged
Toward Deputies' Guns, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1995, at B3. In fact, Vargas was
unarmed at the time of the shooting and the suspect in the earlier bar shoot-
ing was Black, not Mexican. Id. Moreover, according to a man who witnessed
the shooting, Vargas was shot while lying face down in front of his own house.
Edmund Newton, Witnesses Saw Deputies Kill Man, Discuss Alibi, Statement
Claims, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1995, at B3. According to this witness, after the
shooting, one deputy said, "Don't worry, we're gonna say he had a gun." Id.
To date, no criminal charges have been filed against the deputies who were
involved in this shooting. Telephone Interview with Luis Carillo, attorney for
Vargas's girlfriend (June 24, 1996).
On December 21, 1995, police officers shot Joseph Pulido, a seventeen-
year-old Latino youth, in the back as he fled from police. Julio Laboy, Police
Shoot Teen to Death in Chase, ORANGE CouNTY REGISTER, Dec. 22, 1995, at
B1. Police officers had stopped to ask two youths why they were drinking
beer in public when Pulido, who was with the two youths but had not been
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many of these cases, despite the fact that the Latino victim was
unarmed or shot in the back, criminal charges were not
brought against the person claiming justifiable homicide. In
recent history, the most widely publicized incident of this type
occurred in January 1995.
On January 31, 1995, eighteen-year-old Cesar Rene Arce
and twenty-year-old David Hillo, two young Mexican Ameri-
cans, were spray-painting columns supporting the Hollywood
Freeway in Los Angeles at about 1:00 a.m.3" 2 William Masters
I1, a White man carrying a loaded gun without a permit in his
fanny pack,313 was out for a late-night walk and saw the two
boys spray-painting the columns.314 Masters picked up a piece
of paper from the ground and wrote down the license plate
number of the young men's car.315 Masters claims that when
Arce saw him writing, Arce blocked the sidewalk and de-
drinking, took off running. Id. The officers chased Pulido, and shot him when
he would not stop. Id. Although police officers claimed they shot Pulido be-
cause they believed he was armed, no gun was found on Pulido's body. Id. A
gun was found in a yard two houses from the victim's body. Id. The district
attorney's office is investigating the shooting. Tina Nguyen & Geoff Boucher,
Youth Killed During Police Raid, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1996, at B1.
Under California law, a homicide is justifiable when necessarily commit-
ted by public officers "in retaking felons who have... escaped, or when neces-
sarily committed in arresting persons charged with [a] felony, and who are
fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest." CAL. PENAL CODE § 196(3)
(West 1988). California courts have construed this section to
prohibit the use of deadly force ... against a fleeing felony suspect
unless the felony is of the violent variety, i.e., a forcible and atrocious
one which threatens death or serious bodily harm [to the officer or
another], or unless there are other circumstances which reasonably
create a fear of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or to an-
other.
Kortum v. Alkire, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis added).
A reasonableness standard thus encompasses both police-citizen and citizen-
citizen encounters.
On March 24, 1996, a White man, Danny Cargill, shot a Latino man, Luis
Garcia, who was masturbating outside Cargill's home. Bill Hetherman, Fatal
Shooting Is Ruled to Be Self-Defense, SAN GABRIEL TRIB., June 12, 1996, at
Al. Cargill claimed he thought Garcia was an armed prowler and therefore
acted in self-defense. Id. Even though Garcia was shot in the back, the Dis-
trict Attorney's Office declined to file charges against Cargill. Id.
312. Nicholas Riccardi, Jury Probe of Tagger's Slaying is Rejected, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at Bl.
313. See Ann W. ONeill, Tagger's Killer Faces Firearms Charges, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1995, at BI (indicating that Masters was charged with carry-
ing a loaded firearm without a permit).
314. See Night Walk Ends with Dead Teen; Threats Answered with Fatal
Shots, ARIZ. REPUB., Feb. 5, 1995, at A30 (relaying the events of the evening).
315. Id.
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manded that he hand over the paper.316 A scuffle ensued in
which Arce tried to rip the paper from Masters's hand and
Masters tried to jam the rest of the paper into his pocket. Ac-
cording to Masters, when Hillo held up a screwdriver in a
threatening manner, Masters handed over the piece of paper
and began walking away.317  Masters claims he thought the
boys were behind him, so he swung around, and fired at
Arce. 18 Masters then shot Hillo in the buttocks.319 Arce died
from the shot which entered him from his back. 20
Masters told the first police officers at the scene, "I shot
him because he was spray-painting." 21 Later, Masters claimed
he shot the boys in self-defense. 32 In yet another explanation,
Masters claimed that he shot the boys because they tried to rob
him.323 Masters was arrested and jailed on suspicion of mur-
der.324 When he was released from custody, Masters called the
two youths he shot "skinhead Mexicans," blamed Arce's mother
for his death because she failed to raise Arce well, and said
that as a former Marine, he was trained to take down as many
of the enemy as he could.32 5
The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office declined
to prosecute Masters on the ground that Masters acted in self-
defense when he shot Arce. 326 The determination that Masters
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Ann O'Neill & Nicholas Riccardi, Hurt Tagger Treated as Suspect, Not
Victim, Lawyer Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at B3.
320. Nicholas Riccardi, Death of a Tagger a Typical Street Mystery for Po-
lice, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at Al ("The coroner's report showed Arce was
hit in the 'left rear flank.'").
321. Luis A. Carillo, How to Kill a Latino Kid and Walk Free, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1995, at B5; ONeill, supra note 313, at BI; see also Riccardi, supra
note 320, at Al (noting that Masters first told police he shot Arce because he
was tagging).
322. O'Neill, supra note 313, at B8.
323. Riccardi, supra note 312, at B1. Hillo denied that the two boys tried
to rob Masters. Id. Hillo claimed that Masters shot him, walked up to him,
held the gun to his head, and said, "This all happened because you were tag-
ging." Nicholas Riccardi & Julie Tamaki, 1 Tagger Killed, 1 Hurt After Con-
frontation over Graffiti, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at B1.
324. John Rofe, Killing of Tagger Divides LA. Latinos. Issue: Was Shooter
Justified or a Racist?, S.D. UNION TRIB., Feb. 14, 1995, at A3.
325. Hugh Dellios, L. Vigilante Is Revered and Reviled, HOUSTON
CHRoN., Feb. 13, 1995, at A7.
326. Ann W. O'Neill, Latino Lawyers, Garcetti Meet Over Tagger's Death,
L.A. TIMES Feb. 11, 1995, at B1 (noting that Deputy District Attorney Robert
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reasonably believed he was about to be attacked by Arce is
surprising given the fact that the shot that killed Arce entered
him from his back.327 In contrast, the Los Angeles County Dis-
trict Attorney's Office filed murder and manslaughter charges
against two Black men (one of whom was the rap singer known
as Snoop Doggy Dogg) who claimed they shot another Black
man in self-defense, disbelieving their self-defense claim
largely because the victim was shot in the back and buttocks.328
Cohen decided it was reasonable for Masters to fear that he was in danger of
serious injury and was, therefore, warranted in shooting the "attackers")
[hereinafter ONeill, Lawyers, Garcetti Meet]. The City Attorney's Office sub-
sequently filed misdemeanor gun-carrying charges against Masters. O'Neill,
supra note 313, at B1. Masters was tried before a judge and found guilty of
one count of carrying a concealed firearm in a public place and one count of
carrying a loaded firearm in a public place. Weapons Conviction in Tagger's
Death, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Oct. 3, 1995, at 3B. Although Masters
faced a maximum possible sentence of 18 months in jail and a $2,000 fine, he
received no jail time. Efrain Hernandez, Jr., Vandal's Slayer Sentenced to
Clean Graffiti, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at B3 (reporting that the sentence
included four days incarceration, but since Masters had already spent four
days in jail after his arrest, he received credit for time served). Masters was
sentenced to three years of probation. Id. Additionally, Masters was ordered
to remove graffiti for thirty days as community service, give up his guns while
on probation, and attend a 10-hour Hospital and Morgue program in which
participants view victims of violent crimes. Id. Later, Masters was allowed to
switch from graffiti removal to freeway trash pickup after probation officials
expressed concern that Masters might be attacked by a fellow member of the
graffiti cleanup crew. Masters Sentence, CITY NEWS SERVICE OF Los ANGE-
LES, Dec. 28, 1995.
Even though he was shot and his friend killed, Hillo was treated by police
more like a suspect than a victim. ONeill & Riccardi, supra note 319, at B3.
Hillo was charged with misdemeanor vandalism. In a plea bargain agreement
with prosecutors that resolved a number of other charges, Hillo pled no con-
test to vandalism, pled no contest to grand theft (in connection with the theft
of eye drops and cold medicine from a Van Nuys supermarket), and admitted
two probation violations. John Johnson, Tagger Gets 2/a-Year Jail Term in
Plea Bargain, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at B3. In contrast to Masters's no-
jail-time sentence, Hillo was sentenced to a two-and-a-half year jail term. Id.
The judge told Hillo at sentencing that she was "reluctantly" going along with
the plea bargain, but warned Hillo that if he violated even the smallest condi-
tion of probation after his release from County Jail (two-and-a-half years
later), she would not hesitate to send him to state prison. Id.
327. Riccardi, supra note 320, at Al (noting the coroner's report showed
Arce was hit in the "left rear flank").
328. Tina Daunt, Prosecution Calls Rapper's Contention "Not Logical," L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1996, at B3 (noting that a prosecutor in the Snoop Doggy Dogg
murder trial told jurors to ask themselves: "If the famous rapper and his
bodyguard acted in self-defense, why was the victim shot in the back?"); Mi-
chael White, Rapper, Guard Acquitted of Gang Murder, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 21,
1996, at 2 ("Prosecutor Robert Grace disputed the self-defense claim, arguing
in closing statements that Woldemariam, 20, was shot in the back and but-
tocks as he tried to flee Broadus and Lee.").
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The decision not to file criminal homicide charges against
Masters was also based on the prediction that the government
would have had a difficult time convincing a jury to return a
conviction against Masters.3 29  The government's case would
have rested primarily on testimony by Hillo, the young man
who survived the shooting. Hillo would have been a problem-
atic witness since he gave conflicting versions of the facts in in-
terviews with the police.3 Moreover, judging from public re-
action to the event, the community was extremely supportive of
Masters.33 Telephone calls reportedly flooded into the police
station where Masters was held, offering money and legal as-
sistance.332 Sandi Webb, a Simi Valley Councilwoman, de-
clared her support for Masters by stating, "Kudos to William
Masters for his vigilant anti-graffiti efforts and for his foresight
in carrying a gun for self protection. If [Los Angeles] refuses to
honor Masters as a crime-fighting hero, then I invite him to
relocate to our town."333
While the Masters case is about the exercise of prosecuto-
rial, not jury, discretion, it is nevertheless relevant to the dis-
cussion of the effect of racial stereotypes on legal decisionmak-
ing. Racial stereotypes affect all people, including prosecutors,
judges, and jurors.334 The Masters case is difficult because fear
329. O'Neill, Lawyers, Garcetti Meet, supra note 326, at B1 (noting that
one of the reasons Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti decided not to
file murder or manslaughter charges against Masters was the belief that it
would be impossible to win a jury conviction).
330. Initially, Hillo told police that he was not involved in the confronta-
tion and explained his gunshot wound by claiming he had been shot in a drive-
by shooting. Riccardi, supra note 320, at Al. Two hours later, during ques-
tioning by a police detective, Hillo admitted that he had been shot by Masters,
but denied having a screwdriver at the scene. Id. Later, during questioning
by different detectives, Hillo admitted he had a screwdriver in his pocket that
must have fallen out. Id. Then, after detectives falsely told Hillo that a secu-
rity guard had witnessed the whole incident, Hillo admitted that he had the
screwdriver in his hand, but denied using it to threaten Masters. Id. Hillo
claimed he used the screwdriver as a tagging tool to scale signposts. Id.
331. Hernandez, supra note 326, at B3 ("Masters' case exploded onto na-
tional talk radio, where he drew widespread support, much of it from gun
owners and anti-crime and anti-graffiti forces.").
332. Ruben Navarrette, Jr., The Moral Dilemmas of a Tagger's Slaying,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1995, at Ml. One supporter even brought Masters dinner.
Id.
333. Dellios, supra note 325, at A7.
334. The Masters case raises difficult questions. If there is widespread
public support for a particular defendant, should prosecutors decline to press
charges on the ground that it will be difficult to win a conviction? Most legal
observers would probably agree that in light of limited law enforcement re-
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of crime and increasing gang violence are legitimate fears held
by many people, particularly in Southern California. Graffiti
on freeway overpasses, public buildings, and private property
is a reminder that the threat of violent crime is not far off.
Supporters of Masters were likely reacting to this fear of crime
and gang violence. As one supporter explained, "Whatever he
did doesn't bother me. rm not saying shooting people is the
way to do it.... But [the graffiti] is just disgusting. It doesn't
seem like anyone's doing anything about it."335
However legitimate the fear of crime and the threat of
gang violence that graffiti symbolizes, such fear of crime in
general does not satisfy the more specific requirement in self-
defense doctrine that one have a reasonable belief in an immi-
nent threat of death or serious bodily injury by a particular
individual. In this country, defacing property with graffiti is
not a capital offense.336 If the state is not permitted to execute
graffiti offenders after a trial and conviction, surely private
citizens have no greater right to kill such offenders.
One finds this modern conception in Blackstone, who argued that if
we do not execute petty thieves for their crimes, neither should we
permit the use of deadly force in resisting petty theft. The property
sources, the likelihood of success is a legitimate factor that the prosecution
may consider in exercising its charging and plea bargaining discretion.
Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 162 (1994) (discussing
the "can I win" question that prosecutors ask themselves before committing
time, effort, and limited law enforcement resources to prosecuting a case).
Yet, it is also widely agreed that the prosecution has a higher duty than
merely serving as an advocate for- the people. Besides trying to win convic-
tions, the prosecutor is supposed to seek justice. Fred C. Zacharias, Structur-
ing the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV. 45, 50-102 (1991) (providing a framework for understanding
the "do justice" ethical standard and opining that, before trial, doing justice
means ensuring that innocent people are not prosecuted). Some legal observ-
ers felt justice required sending the Masters case to a jury so that twelve citi-
zens could decide whether Masters acted in self-defense. Attorney Luis Car-
illo opined, "If they have the evidence, they should charge him and let the
chips fall where they may." O'Neill, Lawyers, Garcetti Meet, supra note 326,
atB1.
335. Riccardi & Tamaki, supra note 323, at Bl.
336. In contrast, defacing property with graffiti is a capital offense in
Pakistan. On February 9, 1995, a youth convicted of defiling a mosque with
graffiti was sentenced to death by hanging. John-Thor Dahlburg, Death Sen-
tence for Boy, 14, Roils Pakistan, L.A. TnMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at Al. Later, the
youth's conviction and death sentence were reversed. Rick Shrum, Court
Overturns Death Sentence for Blasphemy, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 6,
1995, at C3.
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owner should not be able to react more severely on the street than
does the sentencing authority in the courtroom.337
The support William Masters generated for shooting two
young Mexican American males engaged in spray-painting is
striking when contrasted with the Michael Fay incident, in-
volving a non-Latino White American teenager who was caught
engaging in graffiti in Singapore, which occurred less than one
year earlier. In 1994, Michael Fay pled guilty to two counts of
vandalism and two counts of mischief, admitting that he was
one of a group of youths who spray-painted eighteen cars,
threw eggs at other cars, and switched license plates on still
other cars.338
When a Singaporean judge sentenced Fay to four months
in prison, a $2,230 fine, and six lashes with a rattan cane,
many Americans rallied to Fay's defense.339 Fay's mother ap-
pealed to U.S. government officials, asking them to assist in
gaining clemency for her son. When explaining why her son
should not be subjected to caning, the punishment typically
imposed in Singapore for vandalism, Fay's mother stated,
"Caning is not something the American public would want an
American to go through. It's barbaric."340 Fay's mother further
337. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REV.
949, 969 (1985).
338. Philip Shenon, Singapore Journal; A Flogging Sentence Brings a Cry
of Pain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1994, atA4.
339. Not everyone felt Michael Fay's caning sentence was inappropriate.
Flogging in Singapore, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1994, at B6 (letters to the editor
supporting the caning of Michael Fay). Following this incident, legislators in
several states introduced legislation authorizing paddling as a form of pun-
ishment for graffiti. Assemblyman Mickey Conroy attracted much attention
when, following Michael Fay's caning, he introduced a bill to make young
graffiti vandals in California subject to as many as ten paddle strokes in ju-
venile court. Eric Bailey, Paddling Bill Puts Conroy in Hot Seat of National
Debate, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1994, at Al. The bill was approved by the As-
sembly's Public Safety Committee, but was rejected by the fifll Assembly in
January 1996. Eric Bailey, Panel OKs Graffiti-Vandal Paddling Bill, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at A3; Eric Bailey, Assembly Rejects Paddling as Pun-
ishment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at A3. In 1995, the State of Mississippi
considered legislation requiring judges to sentence adult misdemeanor prop-
erty crime offenders to one to four lashes and felony property crime offenders
to five to fifteen lashes with a cane. The bill passed the House of Representa-
tives, but died in a Senate subcommittee. Reed Branson, Lawmakers Put Off
Vote on Bill to Require Caning, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Mar. 15, 1995, at
13A.
340. Franki V. Ransom, "This is Brutal": Clinton, Hall Vow to Aid Dayton
Team in Singapore, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 5, 1994, at 1A (emphasis
added).
450 [Vol. 81:367
RACE AND SELF-DEFENSE
described her son as "a typical teen-ager" who played on the
American football team.341 U.S. Embassy officials and mem-
bers of the American Chamber of Commerce responded to Fay's
mother's request, condemning the severity of the sentence.
342
Ralph Boyce, Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy,
stated "[W]e see a large discrepancy between the offence and
the punishment. The cars were not permanently damaged.
The paint was removed with paint thinner. Caning leaves
permanent scars."343 Even U.S. President Bill Clinton made a
strong protest to the Singapore government, asking for recon-
sideration of the sentence. 3"
In the Masters case, a White American shot two Mexican
Americans after catching them in the act of spray-painting col-
umns supporting a public freeway, and was called a crime-
fighting hero even though he killed one of the youths. In the
Michael Fay case, the Singaporean government prosecuted a
White American teenager for spray-painting eighteen cars and
engaging in other acts of vandalism. Many Americans were
outraged at the caning punishment the Singaporean govern-
ment imposed on Fay. If a Singaporean citizen had shot and
killed Fay after catching him in the act of spray-painting the
Singaporean citizen's car, it is unlikely that Americans would
view the Singaporean as a hero, even if the Singaporean
claimed, as Masters did, that he thought Fay was going to hurt
him and shot Fay in self-defense. Stereotypes of Mexican
American youths as criminal gang members likely influenced
the general public's reaction to the Masters case.
Stereotypes play a more important role in our thinking
and interactions with other people than we may be willing to
admit.345 We all make assumptions about people. Often our
assumptions are linked to perceived racial identities. Stereo-
typing, in and of itself, is not necessarily evil but can become
341. Id. (emphasis added).
342. Karen Fawcett, Americans in Singapore Condemn Caning for Teen,
USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 1994, at 8A.
343. Ian Stewart, Singapore: U.S. Teenager Jailed for Car Vandalism, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at 12.
344. Shenon, supra note 338, at A4.
345. In confining the discussion in this paper to stereotypes about Blacks,
Asian Americans, and Latinos, I do not intend to trivialize stereotypes about
others, such as Native Americans, women, Jews, gays, and even Whites.
Space and time considerations required that some choice be made, or that this
paper become a book. It is hoped that the discussion provided here will be
applied broadly.
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evil when it results in harmful consequences. Because one of
the purposes of the law is to ensure fair and equal treatment,
the law should discourage reliance on stereotypes, especially
when such reliance results in harmful action such as the use of
deadly force. Part III of this Article discusses ways in which
the law of self-defense can be reformed to address this issue.
III. MINIMIZING THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL
STEREOTYPES IN SELF-DEFENSE CASES
It is widely agreed that legal decisionmaking should be as
neutral and unbiased as possible. 46 If there is some evidence
that suggests jurors in self-defense cases are influenced by ra-
cial stereotypes, legislators and judges should make efforts to
minimize such influence. The cases described in Part II sug-
gest that racial stereotypes influence the reasonableness de-
termination in at least some self-defense cases. Capital sen-
tencing studies finding that killers of Whites are much more
likely to receive the death penalty than killers of Blacks also
suggest that the race of the victim makes a difference. 47
346. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 385 (noting, for example, that courts
pay close attention to the eradication of gender stereotypes in employment
discrimination cases).
347. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 149-88 (1990) (discussing statis-
tical evidence that shows the race of the victim has a significant effect on the
application of the death penalty in Georgia); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT
MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING 69, 92 (1989) (finding in each of eight states studied that killers
of Whites were more likely than killers of Blacks to receive the death penalty);
David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administra-
tion of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON
L. REV. 133, 195 (1986) (finding that death sentences are, on average, 4.6
times more likely in White victim cases than in Black victim cases); William
G. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-
Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 595 (1980) (studying
death sentences during the five years following the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in Florida, Georgia, Ohio and
Texas, which were responsible for roughly 70% of all death sentences imposed
nationwide during this period, and finding in all four states that the race of
the victim was an important determinant of sentence, with Black offender-
White victim cases most likely to result in the death penalty); Samuel R.
Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death:An Analysis of Racial Disparities in
Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 105
(1984) (examining capital sentencing in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia between 1976 and 1980
and finding discrimination based on the race of the victim in each of these
states); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in
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Moreover, the appearance of racial bias decreases respect for
the legal system and erodes our ideals of racial equality. Pro-
phylactic measures should be taken, especially if the cost of
such measures is low.
Two objections to the idea that racial stereotypes might be
influencing jury verdicts in self-defense cases might be raised.
First, it might be argued that it is reasonable to fear a person
because of his race. If defendants and jurors are influenced by
the race of the victim, arguably this might be an appropriate
influence. I will call this argument the "race-is-relevant" ob-
jection. The statistical version of this argument was addressed
in Part HI, but because the argument rests on more than just
statistics, I will briefly revisit the issue here. The second ob-
jection posits that one cannot know for certain whether the
race of the victim actually influences legal decisionmakers in
self-defense cases. Given the paucity of data from the case re-
porters (since acquittals are not generally appealed), this ob-
jection, which I will call the "epistemological" objection, ini-
tially appears persuasive. Ultimately, the argument is
unconvincing because it fails to take into account recent re-
search on human cognition that recognizes the human ten-
dency to categorize through stereotyping and the influence
stereotyping has on perception and judgment.
Kentucky Murder Trials: An Analysis of Post-Gregg Outcomes, 7 JuST. Q. 189,
197 (1990) (finding that even after controlling for the heinousness of the mur-
der, prior criminal record, and the personal relationship between the victim
and the offender, Blacks accused of killing Whites had a higher than average
probability of being charged with capital murder and sentenced to death);
Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race, Homicide Severity, and Application
of the Death Penalty: A Consideration of the Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMINOLOGY
511, 527 (1989) (finding that even after controlling for the seriousness of the
offense, the impact of race was still significant, with Blacks who killed Whites
still more likely to receive the death penalty in Kentucky); Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, Does the Race of the Victim Matter?: An Examination of Capital
Sentencing and Guilt Attribution Studies (work-in-progress) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (citing David C. Baldus et al., Comparative
Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983) ("[A]nalyses suggest that Georgia's
death-sentencing system is tainted by the influence of arbitrary and capri-
cious factors, notably the victim's race . . . ."); Michael L. Radelet, Racial
Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv.
918, 922-23 (1981) (studying over 600 homicides in twenty Florida counties
between 1976 and 1977 and finding that defendants who kill Whites are more
likely to be sentenced to death than defendants who kill Blacks); Jonathan R.
Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining
the Issue of Racial Disparity, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61, 72 (1995) (finding that
Blacks who kill Whites are nearly four times as likely as Whites who kill
Whites to be charged and convicted of capital murder).
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In this Part, I first address these two possible objections. I
then offer some preliminary suggestions as to how the law
might be reformed to reduce the risk of racial bias influencing
the exercise of jury discretion in self-defense cases.
A. Two POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
1. The "Race-is-Relevant" Objection
One might object to reforms to minimize the influence of
racial stereotypes in self-defense cases by arguing that race is,
or more precisely, can be, relevant to the determination of
whether a defendant's belief in the need to use force in self-
defense was reasonable. If race is relevant, then perhaps it is
not improper racial bias, but appropriate consideration of race
that influences the outcome in cases like the ones discussed
above.
At a very basic level, the race-is-relevant argument ap-
pears to make sense because it is not possible for jurors to
completely disregard race in cases involving people of color.
348
In fact, in some cases, it might be desirable to pay attention to
race. For example, the test for whether a seizure has taken
place within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is whether
a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would have felt free
to leave or terminate the encounter with the police.349 Given
differences in experience, the average Black person living in
South Central Los Angeles might feel less at liberty to leave or
to terminate an encounter with two police officers in full uni-
form with guns in their holsters than the average White person
living in Brentwood, an upper-class neighborhood in West Los
Angeles, in a similar situation. This difference has led some
scholars to call for a more inclusive reasonable person stan-
dard, one that considers the experiences of Black people in de-
348. As Neil Gotanda has pointed out in his critique of the color-blindness
principle, in order to disregard race, one must first consider race and then try
to ignore it. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1991) (describing process of racial non-
recognition). Legal decisionmakers cannot completely ignore race because
color-blindness is not truly possible. Although people can never completely
disregard race, we can at least attempt to minimize the influence of racial
bias.
349. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991).
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termining whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has oc-
curred.350
In order to stop a person for brief questioning and investi-
gation, police must have reasonable suspicion that the person
has been or is involved in criminal activity.35' In California v.
Hodari D., Justice Antonin Scalia suggested in dicta that flight
at the sight of a police officer would be sufficient evidence of
criminal activity to give a police officer reasonable suspicion to
stop the person fleeing.352 The race of the person fleeing the
officer might also influence whether that person's flight from
the police is a reasonable response. Tracey Maclin points out
that while flight at the sight of a police officer might be an ab-
normal reaction from a White person living in a neighborhood
in which the police have good relations with the residents, it
might be the natural response of a Black person living in a
neighborhood known for police brutality and police harassment
of Blacks.353 The average Black person living in such a neigh-
borhood might reasonably flee the police for reasons other than
involvement in crime:
From a police perspective, Justice Scalia's remarks may make sense.
"Flight from an approaching patrol car implies guilt; an innocent per-
son, patrolmen reason, would have nothing to fear from the police
and would not [run] away" as did Hodari. Of course, this viewpoint,
never considers that Hodari, a black youth, may have had alternative
reasons for wanting to avoid the cops. Many persons who have never
committed a crime have ambivalent or negative attitudes about the
police. Perhaps a youth like Hodari flees at the sight of police be-
350. See Greene, supra note 107, at 2045 ("One circumstance explicitly
considered by the courts should be the race of the various actors."); Johnson,
supra note 155, at 663 (criticizing the reasonable person standard used to de-
termine whether a seizure has occurred for ignoring the distinct experiences
of racial minorities); Randall S. Susskind, Note, Race, Reasonable Articulable
Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 327, 347-48 (1994) (advocating a
"reasonable African-American" standard); see also Maclin, supra note 9, at
268-78 (advocating consideration of race in determining whether a Fourth
Amendment seizure of the person is consensual); Robert V. Ward, Consenting
to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a
"Reasonable Person," 36 HOW. L.J. 239, 253-58 (1993) (arguing that the court
should take into account the defendant's race, ethnicity, and socio-economic
background as well as police-community relations in deciding whether a de-
fendant's consent to a Terry stop was voluntary).
351. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
352. 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991) ("That it would be unreasonable to stop,
for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of
the police is not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common
sense.").
353. Maclin, supra note 9, at 276.
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cause he does not wish to drop his pants, as many black youths in
Boston have been forced to do, just because the cops suspect he be-
longs to a gang or is selling drugs.54
Macln's argument is supported by studies indicating that
police brutality disproportionately involves White police offi-
cers and minority victims. For example, Kim Lersch found
that during the period between January 1990 and May 1992,
White police officers were centrally involved in 93% of the
cases of serious police brutality; Black or Latino citizens were
the victims in 97% of those cases.5 5 Maclin suggests that
courts determining whether police had reasonable suspicion to
justify a Terry stop "should consider the race of the citizen
[stopped] and how the citizen's race might have influenced his
attitude toward the encounter."356
This issue recently came to the fore in New York. United
States District Court Judge Harold Baer gained notoriety when
he suppressed 34 kilograms of cocaine and 2 kilograms of her-
oin found in the trunk of a rental car driven by Carol Bayless,
a middle-aged Black woman, because he based his ruling at
least in part on the argument that it is not that unusual for
people living in a neighborhood known for police brutality and
corruption to run from the police.357 Four men loaded two duf-
fel bags containing the drugs into Bayless's double-parked
rental car at about 5:00 a.m. in the Washington Heights sec-
tion of New York City.35 8 Judge Baer held that the fact that
one of these men ran after noticing the police officers did not
give the officers reasonable suspicion to stop Bayless. 9 Judge
Baer explained:
Moreover, even assuming that one or more of the males ran from the
corner once they were aware of the officer's presence, it is hard to
characterize this as evasive conduct. Police officers, even those
travelling in unmarked vehicles, are easily recognized, particularly,
in this area of Manhattan. In fact, the same United States Attorney's
Office which brought this prosecution enjoyed more success in their
prosecution of a corrupt police officer of an anti-crime unit operating
in this very neighborhood. Even before this prosecution and the pub-
lic hearing and final report of the Mollen Commission, residents in
this neighborhood tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive
and violent. After the attendant publicity surrounding the above
354. Id.
355. FEAGIN & VERA, supra note 138, at 69.
356. Macln, supra note 9, at 279.
357. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
358. Id. at 234-35.
359. Id. at 242.
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events, had the men not run when the cops began to stare at them, it
would have been unusual.W
The problem with the argument that it may be reasonable
for Blacks in certain neighborhoods to run from police is that
the issue in a Terry stop case is not whether it is reasonable or
unreasonable for someone to run from police officers. The issue
is whether running from police establishes reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity. One might argue that it is both rea-
sonable for a person to run from police in a particular neigh-
borhood and reasonable for a police officer to suspect the
individual fleeing is involved in criminal activity. On the other
hand, consideration of the perspective of the person running
may inform the latter inquiry.
Another way in which racial, as well as class and gender,
differences matter is reflected in difficulties satisfying the re-
quirements for invocation of the right to counsel prior to or
during a police interrogation. In Davis v. United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that invocation of the right to counsel
under Miranda must be clear and unequivocal.361 A year be-
fore the Court issued its opinion in Davis, Janet Ainsworth
pointed out that women and minorities, attempting to assert
the right to counsel, might sound more equivocal, hesitant, and
deferential than White men.362 A rule that only clear and une-
360. Id. Many politicians reacted angrily to Baer's ruling. New York's
Governor George Pataki, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and House Speaker Newt
Gingrich (R-Georgia) stated that Baer was more concerned with the rights of
defendants than with public safety. John J. Goldman, Judge Bows to Pres-
sure, Changes Ruling on Drug Seizure, L-A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at A8.
Presidential candidate and then Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas) called for Baer's
impeachment. Id. White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry stated that, if
Baer did not reverse his ruling, President Clinton, who had appointed Baer in
1994, might ask for his resignation. Id. Even though many legal observers
opined that Baer's ruling was well within the law, see Don Van Natta, Jr.,
Judge's Drug Ruling Likely to Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at A27, Baer
granted the governments motion for reconsideration and vacated his original
decision on the ground that new evidence presented by the government con-
vinced Baer that the government's police officer witnesses were more credible
than Carol Bayless. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
361. 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994). The test for invocation of counsel is
significant because once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, all ques-
tioning must cease until counsel is present or the suspect initiates conversa-
tion with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); see Ari-
zona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1988) (applying Edwards rule to case
in which second interrogation was regarding a different crime).
862. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Power-
lessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 290 (1993).
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quivocal requests for counsel will suffice to invoke the right to
counsel does not adequately recognize differences in speech
registers arising from race and gender differences.
Finally, race 63 may be relevant to the presence or absence
of a required mental state in the criminal law. The fact that a
man accused of rape is from a country that practices marriage-
by-capture, a ritual in which the wife-to-be is supposed to pro-
test and pretend to struggle while the husband-to-be kidnaps
and then forces the wife-to-be to have sex with him, may be
relevant to whether the man intended sex by force or fear
without the woman's consent.364 A man born and raised in
America is expected to know that a woman's protest means
lack of consent; arguably an immigrant Hmong man from
Southeast Asia would not realize this.
Race, as these examples illustrate, can be relevant in
many situations. The race-is-relevant objection to reform of
self-defense law, however, does not rest solely on the claim that
race is relevant. More precisely, the argument rests on the as-
sumption that it is reasonable to believe that another person
poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, at
least in part, because of that person's race. One can agree that
race may be relevant in some criminal cases without making
these further specific claims about the relevance of race in self-
defense cases.
The argument that the race of the victim is probative of
reasonableness takes many different forms. 365 One version of
363. As mentioned earlier, I use the term "race" in this Article broadly to
include culture and ethnicity.
364. Maguigan, supra note 44, at 64 (discussing marriage-by-capture). For
a critique of unmitigated embracement of the cultural defense, see Leti Volpp,
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV.
WOMEN's L.J. 57, 59 (1994) (proposing an antisubordination principle to assist
in determining whether cultural evidence should be permitted); cf Doriane
Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The
Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996) (arguing that cul-
tural evidence should not be permitted at trial).
365. Armour, supra note 12, at 786-801. In Race Ipsa Loquitur, Armour
describes three types of defendants who might make the claim that it is rea-
sonable to fear another person because of the color of that person's skin: (1)
the Reasonable Racist; (2) the Intelligent Bayesian; and (3) the Involuntary
Negrophobe. The Reasonable Racist claims that it is reasonable to fear Blacks
because most Americans would fear Blacks. The Intelligent Bayesian claims
it is reasonable to fear Blacks because of statistical evidence showing Blacks
are more likely to be arrested for violent crimes. The Involuntary Negrophobe
makes a subjective claim that because of a prior bad experience involving
members of the victim's racial group, she personally had reason to fear the
[Vol. 81:367458
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the argument is the notion that a defendant's belief in the need
for self-defense is reasonable if the typical or average American
in the defendant's shoes would have also believed he was fac-
ing imminent death or serious bodily injury. Jody Armour de-
scribes the person who uses force against a Black person and
then makes this argument as "The Reasonable Racist":
The Reasonable Racist asserts that, even if his belief that blacks are
"prone to violence" stems from pure prejudice, he should be excused
for considering the victim's race before using force because most simi-
larly situated Americans would have done so as well. For inasmuch
as the criminal justice system operates on the assumption that
"blame is reserved for the (statistically) deviant," an individual racist
in a racist society cannot be condemned for an expression of human
frailty as ubiquitous as racism.36
The problem with The Reasonable Racist's claim is that a
"typical" belief is not necessarily a "reasonable" belief. Just be-
cause most or many people share the same bias does not mean
that the shared bias is a reasonable bias. The average person
is not necessarily reasonable. Moreover, we as a society have
decided that, even if most people are susceptible to (or guilty
of) racial prejudice, such prejudice is improper.367 For example,
even though a prosecutor has extremely broad discretion in
deciding whom to charge and what charges to file, the prosecu-
tor may not base her charging decisions on race without violat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 68 Similarly, even though generally prosecutors may use
the peremptory challenge to strike prospective jurors for any
reason or no reason at all, prosecutors may not utilize their
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.369
The principle of equality is so much a part of our society that
we have extended prohibitions against race-based decision-
victim even if other reasonable people would not have feared the victim. I ad-
dress only the first two types of claims, those made by the Reasonable Racist
and the Intelligent Bayesian, because most jurisdictions follow an objective (or
hybrid subjectivized-objective) standard of reasonableness under which the
idiosyncratic beliefs of the defendant are not considered characteristic of the
reasonable person.
366. Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
367. See id. at 788 (arguing that typical beliefs are not necessarily reason-
able beliefs).
368. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
369. Edmonson v. Leesville Construction Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991)
(extending Batson to civil cases); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991)
(extending Batson to case in which White defendant objected to prosecutor's
striking of prospective Black jurors); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100
(1986). Recently, the Supreme Court extended the Batson rule to peremptory
challenges based on gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1994).
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making to private actors. For example, in 1992 the Supreme
Court extended the prohibition against racially based peremp-
tory challenges to defense attorneys, treating even private
criminal defense attorneys as state actors for purposes of jury
selection, even though defense attorneys are not usually con-
sidered state actors."' Public and private employers have wide
discretion in making hiring and promotion decisions, but gen-
erally neither may discriminate on the basis of race in making
such decisions."' Similarly, private landlords have broad dis-
cretion in deciding whom to select as tenants, but they may not
base their rental decisions on race. 372
Another version of the race-is-relevant argument relies on
statistical evidence to show that the defendant's beliefs are
reasonable. Michael Levin, for example, argues that a person
jogging alone after dark is morally justified in being afraid of a
young Black male ahead of him on the jogging track because of
the statistical probability that the Black man will attack him:
It is widely agreed that young black males are significantly more
likely to commit crimes against persons than are members of any
other racially identified group. Approximately one black male in four
is incarcerated at some time for the commission of a felony, while the
incarceration rate for white males is between 2 and 3.5%.
... Suppose, jogging alone after dark, you see a young black male
ahead of you on the running track, not attired in a jogging outfit and
displaying no other information-bearing trait. Based on the statistics
cited earlier, you must set the likelihood of his being a felon at .25....
On the other hand it would be rational to trust a white male under
identical circumstances, since the probability of his being a felon is
less than .05. Since whatever factors affect the probability of the
black attacking you-the isolation, your vulnerability-presumably
affect the probability of a white attacking you as well, it remains
more rational to be more fearful of the black than of the white.37 3
370. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson's pro-
hibitions to criminal defense attorneys).
371. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West 1994); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)
(West Supp. 1995).
372. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1982, 3604(a) (West 1994); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12955(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
373. Michael Levin, Responses to Race Differences in Crime, 23 J. Soc.
PHIL. 5, 7 (Spring 1992). Although Levin states that "[a]pproximately one
black male in four is incarcerated at some time for the commission of a fel-
ony," the actual statistics at that time showed that 23% of Black men between
the ages of twenty to twenty-nine were in prison, on probation or parole, or in
some way connected with the criminal justice system. MAUER, supra note 145,
at 2-3 (emphasis added).
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Levin argues that it is reasonable (or in his words "more
rational") to be more fearful of a Black man than a White man
because of the one-in-four statistical probability that the Black
man will attack. The statistics relied on by Levin, however,
merely show that approximately one Black male in four is as-
sociated with the criminal justice system at any given time for
the commission of a felony. The statistics say nothing about
whether the felony is a violent or nonviolent offense. As dis-
cussed earlier, many of the Blacks associated with the criminal
justice system are not violent offenders.3 74 A great number are
incarcerated for non-violent drug offenses.375 Moreover, Levin's
argument is flawed because he attributes a population charac-
teristic to an individual. The fact that one in four Blacks on
any given day is likely to be in prison, on probation or parole,
or in some way connected with the criminal justice system does
not mean that any given Black individual is more likely than
not to be a felon. If one focuses on the three out of every four
Blacks who, at any given time, are not associated with the
criminal justice system, one might conclude that it is more
likely than not that any given Black individual is a not a
criminal.
As noted in Part H, statistical evidence can be used either
to support or refute the claim that it is reasonable to fear
Blacks. 376 Eighty percent of all crimes of violence are intra-
racial (e.g., White-on-White, Black-on-Black, Latino-on-Latino,
or Asian-on-Asian).377 Only 20% of all crimes of violence are in-
ter-racial and only 15% of these crimes, or 3% of all violent
crimes, involve Black defendants and White victims. 3 7  Gov-
ernment statistics indicate that a White person is more than
four times as likely to be killed by another White person than
by a Black person.379 From these statistics, one might conclude
374. MAUER, supra note 145, at 5 (noting the increased enforcement of
drug crimes has fueled the increase in Blacks being associated with the crimi-
nal justice system).
375. Id. at 9; see also Sklansky, supra note 149, at 1289 (discussing the
disparate impact of severe crack cocaine penalties on Black crack offenders).
376. See supra notes 145-161 and accompanying text (noting reliance on a
given set of crime statistics can oversimplify or distort important details).
377. Kennedy, supra note 159, at 1255 n.2 ("About 80 percent of violence
occurs among persons of the same race.").
378. Id. at 1255.
379. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 151, at 17 (Table 2.8-
Victim/Offender Relationship by Race and Sex, 1993 [Single Victim/Single Of-
fender]).
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that the chances of a White person being killed by a Black per-
son are much lower than the chances of being killed by another
White person and that it is, therefore, more reasonable for a
White person to fear another White man over a Black man.
380
Ultimately, however, reliance on statistics to support or refute
arguments of reasonableness is misguided because people per-
ceiving themselves to be in danger do not calculate the statisti-
cal probabilities of death before acting. They react automati-
cally to the stereotypes that are deeply ingrained within.
Levin's argument is further limited. Levin's point is only
that one is morally justified in being afraid of a young Black
male. Even if one were morally justified in being afraid of a
young Black male ahead of one on the jogging track, this might
support the cessation of jogging and a return to one's car, but
should not give one legal license to shoot that young Black
male absent any aggressive behavior on the young Black male's
part. Being apprehensive does not necessarily rise to the level
of having a reasonable belief in an imminent attack which is
required for self-defense. The fear that might lead a person to
avoid a confrontation might not rise to the level of a reasonable
belief in imminent death or serious bodily injury which would
justify picking up a gun and shooting the other person.
2. The Epistemological Objection
A second objection that might be asserted is that it is im-
possible to know whether racial stereotypes about the victim
actually influence the reasonableness determination in self-
defense cases. I call this the "epistemological" objection be-
cause it rests on assumptions about what we can and cannot
know.
The epistemological objection is logical and persuasive at
an intuitive level. It is difficult to prove empirically that jurors
in self-defense cases are influenced by racial stereotypes. Ju-
rors are not required to give reasons for their verdicts.3"' In-
380. As noted in Part II, these statistics do not factor out non-stranger
homicides. Because the statistics do not indicate the probability of a White
person being killed by a White stranger and the probability of that person
being killed by a Black stranger, it is not possible to infer either that it is rea-
sonable, or not reasonable, for a White person to fear a Black stranger over a
White stranger.
381. In fact, Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits jurors
from testifying about their verdicts except under limited circumstances:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
[Vol. 81:367462
RACE AND SELF-DEFENSE
dividual jurors are influenced by an array of different factors.
Even if jurors were to reveal the reasons that led to their ver-
dicts, there would be no guarantee that the reasons disclosed
were in fact the true reasons. Since racial bias is often uncon-
scious, a juror might not know that stereotypes influenced her
decisionmaking.38
2
The epistemological objection, however, fails to take into
account recent research on social cognition and common-
sense.383 Such research indicates that the human brain relies
on default assumptions to interpret ambiguous situations.38 4
Racial stereotypes can be understood as shortcuts which help
the human mind make sense of reality. 385 The Black-as-
criminal stereotype, for example, increased the believability of
Susan Smith's, Charles Stuart's, and Jesse Anderson's false
claims.386 The Asian-as-martial artist stereotype made it eas-
ier for a jury to believe Mr. Simon's claim that he reasonably
thought his Asian American neighbor knew martial arts and
therefore posed a serious enough threat to Simon's life to jus-
tify shooting his neighbor as his neighbor was entering his own
house.387 Fears of gang violence coupled with stereotypes about
Latinos as gang members and illegal immigrants made it eas-
ier for people to rally to William Masters's defense when he
course of the jury's deliberations or the effect of anything upon that
or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to as-
sent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the ju-
ror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror
may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b); see also infra note 427 (discussing use of the general
verdict, as opposed to the special verdict form, in criminal cases).
382. See Charles R. Lawrence IH, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987)
(positing that "a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination
is influenced by unconscious racial motivation").
383. Social cognition has been described as "the direct and explicit study of
the cognitive processes involved in social psychological phenomena, such as
person perception." David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of
Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979).
384. DOUGLAS R. HoFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR
THE ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATrERN 137 (1985); see also K.C. Cole, Brain's
Use of Shortcuts Can Be a Route to Bias, L.- TIMES, May 1, 1995, at Al
(describing behavioral studies indicating that patterns of perception influence
the way individuals view the world).
385. Krieger, supra note 63, at 1187-89.
386. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Black-as-criminal stereotype).
387. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Asian-as-foreigner stereotype).
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shot two young Mexican American males who were spray-
painting under the freeway.388  Not only do existing racial
stereotypes explain such situations, but the tremendous media
attention given to these crimes refines and adds weight to the
stereotypes, further entrenching them. Given the tendency for
the human mind to rely on stereotypes, one can infer that
stereotypes influence decisionmaking in general, and juror de-
terminations of reasonableness in self-defense cases in particu-
lar.38
9
388. See supra Part 1.C (describing the Latino-as-foreigner and Latino-as-
criminal stereotypes).
389. Given the lack of direct evidence supporting this inference, it would
be useful if social scientists were to conduct methodologically valid simula-
tions testing whether jurors in self-defense cases react differently when the
victim's race is varied but all other facts stay constant. None of the social sci-
ence studies that have been conducted on juror-victim racial similarity and
guilt attribution have utilized a self-defense case. See, e.g., Robert W. Hymes
et al., Acquaintance Rape: The Effect of Race of Defendant and Race of Victim
on White Juror Decisions, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 627, 632 (1993) (finding that
mock jurors were more likely to find the defendant guilty of rape when the
defendant's race differed from the victim's race, i.e., in interracial cases, than
when their races were the same); Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape,
and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3 BASIc & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 28 (1982) (finding that jurors thought the defendant was
more likely to be guilty when the victim was White than when the victim was
Black in mock rape, murder, and burglary cases; no similar influence in mock
drug cases); Marina Miller & Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a
Function of Juror-Victim Racial Similarity, 105 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 159, 163-64
(1978) (finding juror-victim racial similarity influenced verdict in mock rape
case with White jurors tending to convict more often when the victim was
White, and Black jurors tending to convict more often when the victim was
Black); Ronald L. Poulson, Mock Juror Attribution of Criminal Responsibility:
Effects of Race and the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) Verdict Option, 20 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1596, 1605 (1990) (finding no race-of-the-victim effect
in mock insanity defense case); Neil A. Rector et al., The Effect of Prejudice
and Judicial Ambiguity on Defendant Guilt Ratings, 133 J. Soc. PSYCHOL.
651, 657 (1993) (finding that the race of the victim did not significantly affect
juror decisionmaking in a mock rape case); Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu,
Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 140-44 (1979) (finding juror-victim ra-
cial similarity influenced verdict in mock rape case with White students find-
ing the defendant guilty more often when the victim was White than when the
victim was Black, and Black students finding the defendant guilty more often
when the victim was Black than when the victim was White).
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B. TENTATIVE PROPOSALS
Anyone who starts out with the conviction that the road to racial jus-
tice is only one lane wide will inevitably create a traffic jam and make
the journey infinitely longer.
-Martin Luther King, Jr.
390
Assuming that racial stereotypes affect jury decisionmak-
ing, it is worth exploring ways the law can be reformed to
minimize the risk of this occurring. Several legal scholars have
suggested ways to minimize racial bias in the criminal justice
system. For example, recognizing that "White jurors may tend
to view the victimization of nonwhites as less serious than the
victimization of members of their own racial group," Albert
Alschuler has proposed the use of racial quotas in jury selec-
tion to increase the number of minorities on juries.391 Sheri
Lynn Johnson supports giving minority defendants the right to
three racially similar jurors on the petit jury.392 Having more
juries comprised of jurors with different perspectives on the
significance of race would probably educate jurors about racial
bias more effectively than limiting instructions. The Supreme
Court, however, has resisted extending the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair cross-section of the community beyond the venire
to petit juries393 and is unlikely to rule differently in the near
future. If a jurisdiction were to adopt a racial quota for jury
selection, the practice most likely would be subject to strict
scrutiny given the Supreme Court's recent decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.394 Some academics have questioned
390. MARTIN LuTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TowARD FREEDOM 34 (1958).
391. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DuKE L.J. 704,
732 (1995) (advocating affirmative action or racial quotas injury selection).
392. Johnson, supra note 9, at 1698-99 (arguing that a defendant of color
should have the right to have at least three racially similar jurors on the
jury).
393. The Supreme Court stated:
It should also be emphasized that in holding that petit juries must be
drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we im-
pose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the popula-
tion. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composi-
tion....
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
394. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) (hold-
ing that all racial classifications imposed by federal, state, or local govern-
mental actors must be analyzed by a reviewing court under a strict scrutiny
standard).
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whether such a scheme would survive a constitutional chal-
lenge.395
George Fletcher also supports the notion of increased di-
versity on the jury to ensure greater victim representation. In
his recent book, With Justice for Some: Protecting Victims'
Rights in Criminal Trials, Fletcher notes:
The great advantage of victim representation on the jury is not the
resulting spin on the outcome but rather the inhibitory effect on the
deliberations. With a gay, black, or Jew sitting in the jury room, thejurors are not likely to make comments that subtly reflect shared bi-
ases about these subcultures.396
Sheri Lynn Johnson has also proposed a racial imagery
shield law, which would preclude racially charged argument or
testimony unless it fit within one of eight particularized ex-
ceptions, and a new ethics code provision prohibiting the use of
racial imagery in argument and testimony.397 The detailed na-
ture and number of exceptions may make Johnson's racial im-
agery rule difficult to implement. Nonetheless, her proposals
constitute positive thoughts toward eliminating the influence
of racial stereotypes on legal decisionmakers. 398
In a more recent attempt to address the problem of racial
bias against Black defendants in criminal cases, Paul Butler
has proposed that Black jurors should exercise their power to
nullify and acquit Black defendants accused of non-violent
crimes even when the evidence demonstrates guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.399 While Butler addresses important ques-
395. Alschuler, supra note 391, at 716 n.58 (listing academics who question
whether a racial quota system would pass constitutional muster).
396. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 251. But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The
Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 828-40 (1995)
(pointing out that the purpose of the criminal trial is not to stand by the vic-
tim, but to adjudicate the factual and legal responsibility of the defendant for
the alleged offense).
397. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1794-97, 1800-02.
398. One problem with Johnson's racial imagery shield law proposal is that
it specifically exempts "a racial attitude, including race-based fear" alleged to
have contributed to the defendanfs belief that his actions were reasonable
where the defendant's good faith is both relevant and disputed, and the de-
fendant's racial attitude is not described in unnecessarily inflammatory
terms. Id. The covert appeal to race by Bernhard Goetz's criminal defense
attorney arguably would fall within this exception because Goetz's race-based
fear allegedly contributed to Goetz's belief that his actions were reasonable,
Goetz's good faith was both relevant and disputed, and the use of four Black
youths to recreate the subway shooting scene arguably was not unnecessarily
inflammatory. This problem, however, could be resolved by eliminating this
particular exemption.
399. Butler, supra note 197, at 705.
[Vol. 81:367
RACE AND SELF-DEFENSE
tions in a novel and thought-provoking manner, his racially
based jury nullification proposal raises a host of problems. In-
structing Black jurors to acquit guilty Black defendants would
compound the natural tendency all people have to favor mem-
bers of their own social groups (in-group favoritism) over mem-
bers of other groups (out-group antagonism). Additionally,
giving nullification instructions to Black jurors might encour-
age White jurors to nullify in favor of White defendants and/or
White victims, Latino jurors to nullify in favor of Latino defen-
dants and/or Latino victims, and Asian American jurors to
nullify in favor of Asian American defendants and/or Asian
American victims. Non-Black jurors would feel justified in
nullifying because they would only be doing what Black jurors
were doing. Rather than minimizing the problem of racial
bias, racially based jury nullification instructions might have
the opposite effect.
To deal with the problem of racial stereotypes affecting ju-
ror determinations of reasonableness in self-defense cases, at
least three options are available.00 First, we could maintain
the status quo despite its flaws. Second, we could eliminate
the reasonableness requirement and embrace a completely
subjective standard for determining self-defense claims. Third,
we could maintain the reasonableness requirement, but at-
tempt to reform self-defense doctrine to minimize the influence
of racial stereotypes. The first two possibilities contain serious
drawbacks. Maintaining the status quo is not a desirable op-
tion if we truly want to reduce the risk of racial stereotypes in-
fluencing jurors and other legal decisionmakers. Eliminating
the reasonableness requirement in favor of a completely sub-
jective standard is a tempting alternative, but it would favor
actors who act out their racial biases. A defendant who hon-
estly believed another person posed an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily injury solely because of that person's
race would be exculpated under a completely subjective stan-
dard.
400. A fourth option is also possible, but not likely. We could completely
eliminate the belief requirement from self-defense doctrine and acquit only
those defendants who are correct in their assessment of the danger. Under
such a view, the use of defensive force would have to be necessary based on
objective facts. The problem with such an approach is that the law has never
required the defendant who claims self-defense to be correct. Acquitting de-
fendants who reasonably believe in the need for self-defense strikes a balance
between recognizing the infallibility of human nature and requiring defen-
dants to be accountable for their actions.
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Working within the current framework of self-defense law,
I make two preliminary suggestions for reform: (1) clarification
of the act-belief distinction through a revised jury instruction
on self-defense that makes explicit the requirement that both
the defendant's beliefs and acts must be reasonable, coupled
with a new two-tiered framework for assessing criminal liabil-
ity in recognition of the act-belief distinction, and (2) a supple-
mental limiting jury instruction, to be given at either party's
request or by the judge sua sponte in any case in which self-
defense is an issue, that reminds jurors not to rely on racial
stereotypes in determining whether a defendant's acts or be-
liefs were reasonable.
Clarification of the act-belief distinction is a reform needed
in all self-defense cases, not just self-defense cases in which
race is an issue.40 1  Jurors deciding self-defense claims may
conflate the reasonable act and reasonable belief requirements
whether or not race is an issue in the case. This problem of
conflation may be accentuated when the case involves race.
Indeed, it was the close scrutiny of self-defense cases involving
victims of color which illuminated the conflation of reasonable
acts and reasonable beliefs and led to this proposal.
The second proposal, the supplemental limiting instruction
on the impropriety of relying on stereotypes, is necessary be-
cause clarifying the act-belief distinction does not directly ad-
dress the problem of racial stereotypes. At the least, this sec-
ond reform will send a strong normative message that jurors in
self-defense cases should not permit racial stereotypes to influ-
ence their decisionmaking. It is hoped that the instruction will
also minimize the influence of racial stereotypes on jury deci-
sionmaking in self-defense cases by making the inappropriate-
ness of racial stereotyping explicit. Additionally, the instruc-
tion may have a socially transformative effect, following the
example of changes in rape law which have affected societal
attitudes about what constitutes a rape. Before those changes,
many people believed that it was not rape if the woman did not
immediately complain about the incident to the police or forci-
401. It might be argued that racial stereotypes affect only beliefs, not ac-
tions. If racial stereotypes affect only beliefs, not actions, then one can fur-
ther argue that clarifying the act-belief distinction in self-defense doctrine is a
remedy that does not address the problem of racial stereotypes. Modem re-
search, as well as common sense, demonstrates that stereotypes can affect
both beliefs and actions. The Black-as-criminal stereotype might cause a per-
son not only to believe that a particular innocent Black person is dangerous,
but also to act on that belief by shooting the innocent Black.
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bly resist her attacker. Jury instructions in most states now
inform such jurors that resistance is not an element of the
crime and the lack of a fresh complaint is not a defense. While
it is difficult to discern whether such instructions have influ-
enced actual outcomes in rape cases, such reforms have had a
noticeable impact on societal attitudes about rape. Today, one
is less likely to hear someone say that a woman claiming she
was raped is lying because she didn't resist or immediately call
the police. It is hoped that attempts to reform self-defense law
in ways that reflect this society's commitment to racial justice
will have similar transformative effects.
One might argue that it is unfair for jurors with the luxury
of hindsight to hold people who have acted in situations of dis-
tress to objective standards. This argument might be persua-
sive if the law embraced subjective standards in all matters of
criminal liability, but it does not. The criminal law utilizes
objective standards like reasonableness in many doctrines
other than self-defense, such as duress, necessity, and provo-
cation. In doing so, the law presumes that people can be ex-
pected to conform their conduct to societal norms expressed in
the reasonableness requirement.
1. Act-Belief Distinction
One can have as many racist thoughts and beliefs as one
wants and society will not punish these racist thoughts and
beliefs.4 2 If, however, a person acts upon racist thoughts and
beliefs in a way that causes physical harm to another person,
society not only can punish the actor for the harm caused, it
can also increase the penalty based on the fact that racist
thoughts motivated that person's actions.4 °3 In this society, one
is free to think whatever thoughts one chooses, but must check
oneself at the point at which one acts on those thoughts. This
is why it is not a crime for a woman to refuse to enter an eleva-
tor because a man is on that elevator, even if the woman is
avoiding the man because of a gender stereotype that views all
men as potential rapists. If, however, the woman acts upon
this stereotype by shooting the male elevator rider, the woman
can and should be prosecuted for her actions.
In many states, the jury instructions on self-defense do not
make clear that both the defendant's beliefs and actions must
402. See generally RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
403. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 489 (1993).
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be reasonable.4" For example, the standard jury instruction
given in California in self-defense cases reads:
The killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable and not
unlawful when the person who does the killing actually and reasona-
bly believes:
a. That there is imminent danger that the other person will ei-
ther kill [him][her or cause [him][her] great bodily injury; and
b. That it was necessary under the circumstances for [him][her]
to use in self-defense, such force or means as might cause the
death of the other person, for the purpose of avoiding death or
great bodily injury to [himself][herself].
A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to jus-
tify a homicide. To justify taking the life of another in self-defense,
the circumstances must be such as to excite the fears of a reasonable
person placed in a similar position, and the party killing must act
under the influence of such fears alone. The danger must be appar-
ent, present, immediate and instantly dealt with, or must so appear
at the time to the slayer as a reasonable person, and the killing must
be done under a well founded belief that it is necessary to save one's
self from death or great bodily harm. 405
California's standard self-defense jury instructions, like
the self-defense jury instructions in many jurisdictions, are
problematic for two reasons. First, they focus the jury's atten-
404. For a detailed discussion of the inherent requirement of reasonable
action in self-defense claims, see infra Part III.B.l.b. Jury instructions on
self-defense in many states focus on the reasonableness of the defendant's be-
liefs or fears, without mentioning the requirement that the defendant's ac-
tions also must have been reasonable. See, e.g., ALABAMA CRIMINAL CODE,
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13A-3-23 (1989); ALASKA PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 81.330, 81.335(a) (1980); CALIFORNIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL No. 5.12 (West 1988) (revised 1994); CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL No. 5.30 (West 1988) (revised 1995);
COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 7:16, 7:17, 7:20.5 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1993); FLORIDA JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.04(d) (West
1981) (revised 1985); FLORIDA JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES §
3.04(e) (West 1981) (revised 1992); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIMINAL § 24-25.06 (3d ed. 1992); PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS-
CRIMINAL §§ 54.17, 54.22 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995); MICHIGAN CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.15 (2d ed. 1991); MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 114.17 (West 1992); MISSOURI APPROVED IN-
STRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 306.06 (3d ed. 1987); MONTANA CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS §§ 3-102, 3-115(a) (1990); NEBRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIMINAL §§ 7.1-7.3 (2d ed. 1995); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEW YORK
§§ 35.00, 35.15 (1983) (revised 1989); PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL SUGGESTED
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 9.505E (1979); WISCONSIN JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 800, 801, 805, 815, 820 (1966) (revised 1994);
WYOMING PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 5.201-5.212 (1978).
405. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, supra note 404, No. 5.12
(emphasis added).
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tion on the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs and fail to
make explicit the fact that both the defendant's beliefs and ac-
tions must be reasonable to constitute self-defense. 40 6 Second,
in using the terms "beliefs" and "fears" interchangeably, the in-
structions fail to recognize the distinction between a fear
grounded in emotion and a belief grounded in reason. One
might genuinely fear another person yet lack the belief neces-
sary for a self-defense acquittal if one's belief in the imminence
of serious bodily harm and the necessity of using force to pro-
tect oneself is not reasonable. Of course, beliefs and fears are
not completely separate notions. Fears may be grounded in
reasonable or unreasonable beliefs. Nonetheless, the complex-
ity of the distinction between fears and beliefs may be obscured
when the two terms are conflated.
a. The Honest and Reasonable Belief Requirement
Racial stereotypes can operate at two different levels in
self-defense cases. First, racial stereotypes may influence the
beliefs and acts of the defendant who claims he acted in self-
defense. Second, racial stereotypes may affect the jury (or
other legal decisionmaker) deciding the reasonableness of the
defendant's beliefs and actions.
Current self-defense doctrine requires that the defendant
honestly and reasonably believed in the imminence of death or
serious bodily injury and in the necessity of using force to avoid
the threatened harm. 7 It is unclear whether, under current
standards, a defendant's reliance on racial stereotypes should
inform the jury's determinations regarding either the honesty
or the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs, or both.
With respect to the question whether the defendant hon-
estly believed in the need to act in self-defense, it seems clear
that if the defendant's subjective beliefs were influenced by
racial stereotypes, this fact would be relevant to support the
defendant's claim that his belief in the need to act in self-
406. The act-belief distinction which this Part proposes is analogous to the
distinction in substantive criminal law between the mens rea and actus reus.
In general, criminal liability may be imposed only if the actor had the requi-
site mens rea and performed a voluntary act (or omission where there was a
duty to act) causing social harm, constituting the actus reus. DRESSLER, su-
pra note 24, § 9.01[A], at 69. Bad thoughts alone are not sufficient. Id. §
9.01[B], at 70.
407. See supra Part IA (discussing the various standards of reasonable-
ness-objective, subjective, or a hybrid of the two-applied in traditional self-
defense cases).
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defense was honest. Accordingly, it might be appropriate for
the jury to consider evidence that the defendant was influenced
by racial stereotypes in formulating his own subjective belief in
the need to act in self-defense.
However, with respect to the question whether the defen-
dant reasonably believed in the need to act in self-defense, it is
not clear whether the fact that the defendant was subjectively
influenced by racial stereotypes is relevant to the reasonable-
ness of his beliefs. On the one hand, the jury should be able to
determine on its own what constitutes a reasonable (or unrea-
sonable) belief, without referring to what the defendant sub-
jectively believed. On the other hand, in determining whether
a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have be-
lieved and acted as the defendant did, a strong argument could
be made that the jury should consider relevant facts as to what
the defendant knew or believed. If the defendant's beliefs and
actions were heavily influenced by racial stereotypes, this fact
could be relevant to the reasonableness determination in two
ways. First, the defendant's reliance on racial stereotypes
could undercut the defendant's claim that he acted reasonably.
For example, there was some evidence that Goetz held racist
views about Blacks and may have reacted to stereotypes about
Blacks as criminals when he shot the four Black youths on the
subway; this fact arguably undermines Goetz's claim that his
belief in the need to use deadly force against the youths was
reasonable because the reasonable person is not supposed to be
a racist.40 8 Likewise, there was some evidence that Masters
held racist views about Mexican Americans and may have shot
the two Mexican American youths in response to stereotypes
about Mexican Americans rather than because he believed
they posed an imminent threat to him.4 °9 This fact would likely
undermine Masters's claim that his beliefs were reasonable.
Second, if the reasonable person is characterized as the ordi-
nary person or average American and if the ordinary or aver-
age American would be similarly influenced by racial stereo-
types, the fact that the defendant was influenced by racial
408. Goetz apparently made a racist comment at a neighborhood block
meeting about ridding the neighborhood of "spics and niggers." FLETCHER, su-
pra note 59, at 136. The judge kept this information from the jury presuma-
bly because he thought its risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighed
its probative value.
409. Upon his release from prison, Masters called Arce and Hillo "skinhead
Mexicans" and blamed Arce's mother for his death because she failed to raise
Arce well. Dellios, supra note 325, at A7.
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stereotypes might bolster his claim that he believed and acted
reasonably.410
Often, evidence that a defendant holds racist views, be-
longs to White supremacist organizations, or uses racial slurs
is excluded from the jury's consideration on the ground that its
probative value is outweighed by the potential for prejudice.
Given the fact that reasonableness is generally considered to
be an objective (or subjectivized-objective), rather than a purely
subjective standard, evidence that racial stereotypes influ-
enced the defendant should not inform the determination of
whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable. Accordingly,
jurors should be instructed that while a defendant's reliance on
racial stereotypes may be used to support a finding that the de-
fendant's beliefs were sincere or honest, a defendant's reliance
on racial stereotypes is not reasonable as a matter of law. Ac-
cordingly, the defendant's actual reliance on racial stereotypes
may not be used to support a finding that the defendant's be-
liefs were reasonable.
In permitting the defendant's reliance on racial stereo-
types to support a finding that the defendant's belief in the
need to act in self-defense was honest, but prohibiting this fac-
tor from supporting a finding that the defendant's belief was
reasonable, a racially biased defendant receives a mitigated
conviction for manslaughter, rather than murder, as long as
the jurisdiction recognizes the imperfect self-defense doc-
trine.41' In other words, the law partially excuses the racially
biased defendant who sincerely but unreasonably believes
Blacks, Asian Americans, and/or Latinos are more dangerous
than others, but does not let him off the hook completely.
It is important to distinguish between the ways in which
stereotypes may operate upon the defendant and the ways in
which racial stereotypes may operate on jurors. With respect
to racial stereotypes that may have influenced the defendant's
beliefs and actions, jurors may utilize the defendant's reliance
on racial stereotypes to support the honesty, but not the rea-
sonableness, of the defendant's beliefs. The second proposal
discussed in this Part, a supplemental limiting instruction on
racial stereotypes, attempts to minimize the influence of racial
410. See infra Part m.C (calling into question the desirability of this posi-
tivist conception of reasonableness).
411. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the doctrine of imperfect self-defense
and noting that the doctrine fails to resolve adequately the ambiguities inher-
ent in the reasonableness requirement).
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stereotypes on jurors in self-defense cases. As decisionmakers
in the criminal justice system who act in the comfort of the
courtroom, rather than in the hurried, emergency-like situa-
tion in which the defendant may have found himself, jurors
should strive to act with as much fairness as possible. Juror
reliance on racial stereotypes should play no part in the legal
decisionmaking process.
b. The Reasonable Act Requirement
That there can be a distinction between reasonable beliefs
and reasonable acts in self-defense contradicts intuition. It
seems only logical to assume that if I reasonably believe that
someone is about to kill me and that I have to use deadly force
to stop that person from killing me, then my use of deadly force
must also be reasonable. The distinction between reasonable
beliefs and reasonable actions is subtle but important. The re-
quirement of a reasonable act is embodied in both the immi-
nence and necessity requirements and the proportionality prin-
ciple in self-defense doctrine.
i. Necessity and Imminence: "No Less Drastic
Alternatives"
When we say that a defendant must have honestly and
reasonably believed in the imminence of death or serious bodily
injury and in the necessity of using deadly force to combat this
threat in order to have acted in self-defense, we necessarily see
imminence and necessity as part of the reasonable belief re-
quirement. Imminence and necessity, however, also relate to
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions. The necessity
and imminence requirements seek to ensure that people do not
act with force against others unless and until it is reasonably
necessary to use such force to protect against an imminent
unlawful attack. If less drastic alternatives are available, then
the use of deadly force cannot be deemed necessary.412 When
jurors are given instructions that emphasize only the honesty
and the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs, they may
conflate the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that his
life was in danger with the reasonableness of the defendant's
412. See, e.g., Laurence A. Alexander, Justification and Innocent Aggres-
sors, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1177, 1180 (1987) (illustrating the difference between
proportionality and necessity and explaining necessity in terms of no lesser
force available).
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choice to use the amount of force he used and the decision to
use that force at that instant.
Perhaps a simpler way of understanding the act require-
ment embedded in the necessity and imminence requirements
is to think of these requirements as embodying a "no less dras-
tic alternatives" requirement. Bernhard Goetz might have
honestly believed that the four youths he encountered on the
subway posed an imminent threat of serious bodily injury and
that it was thus necessary to shoot them. Moreover, (for the
sake of argument) the hypothetical reasonable -person might
have had similar beliefs. Even if Goetz's beliefs were reason-
able, however, it does not necessarily follow that Goetz's action
of shooting the youths in response to a request for five dollars
was reasonable. Many less drastic alternatives were available
to Goetz, but he instead chose to shoot the youths. Goetz ad-
mitted that he knew none of the youths had a weapon. None of
the youths did anything to Goetz that resembled a physical at-
tack or threat of a physical attack.413 Goetz could have tried to
move away from the youths by moving to another section of the
subway. Goetz could have responded to the youths' request for
money by saying, "No." Goetz could have displayed his weapon
(which would have warned the youths not to mess with him
any more). Or Goetz could have shot at the ground or aimed at
the ceiling of the subway (which too would have warned the
youths not to mess with him). Instead, Goetz began shooting
at the youths with the intention of murdering the youths,
hurting them, and making them suffer as much as possible.
Goetz's use of deadly force was not reasonable in light of the
threatened harm, and therefore his self-defense claim should
have been rejected.
Similarly, Rodney Peairs might have genuinely believed
that Yoshihiro Hattori posed an imminent threat to his family
and that it was necessary to shoot Hattori. For the sake of ar-
gument, the reasonable person in Peairs's shoes might have
held similar beliefs. Despite the purported reasonableness of
Peairs's beliefs, it is questionable whether Peairs's conduct was
413. Supporters of Goetz argued that the youths carried screwdrivers in
their jackets which they could have used to threaten Goetz. The screwdrivers,
however, were concealed and Goetz was not aware of the screwdrivers at the
time he started shooting. Therefore, the presence of concealed screwdrivers
does not bolster Goetz's argument that he honestly and reasonably feared the
youths. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (noting that the media and
public's willingness to accept the rumor of "sharpened screwdrivers" recast
Goetz as the victim and the Black youths as menacing criminals).
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reasonable. Several less drastic alternatives were available to
Peairs, but he chose to shoot the young Japanese boy in the
chest. When his wife screamed for him to get his gun, Peairs
did not stop to ask his wife what she was screaming about.
Peairs did not check to see whether there was any real danger,
but instead rushed to the carport door with his gun. Peairs
could have stayed inside the house and called the police.
Peairs could have looked outside to check on the situation, and
upon seeing that the boys were leaving, he could have let them
go. Peairs could have fired a warning shot in the air from the
doorway of his house. Or Peairs, who was familiar with guns,
could have aimed at a non-fatal part of Hattori's body as op-
posed to Hattori's chest. Under these circumstances, it was not
reasonable for Peairs to use deadly force in the manner that he
did on Yoshihiro Hattori. As the appellate court which af-
firmed the judgment in the civil wrongful death case against
Rodney Peairs explained:
There was absolutely no need to resort to the use of a dangerous
weapon to repel an attack, as in fact there would have been no fear of
an attack if Rodney had summoned help or simply stayed within his
home.... Further, Rodney saw Yoshi [Hattori] at the back of the
Toyota. He had sufficient time to shut the door, which Bonnie had
done earlier.... We know that when Rodney Peairs first saw Yoshi,
he was further away than when Bonnie [Peairs] had seen him, and
she was able to shut the door. Self-defense is not acceptable. There
was no justification whatsoever that a killing was necessary for Rod-
ney Peairs to save himself and/or to protect his family. 44
The Goetz and Peairs cases show that it is often easier to
demonstrate that one's belief in the need to use force in self-
defense was reasonable than to demonstrate that one's use of
deadly force was reasonable.
ii. Proportionality
The requirement that the defendant's acts must be rea-
sonable is found not only in the necessity and imminence re-
quirements, it is also found in the proportionality requirement.
This requirement ensures that the amount of force used by the
defendant (i.e., the defendant's acts) must not be excessive in
414. Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 509, 514-15 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
During the Menendez trial, commentators found the brothers' self-
defense claim hard to believe because the brothers could have responded to
their father's abuse in many ways short of killing him. Burden of Proof (CNN
television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1995) (questioning whether the Menendez
brothers' self-defense claim was legitimate when the brothers could have left
the home).
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relation to the threatened harm.415 This is an objective stan-
dard. The proportionality requirement is not satisfied if the
evidence merely demonstrates that the defendant subjectively
believed that the force he used was proportionate to the force
threatened. The defendant's force is considered proportionate
only if a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would
have responded to the threatened force in a similar manner. If
jurors confuse the belief and act requirements, they may im-
port the subjective aspects of the belief requirement into the
act requirement.4 16
Some might argue that the distinction between beliefs and
acts in self-defense is a distinction without a difference because
the necessity requirement subsumes the proportionality re-
quirement. If jurors find that the defendant reasonably be-
lieved it was necessary to use the amount of force used to pro-
tect himself, they implicitly will have also found that the
defendant used a reasonable amount of force. This would be
true if reasonable force were merely defined as that amount of
force a reasonable person would have found necessary to use
under the circumstances. The proportionality requirement,
however, addresses concerns beyond mere necessity. The pro-
portionality requirement aims to ensure that the defendant re-
frains from using force that exceeds the force threatened, even
if it is the only force that can avoid the threatened harm (i.e.,
even if the force used was necessary to avoid the threatened
harm).
A hypothetical will clarify the distinction between neces-
sity and proportionality. V and D are standing next to the rail-
road tracks. V threatens to slap D. Because of the crowd sur-
rounding them, the only way D can avoid V's slap is by pushing
V into the path of an oncoming train. Even though pushing V
onto the railroad tracks may be necessary to avoid the threat-
ened harm of V's slap, if D does this, he cannot-or at least he
should not be able to-claim self-defense, because his use of
415. In addition to the requirement that the defendant actually and rea-
sonably believed his use of force was necessary to respond to an imminent
threat, the common law rule requires that the defendant's use of force be pro-
portional to the threatened force. DRESSLER, supra note 24, § 18.02, at 200.
416. As discussed in Part I, the belief requirement in self-defense doctrine
requires that the defendant's beliefs be both honest and reasonable. Addi-
tionally, most jurisdictions utilize a hybrid subjectivized-objective reasonable
person standard as opposed to a purely objective reasonable person standard.
See supra Part L.A (discussing traditional self-defense doctrine and the objec-
tive-subjective debate).
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force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury (pushing V
into the path of the oncoming train) would be disproportionate
to the force threatened (a slap). In balancing the respective in-
terests of D and V, the harm threatened by V (a slap to D) is far
less substantial than the harm which would result from D's act
of pushing V onto the railroad tracks (V's death). Therefore, as
between D and V, we expect D to endure a slap from V if killing
V is the only way D can avoid that slap.
c. New Two-Tiered Framework and Model Jury Instruction
If the distinction between beliefs and acts is not made
clear, jurors might mistakenly conclude that a defendant's use
of deadly force is justified based solely on a finding that the de-
fendant's belief in the need to use force in self-defense was rea-
sonable. To recognize the reduced culpability of a defendant
who reasonably believes in the need to use deadly force in self-
defense, but whose actions are unreasonable either in terms of
proportionality, imminence, or necessity, legislatures could
implement a two-tiered framework for liability in self-defense
cases similar to the two-tiered approach used in jurisdictions
that recognize the imperfect self-defense doctrine. 417 Under the
proposed approach, if the defendant's beliefs and acts were
reasonable, the defendant will be acquitted of murder. If, how-
ever, the defendant's beliefs were reasonable but his acts were
unreasonable, the defendant may be convicted of manslaughter
rather than murder.418 This two-tiered approach would allow
the jury to recognize differing degrees of culpability rather
than force the jury to make an all-or-nothing decision.
Jurisdictions should also revise their jury instructions on
self-defense to better reflect the act-belief distinction. A sam-
ple jury instruction could look something like this:
Model Jury Instruction on Self-defense
A homicide is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense.
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the
417. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the merits of the imperfect self-
defense doctrine).
418. Jurisdictions could decide whether to continue recognizing imperfect
self-defense. Jurisdictions which adopt this new two-tiered approach and re-
tain imperfect self-defense would need to consider the appropriateness of
treating the killer who honestly and reasonably believes in the need to use de-
fensive force, but acts unreasonably, the same as the killer who honestly but
unreasonably believes in the need to use defensive force. The two killers may
not be equally culpable.
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following conditions must be found to have existed at the time of the
illing [or striking]:
1. Actual and Reasonable Belief Requirement
A. Actual Belief. The defendant must actually believe that s/he
is in danger of [death or serious bodily injury[bodily harm] and that
it was immediately necessary for her/him to use [deadly] force
against the victim to prevent such [death or serious bodily in-
jury][bodily harm].
B. Reasonable Belief. A reasonable person, in the defendant's
circumstances, would have also believed that s/he was in danger of
[death or serious bodily injury][bodily harm], and that it was imme-
diately necessary for her/him to use [deadly] force against the victim
to prevent such [death or serious bodily injury][bodily harm].
[If the defendant was influenced by racial stereotypes, this fact
may be considered to support the honesty, but not the reasonable-
ness, of the defendant's beliefs. Reliance on racial stereotypes to in-
form one's beliefs in a self-defense situation is not reasonable as a
matter of law.]
2. Reasonable Act Requirement
A. No Less Drastic Alternatives Available. The kind and degree
of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense is limited by
what a reasonable person in the same situation as the defendant
would have used. Any use of force beyond this is unreasonable and
unlawful. If less drastic alternatives were available, the reasonable
person would have used such alternatives before resorting to the use
of [deadly] force.
B. Proportionali . The defendant is not justified in using an
amount of force clearly in excess of the threatened force.
While this model jury instruction employs an objective
rather than a purely subjective standard of reasonableness,
jurisdictions would still be free to subjectivize the reasonable
person standard by incorporating the physical characteristics
of the defendant, such as height, weight, physical disabilities,
and other circumstances into the reasonable person standard.
In this respect, the model jury instruction does not differ from
most currently employed self-defense instructions. The in-
struction retains another important feature of currently em-
ployed self-defense instructions. Only apparent, not actual,
danger is required.
The model jury instruction makes three notable changes to
California's pattern self-defense instruction. First, the model
instruction adopts the "immediately necessary" language used
in the Model Penal Code,419 as opposed to relying solely on the
419. For the text of the Model Penal Code § 3.04(1), see supra note 68.
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"imminent danger" language currently utilized in California,42 °
to address the situation that one of my colleagues calls the
James Bond hypothetical.421 Jaws (James Bond's nemesis) is
chasing Bond. Bond escapes up a mountain. From the top of
the mountain, Bond can see Jaws through his laser-scoped ri-
fle. He has a clear shot and can kill Jaws if he shoots Jaws
now. If he waits, Jaws will come up the mountain in fifteen
minutes and Bond will be unable to defend against the threat
of inevitable death or serious bodily injury. The critical ques-
tion is whether Bond can shoot Jaws now, from the top of the
mountain, while he has a clear shot. If Bond is in a jurisdic-
tion that requires "imminent danger," he must wait until Jaws
has climbed the mountain and is about to attack before at-
tempting to shoot Jaws. If he waits, he may not survive. If
Bond is in a jurisdiction that requires that it was "immediately
necessary" to use the force used to repel the threatened attack,
Bond may shoot from the mountain top rather than wait for
Jaws to arrive.4 22
Second, the proposed instruction informs jurors that if the
defendant was actually influenced by racial stereotypes, this
fact may be relied upon to support the honesty, but not the rea-
sonableness, of the defendant's beliefs. While drawing a dis-
tinction between honest and reasonable beliefs may seem cum-
bersome, courts have engaged in similar distinctions. For
example, until recently, California courts followed the rule that
in self-defense cases battered woman syndrome evidence is
relevant to the honesty, but not the reasonableness, of the bat-
tered woman defendant's beliefs.423
420. For the text of CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL No. 5.12,
see supra text accompanying note 405.
421. My colleague, Larry Alexander, uses this hypothetical to illustrate the
difference between an "imminence" requirement that focuses on the immedi-
acy of the threatened harm and an "immediately necessary" requirement that
focuses on the immediacy of the need to act to avoid the threatened harm.
422. Another hypothetical clarifies the difference between an "immediately
necessary" standard and an "imminence" standard. V takes D hostage. V
tells D that he plans to kill her in one week. One day, V falls asleep, leaving
his loaded rifle unattended. If D waits until the threat of death is "imminent,"
i.e., next week, she will likely die. If D takes the gun from V and shoots V
now, D can justify her use of deadly force as "immediately necessary" under
the circumstances.
423. See, e.g., People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921-22 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (citing People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)), over-
ruled by People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996). On August 29, 1996, the
California Supreme Court overruled Day and Aris, holding that battered
woman syndrome evidence is relevant to both the honesty and the reason-
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Finally, the proposed instruction differs from self-defense
instructions in California and other states in adding a re-
quirement that the force used by the defendant (i.e., the defen-
dant's acts) must have been reasonable in terms of propor-
tionality, necessity, and imminence. This added requirement
makes explicit the act-belief distinction, reminding the jury to
focus on the reasonableness of the defendant's use of force as
well as the reasonableness of her beliefs in deciding whether
the defendant should be acquitted on the ground of self-
defense.424
2. Supplemental Limiting Instruction
Clarifying the act-belief distinction may make it more dif-
ficult for defendants who kill or maim Blacks, Asian Ameri-
cans, and Latinos, and claim self-defense, to be acquitted.
Nevertheless, because the proposed model self-defense in-
struction does not directly address the problem of racial stereo-
types influencing juror determinations of reasonableness in
self-defense cases, additional reforms are necessary. One pos-
sible reform would be to require judges to give jurors a sup-
plemental limiting instruction addressing the impropriety of
relying on stereotypes.425  This instruction would have to be
ableness of the battered woman defendant's beliefs. Humphrey, 921 P.2d at
10. In other areas of the law, evidence may be considered by the jury for one
purpose, but not another. See, e.g., People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 706,
709 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that jury consideration of evidence of the defendant's
voluntary intoxication was proper on issue of whether defendant intended to
kill or premeditated and deliberated, but improper on issue of whether defen-
dant acted recklessly).
424. Several jurisdictions distinguish between beliefs and acts in their
model self-defense instructions, requiring both the defendant's beliefs and the
force used by the defendant to have been reasonable. RECOMMENDED ARIZONA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 4.04 (1989); IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS §§ 1517, 1518 (1995); IOWA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§
400.1-400.6 (1990); MODEL JURY CHARGES-CRIMINAL, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 (3d ed.
1990); NEW MEXICO UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 14-5181 (1996);
NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES §§
308.40, 308.45 (1986); OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIINAL §§ 11.31, 11.33
(1962); TENNESSEE PATTERN JURY INsTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 40.06 (3d. ed.
1992); VIRGIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 54.500, 54.510 (1979
& Supp. 1994); WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 17.02
(2d ed. 1994).
425. Currently, judges give jurors in non-capital cases generic instructions
to resist the influence of bias or prejudice. These instructions avoid explicit
references to race. See, e.g. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL No.
1.00 (8th ed. 1994) ("You must not be influenced by... sympathy, passion, [or]
prejudice."); HON. EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 12.01 (4th ed. 1992) ("In deciding the issues presented to you
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given whenever a party in a self-defense case requested such
an instruction. If neither party requested this limiting in-
struction, the judge could give such an instruction on her own
motion. This supplemental jury instruction would remind ju-
rors that they should not rely upon stereotypes to support a
finding that the defendant's use of force was reasonable. A
model limiting jury instruction might look something like this:
Model Supplemental Limiting Instruction
on the Impropriety of Relying on Racial Stereotypes
It is natural to make assumptions about the parties and witnesses
in any case based on stereotypes. Stereotypes constitute well-learned
sets of associations or expectations correlating particular traits with
members of a particular social group. You should try not to make as-
sumptions about the parties and witnesses based on their member-
ship in a particular racial group.
If you are unsure about whether you have made any unfair as-
sessments based on racial stereotypes, you may engage in a race-
switching exercise to test whether stereotypes have colored your
evaluation of the case before you. Race-switching involves imagining
the same events, the same circumstances, the same people, but
switching the races of the parties. For example, if the defendant is
White and the victim is Latino, you could imagine a Latino defendant
and a White victim. In intraracial cases in which both the defendant
and the victim are persons of color, you may simply assign a different
race to these actors. For example, if both the defendant and victim
are Black, you may imagine that both are White. If your evaluation
of the case before you is different after engaging in race-switching,
this suggests a subconscious reliance on stereotypes. You may then
wish to reevaluate the case from a neutral, unbiased perspective.
Some might argue that the judge should go further and telljurors what types of things constitute stereotypes. Coming up
with an exhaustive list of stereotypes that would cover every
possible situation, however, would be difficult and counter-
productive. Applicable stereotypes might be overlooked if a list
of stereotypes were generated in the abstract. If a stereotype
were inadvertently omitted, jurors might think it appropriate
to rely on the omitted stereotype. In lieu of including a long
list of stereotypes in the limiting instruction, attorneys could
be encouraged to present argument and evidence to the jury,
for decision in this trial you must not be persuaded by bias, prejudice, or sym-
pathy for or against any of the parties to this case or by any public opinion.").
In contrast, judges provide jurors in federal capital cases with explicit in-
structions not to consider the race or color of the defendant or the victim.
Judges further instruct federal capital jurors not to recommend a sentence of
death unless they conclude that they would recommend death irrespective of
the race or color of the defendant or victim. 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1) (1996).
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giving examples of stereotypes and discussing how such stereo-
types can influence perception and judgment.
This proposal makes a much-needed distinction between
consideration of race (which is permissible and appropriate)
and reliance on racial stereotypes (which is impermissible and
inappropriate). The supplemental limiting instruction does not
ask jurors to disregard race, a task that would be impractical
and infeasible. The instruction simply reminds jurors that ra-
cial and other stereotypes should not act as a substitute for ac-
tual facts supporting a finding that the defendant's use of force
against the victim was reasonable.
Several objections might be made to this proposal. First,
telling jurors they should not be influenced by stereotypes in
deciding whether the defendant's fear of the victim was rea-
sonable might force jurors' true feelings under the rug. Jurors
who are influenced by stereotypes to believe that it is reason-
able to fear Blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans, or any person of
color, might nod their heads and pretend to abide by the in-
struction while covertly relying on stereotypes to make up their
minds. Alternatively, such reliance might occur at the uncon-
scious or subconscious level without the jurors' awareness.
Given the fact that jury deliberations are secret proceedings, 426
and that jurors are not required to justify their verdicts except
in limited circumstances,427 it would be impossible to determine
whether jurors were in fact abiding by the instruction.428
The same type of objection, however, could be made
against several rules that, while not always successful in ap-
plication, have been instrumental in raising social conscious-
ness, such as the prohibition on race-based peremptory chal-
lenges 429 and abolition of the fresh complaint and resistance
426. See supra note 381 (discussing FED. R. EviD. 606(b) and the secrecy
that attends jury deliberations).
427. In the usual criminal case, jurors return a general verdict of guilty or
not guilty without revealing to anyone the grounds on which the verdict rests.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7, at 1050
(2d ed. 1992); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969) ("It is
one of the most essential features of the right of trial by jury that no jury
should be compelled to find any but a general verdict in criminal cases .... "
(quoting G. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BY
JURIES 49 (1905)). In a few criminal cases, such as actions for criminal forfei-
ture, jurors are directed to fill out a special verdict form, answering "yes" or
"no" to specific questions regarding the elements of the charged offense or of-
fenses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e).
428. This argument, however, holds true for all jury instructions.
429. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,84 (1986).
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requirements in rape law.430 While the law is clear that per-
emptory challenges may not be based on race, attorneys have
no difficulty finding ways to manipulate this requirement by
coming up with ostensibly race-neutral reasons for striking po-
tential jurors.431 Last year, the United States Supreme Court
430. See infra text accompanying notes 433 & 434 (noting that the resis-
tance and immediate complaint requirements have been eliminated in most
jurisdictions).
431. In a recent California case, a prosecutor struck three young Black
women from the jury. People v. Galbert, No. A064486, 1995 WL 108696, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1995). In response to a Wheeler challenge, People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (Cal. 1978), the prosecutor explained that he struck
these jurors because of their youth, braided hair, obesity, and ostentatious
dress. Galbert, 1995 WL 108696, at *2. The trial court and the court of ap-
peals found the prosecutor's explanation sufficiently race neutral. Id. at *1,
*3.
In another case, the prosecutor struck a single Black mother of modest
means who rented an apartment in an urban area and worked for the U.S.
Post Office. United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1993).
The government asserted two reasons for striking this prospective juror.
First, the U.S. Attorney's Office asserted that, as a matter of policy, it rou-
tinely struck postal employees from drug cases. Id. at 390-91. Second, the
prospective juror, as a single parent living in a rental property in the city of
Newark supporting herself and two children on the income of a postal worker
with four years tenure, suggested to the prosecutor that this prospective juror
"may be involved with a drug situation where she lives." Id. at 391. The trial
judge rejected the first reason, apparently finding incredulous the assertion
that the government routinely excluded postal workers from jury duty, but
accepted the government's second reason (single mother renting an apartment
in Newark as someone likely involved in a drug situation) as race neutral. Id.
The circuit court affirmed the judge's decision on appeal. Id. at 394.
In another case involving a Latino defendant, the prosecutor struck six
Latinos from the jury venire. United States v. Romera-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559,
560 (5th Cir. 1989). The prosecutor explained that he struck five of these po-
tential jurors because their age, employment, and marital status indicated
they might be too lenient. Id. The prosecutor dismissed the sixth, a pipeline
operator, based on the prosecutor's P rule, a self-imposed rule under which
the prosecutor ostensibly never accepted a juror whose occupation began with
a P. Id. The judge, apparently finding the prosecutor's explanation credible,
rejected the defendant's Batson challenge. The defendant was tried and con-
victed. Id. On appeal, the circuit court remanded the case and ordered the
trial court to make the findings required by Batson. Id. On remand, over the
defendant's objection, the trial court decided to hold an evidentiary hearing to
allow the prosecutor to explain his reasons for striking the six Latino venire-
men. Id. The prosecutor reiterated his adherence to the P rule, but added a
new reason for striking the Latino pipeline operator from the jury. Id. at 561.
The prosecutor stated that he had been informed that the use of marijuana by
pipeline operators was somewhat prevalent. Id. The prosecutor explained
that he had failed to mention this additional reason earlier because the sud-
den and rapid pace of the sidebar conference had prevented him from fully
collecting his thoughts. Id. This time the trial judge rejected the P rule as a
legitimate race-neutral reason since the prosecutor had accepted three Whites
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held that the race-neutral explanation tendered by the propo-
nent of a peremptory challenge need not be persuasive or even
plausible.432 If the race-neutral explanation need not be per-
suasive nor even plausible, any explanation will likely survive
a Batson challenge. Attorneys can nod their heads and pre-
tend to abide by Batson while covertly relying on race to exer-
cise their peremptory challenges. If this is so, then surely ju-
rors, who are not subject to the same kind of scrutiny as
attorneys, may do the same when instructed not to rely on ra-
cial stereotypes in deciding whether the defendant acted rea-
sonably in self-defense.
A similar argument might be made with respect to the
abolition of the resistance requirement and the fresh complaint
requirement in rape law. Even though the requirements that
the victim of a rape must have resisted 433 and complained im-
whose occupations also began with a P: a production supervisor, a payroll
clerk, and a part-time secretary. Id. Nonetheless, the court found the prose-
cutor's new reason sufficient to uphold the strike, and the trial court's deci-
sion was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 561-62.
In yet another case, both the district court judge and a three judge panel
on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found the prosecutor's explanation for
striking a female Black juror-that the struck juror's name, Arlene Grander-
son, closely resembled the name of a defendant, Anthony Grandison, whom
the prosecutor had once prosecuted for the murder of two government wit-
nesses-to be a race-neutral and non-pretextual reason to challenge the juror.
United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988).
432. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam) (holding
that the prosecutor's proffered explanation for peremptory challenge of a
Black juror-that the juror had long, unkempt hair, a moustache, and a
beard-was race-neutral and satisfied the prosecutor's burden of articulating
a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike).
433. For example, former California Penal Code section 261 provided,
"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the
spouse of the perpetrator ... [wihere a person resists, but the person's resis-
tance is overcome by force or violence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988)
(emphasis added). Under former California case law, this provision was in-
terpreted to mean that resistance was a crucial and necessary element of
rape. People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 113-14, 124 (Cal. 1986) (explaining for-
mer section 261 and holding that the legislature, in amending section 261, in-
tended to eliminate the resistance requirement). In 1994, the California Su-
preme Court held that a victim need not demonstrate resistance in order to
prove an act of sexual intercourse accomplished by force, violence, or fear of
immediate bodily injury. People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1190 (Cal. 1994)
(affirming rape conviction in a case in which the victim froze and did not re-
sist the defendant's sexual advances because she feared he might hurt her).
But cf Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Pa. 1994)
(holding, as an all male Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that a victim must do
more than say "no" (e.g., try to escape or fight back) in order for a defendant
to be convicted of rape).
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mediately to the police434 have been abolished in most jurisdic-
tions, jurors continue to find lack of resistance and the lack of a
fresh complaint relevant.435 Telling jurors that they need not
Similarly, New York once required proof of resistance in order to sustain
a rape conviction.
Under the prior definition of "forcible compulsion," [N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 2101 (McKinney 1909)] a woman could be raped only when "her re-
sistance was forcibly overcome" or when "her resistance is prevented
by fear of immediate and great bodily harm, which she has reason-
able cause to believe will be inflicted upon her." In 1965, this defini-
tion was amended to read "physical force that overcomes earnest re-
sistance." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney 1965).
Margaret A. Clemens, Note, Elimination of the Resistance Requirement and
Other Rape Law Reforms: The New York Experience, 47 ALB. L. REV. 871, 872
n.4 (1983). In 1982, the New York legislature eliminated the "earnest resis-
tance" requirement from section 130.00(8) and redefined "forcible compulsion"
as 'physical force or threat, express or implied, which force or threat places a
person in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury to himself, herself
or another person.'" Id. at 874; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8)
(McKinney Supp. 1982-83); see also People v. Fransua, 522 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) ("Under the appropriate definition of forcible compul-
sion, the victim was not required to put up any resistance.").
434. For many years, California juries were allowed to hear that the victim
of an alleged sexual assault reported the attack immediately after it occurred,
based on the assumption that it was natural for a victim of a sexual assault to
report promptly the sexual assault if it actually occurred. In 1994, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court discredited the theoretical underpinnings of the fresh
complaint doctrine. In People v. Brown, 883 P.2d 949 (Cal. 1994), the court
noted that the assumption that a true victim would promptly report a sexual
assault was not supported by empirical studies showing that many victims of
sex crimes are too embarrassed or afraid to report immediately the fact that
they have been assaulted. Id. at 950. The court went on to hold that proof of
an alleged victim's disclosure of the sexual assault to others, whether prompt
or not, generally should be admitted as relevant evidence. Id. The prompt-
ness of the complaint, however, is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of
such evidence. Id. at 950-51. But cf. People v. McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265, 269
(N.Y. 1993) (allowing only admission of prompt complaints).
435. See McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d at 269 (noting that [t]he contemporary ra-
tionale for permitting prompt outcry evidence is that some jurors would inevi-
tably doubt the veracity of a victim who failed to promptly complain of a sex-
ual assault, such conduct being 'natural' for an 'outraged female'" and that
"the admissibility of prompt outcry remains viable because 'our judicial proc-
ess cannot remove from every juror all subtle biases or illogical views of the
world....'" (quoting People v. Rice, 554 N.E.2d 1265 (N.Y. 1990) and State v.
Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 377 (N.J. 1990))); Diane M. Kottmyer & Martin F. Murphy,
Developments in Criminal Law: The Changing Face of Rape Prosecutions, 36
BOSTON B.J. 31, 35 (1992) (noting that many jurors, in deciding rape cases,
look for evidence of a complaint, and are dissatisfied if there is no such evi-
dence); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea
of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1013, 1049 (1991)
(discussing one rape study in which almost one-third of the potential jurors
believed that a woman's resistance should be the major factor in determining
whether a rape has taken place, and over half felt that a woman should do all
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find that the victim resisted or that she immediately reported
the rape to the police does not guarantee that jurors deciding
whether or not a rape occurred will disregard a victim's failure
to resist or her failure to immediately report.436
Despite these objections, a rule that makes clear that
stereotypes should not be relied upon to support a finding that
the defendant's use of force was reasonable would be worth-
while for the same reason the prohibition on race-based per-
emptory challenges and the elimination of the resistance and
fresh complaint requirements in rape law have been useful.
These reforms have positively improved jury selection proce-
dures and rape law. In raising social consciousness about the
need to treat minorities and women fairly, these changes in the
law have not only helped defendants of color and rape victims,
but they have also been beneficial to society, increasing societal
awareness of and sensitivity to race and gender issues. Even
though some attorneys may have found ways to manipulate the
requirement that peremptory challenges not be based on race,
the overt use of race-based peremptory challenges is probably
less common than before the Batson rule was announced.437
she can to resist while being raped (citing HUBERT S. FIELD & LEIGH B.
BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 3 (1980)). But cf Sheila R. Deitz et al., Attribution
of Responsibility for Rape: The Influence of Observer Empathy, Victim Resis-
tance, and Victim Attractiveness, 10 SEx ROLES 261, 276 (1984) (observing
that male subjects in a rape study saw the defendant as less guilty when the
victim resisted actively).
436. During the fall of 1994, 1 had students in my criminal law class volun-
teer to conduct a mock rape trial using a six-minute scene from the movie
LAST TANGO IN PARIS (United Artist 1972). The idea for this class exercise
came from Robert Garcia, Rape, Lies and Videotape, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 711,
711 (1992). The scene depicts a sexual encounter between a man and a
woman in an apartment. Six students watched the clip and played the role of
witnesses. Four students who did not see the film played the role of lawyers,
two as defense attorneys and two as prosecution attorneys. One student
acted as the judge, and the rest of the class pretended to be the jury. The
majority of the class found the defendant, played by Marlon Brando, not guilty
of rape. During our class discussion, I was surprised to hear that many of the
students who voted Brando not guilty of rape found significant the fact that
the young French woman in the movie failed to report immediately the sexual
encounter to the police. This was despite their knowledge that an immediate
complaint to the police was not an element of the crime of rape.
437. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Per-
emptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
172 (1989) (opining that Batson most likely has worked a significant change in
the way prosecutors use their peremptory challenges); see also Jean Montoya,
The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Question-
naire and the "Blind" Peremptory (forthcoming) (manuscript at 38, on file with
author).
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Similarly, even though jurors may still believe the victim's
failure to resist or her failure to complain immediately to the
police are facts relevant to the question whether a rape has oc-
curred,438 at least most people now realize that a woman can be
raped even if she does not resist an unwanted sexual advance
or immediately file a complaint with the police.
Having the judge instruct jurors to engage in race-
switching if they are uncertain whether stereotypes have influ-
enced their judgment might help to bring unconscious racial
bias to the surface. 439  Encouraging attorneys to explain the
dangers of stereotyping in oral argument and through the in-
troduction of evidence about how stereotyping influences per-
ception and judgment is designed to accomplish similar objec-
tives.
Second, some might object to a race-switching instruction
on the ground that it introduces facts not in evidence and en-
courages jurors to speculate. If the instruction told jurors to
438. See supra note 436 (discussing Professor Cynthia Lee's experience
that criminal law students continue to find prompt complaint significant de-
spite changes in the law).
439. John Grisham illustrates the value of race-switching in his book A
Time To Kill. JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME To KILL 503-04 (1989). In this story, a
Black man kills two White men who brutally raped his daughter. Id. at 72.
The Black father is charged with two counts of murder and tried before an all-
White jury. Id. at 394. The jury is deadlocked until one woman juror per-
suades the other jurors to engage in a race-switching exercise. She tells her
fellow jurors:
I have a proposal... that just might settle this thing.... I thought
of something last night when I couldn't sleep, and I want you to con-
sider it. It may be painful. It may cause you to search your heart
and take a long look at your soul. But 111 ask you to do it anyway.
And if each of you will be honest with yourself, I think we can wrap
this up before noon.
Id. at 503-04. After the jury reaches a verdict, we learn what this juror told
her fellow jurors:
She told them to pretend that the little girl had blond hair and blue
eyes, that the two rapists were black, that they tied her right foot to a
tree and her left foot to a fence post, that they raped her repeatedly
and cussed her because she was white. She told them to picture the
little girl layin' there beggin' for her daddy while they kicked her in
the mouth and knocked out her teeth, broke both jaws, broke her
nose. She said to imagine two drunk blacks pouring beer on her and
pissing in her face, and laughing like idiots. And then she told them
to imagine that the little girl belonged to them-their daughter. She
told them to be honest with themselves and to write on a piece of pa-
per whether or not they would kill those black bastards if they got
the chance. And they voted, by secret ballot. All twelve said they
would do the killing.
Id. at 513.
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decide the case as if the parties were of different races, this
objection might be persuasive. The proposed instruction, how-
ever, does not direct jurors to decide the case on imagined
facts. It merely permits jurors who are uncertain as to
whether they have relied on racial stereotypes to check them-
selves by engaging in the exercise. If jurors find themselves
reaching a different result after the exercise, this will indicate
that racial stereotypes have had some influence on their delib-
erative processes. With this heightened awareness, the jurors
should reconsider the actual, not imagined, facts of the case,
trying this time to minimize reliance on racial stereotypes to
reach their verdict.
Third, one might argue that the supplemental limiting in-
struction would be ineffective because "jurors do not attend to
or are confused by jury instructions" in general." Marcus
Gleisser characterizes the reading of the jury instructions as a
hopeless exercise in futility:
Probably the most discouraging part of a trial is the time when the
judge tries to cram into twelve non-legal minds all the law applicable
to the case at hand. The blank expressions on the faces of the citizen-
jurors is pitiful; it is matched only by the bleak look on the judge as
he plods through the legal terminology that he knows is making little,
if any, impression on his listeners."'
This argument, however legitimate, could be made against any
and all jury instructions. If jury instructions were truly use-
less, we would stop giving jury instructions altogether. The
more reasoned approach is to strive for more clarity in jury in-
structions.
Several recent studies have found that jury instructions
can have a significant impact on jurors, particularly in reduc-
ing the influence of racial bias. In one study, racial differences
in guilt attribution between Black and White defendants oc-
curred when no jury instructions were given; these racial dif-
ferences disappeared when jury instructions were present.44
In another study, juror subjects treated Black and White de-
fendants differently when they were not given any instructions
440. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1793 (citing AMIRAM ELWoIRK ET AL.,
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 12-17 (1982)); see also David
V. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59
JUDICATURE 478,480-82 (1976).
441. MARCUS GLEISSER, JURIESAND JUSTICE 228 (1968).
442. Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James R.P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determi-
nations: A Modern Racism Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1713,
1718 (1991).
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or when they were given instructions strongly encouraging
them to exercise their power to nullify.4 3 These differences
were not present when jurors received standard jury instruc-
tions or jury instructions with a mild nullification statement.4 4
Another study found that subjects tended to find a defendant
guilty when the defendant's testimony was presented in a for-
eign language and translated through an interpreter, but this
bias was eliminated by the judge's instructions to ignore the
fact that the testimony was translated."5
Fourth, some might object to application of the supplemen-
tal limiting instruction in certain self-defense cases, arguing
that when a minority defendant kills a White person, he should
be able to argue that cultural factors made him do it." 6 The
proposed instruction, however, would not preclude argument
443. The radical nullification instructions included the following state-
ment.
Members of the jury: Although you are part of a public body bound to
give respectful attention to the laws, you have the final authority to
decide whether or not to apply a given law to the acts of the defen-
dant on trial before you. It is important to remember that you repre-
sent the community and that it is appropriate to bring into your de-
liberation the feelings of the community and your own feelings based
on conscience. Despite any respect you hold toward the law, nothing
will bar you from determining the final verdict if you feel that the
law, as applied to this fact situation before you, will produce an in-
equitable or unjust result.
Hill & Pfeifer, supra note 106, at 6.
444. Id.
445. Cookie White Stephan & Walter G. Stephan, Habla Ingles? The Ef-
fects of Language Translation on Simulated Juror Decisions, 16 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 577, 581 (1986).
446. In People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985), Patrick "Hooty" Croy, a
Native American, shot and killed a police officer in what he claimed was self-
defense. Id. at 397. Initially, Croy was convicted of first degree murder, rob-
bery, and other crimes, and was sentenced to death. Id. at 393. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. Id. At
Croy's second trial, Croy's attorney, Tony Serra, argued that because of anti-
Indian racism in Yreka County and a long history of Whites killing Indians,
Croy had been raised to fear Whites. Therefore, when confronted by a White
police officer, Croy honestly and reasonably believed he was faced with immi-
nent death. This time, the jury acquitted Croy on all counts. See Alison Dun-
des Rentelin, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIES 437, 454-56 (1993) (describing Croy's attor-
ney's presentation of a cultural defense in the context of self-defense); David
Talbot, The Ballad of Hooty Croy, L.A. TIMEs, June 24, 1990, (magazine), at
16 (summarizing both the prosecution's story and the defense's version of the
facts); Henry Weinstein, Opening Statements Could Be Crucial in Simpson
Trial Courts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at Al (recounting Tony Serra's argu-
ments to the jury in the Patrick "Hooty" Croy case).
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regarding culture. It would merely warn jurors to be aware of
the effect stereotyping has on perception and judgment and in-
struct them not to rely on stereotypes in deciding whether the
defendant acted reasonably. 7 In order to comport with equal
protection, a limiting jury instruction telling jurors not to rely
on racial stereotypes in determining whether the defendant
acted reasonably should apply in all self-defense cases in which
race is relevant. Stereotypes about Whites exist in certain cir-
cles, and it would be just as inappropriate for minority jurors
to rely on stereotypes about Whites as it would be for White ju-
rors to rely on stereotypes about minorities.
Fifth, one might object to the supplemental limiting jury
instruction on the ground that such an instruction increases
the risk that jurors will focus on, rather than try to ignore,
race." This objection might be analogized to the unringing-
the-bell problem, a problem endemic to criminal trials in gen-
eral. Some attorneys will ask questions that they know are
improper in order to plant ideas in the jurors' minds." 9 Even if
opposing counsel objects to the question and the judge sustains
the objection and tells the jury to disregard the question, the
jury is likely to remember the question and its implications.
Worse yet, if opposing counsel does not object quickly enough,
the witness may answer the question. In such instances, the
judge's admonition to the jury to disregard the question and
answer is extremely unlikely to be effective. The bell has been
rung and telling jurors to pretend they did not hear the bell
cannot unring it.4 50 A similar objection argues that having the
447. In proposing a limiting jury instruction in the form of a directive from
the judge to the jury, my proposal goes one step beyond Holly Maguigan's
proposal which relies on prosecutors to make the same types of arguments.
Maguigan, supra note 364, at 90-94.
448. Johnson, supra note 9, at 1679 n.369 (noting "there is some evidence
from mock jury studies that instructing jurors to disregard a fact results in
greater emphasis being given to that fact"); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1775-76
(pointing out that prosecutors in the first Rodney King trial did not object to
the use of animal imagery by the defendants in describing Mr. King because
an objection, even if sustained, would have called more attention to the testi-
mony).
449. For example, in the Bernhard Goetz trial, Goetz's attorney Barry
Slotnick repeatedly asked questions which he knew were improper. See gen-
erally LESLY, supra note 183.
450. When a criminal defendant chooses to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to take the stand, the court
may give the jury an instruction that they should not infer guilt from the de-
fendant's failure to testify. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300-03 (1981).
The court may give this jury instruction even over the defendant's objection.
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judge give the jurors an instruction on race legitimizes consid-
eration of race when what we should be striving for is color-
blindness, not color-consciousness.
It is true that a limiting instruction telling jurors not to
consider stereotypes in determining whether the defendant
acted reasonably, as well as oral argument and evidence on the
dangers of stereotyping, might make jurors focus on the race of
the parties more than they might otherwise. A race-conscious
approach, however, would be a positive improvement over cur-
rent self-defense law, which pretends a color-blindness that
does not exist in reality. 5 Jurors, like all people, notice race
whether they are conscious of it or not. Addressing the influ-
ence of race by instructing jurors that racial stereotypes should
not be relied upon deals head on with the issue of race. 52
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978). The Lakeside decision has
been criticized because a jury instruction telling the jury not to infer guilt
from a defendant's silence at trial highlights the fact that the defendant did
not testify which may work to the defendant's detriment. Id. at 345 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("For the judge or prosecutor to call [the defendant's failure to
take the stand] to the jury's attention has an undeniably adverse effect on the
defendant.... When the jurors have in fact overlooked it, telling them to ig-
nore the defendant's silence is like telling them not to think of a white bear.").
The devastating effects of a jury instruction highlighting the fact that
someone has asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation became apparent during the O.J. Simpson trial when the defense
asked Judge Lance Ito to call Detective Mark Fuhrman back to the witness
stand so that he could claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in front of the jury. Andrea Ford et al., Defense Nears End
Without Putting Simpson on Stand, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1995, at Al. Judge
Ito denied the defense request, but agreed to instruct the jury that Fuhrman
was unavailable to rebut charges that he lied on the witness stand when he
denied using the N-word and that the jury could draw inferences as to
Fuhrman's credibility from his unavailability. Tim Rutten & Henry Wein-
stein, Legal, Tactical Reasons Cited for Risky Appeal, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8,
1995, at Al. Even though Judge Ito agreed with prosecutors that the jury
should not be informed that Fuhrman had taken the Fifth Amendment and
refused to answer the question, "Did you plant evidence in this case?" in court
outside the presence of the jury, the government appealed the ruling, on the
ground that telling the jury that Fuhrman was unavailable would invite the
jurors to speculate unfairly about Fuhrman's misconduct. Id. Judge Ito's
ruling was overturned on appeal. Jim Newton et al., Justices Overrule Ito on
Reference to Fuhrman, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1995, at Al (reporting that the
appellate court ruled that the proposed instruction regarding the unavailabil-
ity of former Detective Fuhrman was not to be given).
451. Gotanda, supra note 348, at 62-63 (arguing that "race cannot be easily
isolated from lived social experience" and should not be divorced from judicial
decisions).
452. Armour, supra note 2, at 733 (arguing that under certain circum-
stances, attorneys should be permitted to make reference to race in argu-
ments to the jury).
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Finally, one might argue that because stereotypes based
on socially constructed notions of race are so rooted in our psy-
ches, telling jurors not to rely on such stereotypes is unlikely to
work.453 This is the strongest argument against the proposed
supplemental jury instruction, and the reason why the limiting
instruction should be supplemented with attorney argument
and evidence regarding the way stereotypes influence percep-
tion and judgment. Recent research by social cognition psy-
chologists indicates that the human brain naturally relies on
default assumptions, such as racial and other stereotypes, to
make sense of reality.4 4 If this is true, stereotypes are likely to
influence jurors no matter what they are told. Professor Sheri
Lynn Johnson explains:
A second reason [to doubt the efficacy of racial bias jury instructions]
is specific to the problem of race and guilt attribution: because the
process involved is probably unconscious for most jurors, instructing
them to put racial prejudice out of their minds or to ignore the defen-
dant's race in assessing the evidence is unlikely to be productive. Ju-
rors who believe they are fair will not be affected by even the sternest
warnings that they must be fair.4 55
Nonetheless, there is reason to be hopeful that a limiting
instruction might minimize the influence that racial stereo-
types might otherwise have on jurors. Recent social science re-
search provides indirect support for the theory that low-
prejudiced individuals can disassociate their stereotype-
congruent responses from their stereotype-incongruent per-
sonal beliefs if race is made salient. These studies suggest that
a limiting jury instruction may minimize a juror's reliance on
stereotypes in deciding whether a defendant's beliefs and ac-
tions were reasonable.456
453. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 1679 (opining that Black defendants
facing all-White juries would gain little help from such instructions); see also
Lawrence, supra note 382, at 322 (arguing that racial discrimination results
from, or is influenced by, unconscious racial motivation); Cole, supra note 384,
at Al (noting that wanting to be fair is not necessarily enough to enable one to
be fair because of the makeup of the human mind).
454. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 384, at 137 (stating that the "ability to
ignore what is very unlikely.., is part of our evolutionary heritage).
455. Johnson, supra note 9, at 1679.
456. In one study, Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio tested high- and
low-prejudiced college women's reactions to a female victim in distress whose
race was varied. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form
of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRImINATION, AND RACISM 61, 73-86 (Samuel L.
Gaertner & John F. Dovidio eds., 1986). Gaertner and Dovidio found that
when the subjects believed there were other people available to help the vic-
tim, they helped Black victims much less frequently than White victims. Id.
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While these recent social science studies provide some
promising indication that limiting instructions such as the
proposed supplemental instruction may actually influence out-
comes, they do not provide direct evidence that people can dis-
associate their automatic stereotype-congruent responses from
their controlled stereotype-incongruent beliefs. Further social
science research, directly testing whether low-prejudiced peo-
ple can suppress their otherwise automatic stereotype-
congruent responses when instructed to do so, is needed. In
the meantime, giving jurors in self-defense cases a supplemen-
tal instruction informing them not to rely on racial stereotypes
would still have symbolic value. Such an instruction would
send a strong normative message that racial stereotypes are an
inappropriate substitute for a finding of danger. Coming from
the court, the instruction would remind jurors to adhere to the
principles of fairness and equality which they are sworn to up-
hold. Jurors, newly cognizant of the ways in which racial
stereotypes can influence perception and judgment, would at
at 77. Belief in the presence of a non-racial element differentially influenced
the reactions of the women subjects. Id. at 76-77. Gaertner and Dovidio con-
cluded that the results of this study supported the hypothesis that when a
racially based response can be rationalized or attributed to factors other than
race, even well-intentioned people will discriminate against Blacks. Id. at 85.
In another study, subjects were exposed to either high or low concentra-
tions of Black stereotype-related words in a manner outside their conscious
awareness. Patricia Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 7-8 (1989). In
an ostensibly unrelated second experiment, subjects read a description of a
person whose race was not specified engaging in ambiguously hostile behav-
ior. Id. at 8-12. Both high- and low-prejudiced subjects rated the person's
hostility level higher when subliminally exposed to a high concentration of
Black stereotype-related words than when they were exposed to a low concen-
tration of such words. Id. at 10-12.
Devine also tested high- and low-prejudiced White subjects on their abil-
ity to inhibit negative stereotype-congruent information and replace such in-
formation with thoughts consistent with non-prejudiced values. Id. at 13.
First, the subjects were asked to list as many alternate labels as they were
aware of for Black Americans. Id. The experimenter told the subjects that
she was interested in how people think and talk informally about social
groups. Id. They then were asked to list any and all of their own thoughts,
flattering or not, in response to the social group Black Americans. Id. Devine
found that low-prejudiced subjects listed positive attributes consistent with
equality, and high-prejudiced subjects listed negative traits consistent with
stereotypes about Black Americans. Id. at 13-14. Devine concluded that
when low-prejudiced persons are conscious of stereotypes, they will inhibit
their negative stereotype-congruent responses and replace them with
thoughts consistent with non-prejudiced values. Id. at 14-15. For a more de-
tailed account of these studies, see generally Armour, supra note 2 (discussing
this and other studies examining racial stereotyping).
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least try to prevent such influence upon the decision-making
process. A limiting instruction would also provide socially con-
scions jurors with tangible means to check the improper con-
sideration of race by fellow jurors.
C. TOWARD A NORMATIVE CONCEPTION OF REASONABLENESS
Jurisdictions utilizing an objective or hybrid subjectivized-
objective standard of reasonableness currently employ what I
call a positivist model of reasonableness. By positivist, I mean
that the model is descriptive rather than normative. Applying
a positivist model of reasonableness, legal decisionmakers
evaluate the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs and ac-
tions by trying to determine whether the ordinary reasonable
person would have believed and acted the way the defendant
did. The reasonable person is a fictional character who is sup-
posed to represent the average American. If most Americans
would have had the same fears as the defendant and acted
similarly, then the defendant's use of force is considered rea-
sonable and the defendant will be acquitted on the ground of
self-defense or may not even be prosecuted. 4
7
The reasonable person, when defined by reference to the
ordinary or average person, suggests a need to consider how
most people would have felt or reacted. If the defendant's beliefs
and actions are typical of the beliefs and actions of the average
American in the mind of the decisionmaker, the defendant will
be acquitted on the ground of self-defense. Reasonableness un-
der a positivist model means typical or common.
A typical or common belief, however, is not necessarily a
reasonable belief.458 At one time, most Americans believed
there was nothing wrong with slavery. The fact that slavery
was not only accepted but approved of by most people did not
mean that such a belief was reasonable. Reliance on a concep-
tion of reasonableness that focuses on what the average Ameri-
can thinks may be problematic in self-defense cases because
socially constructed racial images of Blacks and other non-
Whites may influence what the average American thinks. The
average American might fear a Black man simply because of
457. In practice, jurors think of themselves as reasonable people. There-
fore, if the jurors decide that they themselves would have believed and acted
as the defendant did, they are likely to find that the defendant acted rea-
sonably in self-defense.
458. Armour, supra note 12, at 789 (discussing "the fallacy of equating rea-
sonableness with typicality").
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the Black man's race when it is not normatively justified to as-
sume that another person is violent or dangerous based on
race.
Interpreting reasonableness as a function of typicality is
problematic because it permits racial stereotypes to have too
great an influence on juror determinations in self-defense
cases. The objective standard of reasonableness as currently
constructed is insufficient to guard against such influence. In
assessing reasonableness, perhaps something more than typi-
cality ought to be required. To find that a defendant acted rea-
sonably in self-defense, perhaps the jury should find not only
that the defendant's beliefs and actions were those of the aver-
age person, but that the defendant's beliefs and actions were
also normatively justified. Use of a normative standard seems
particularly appropriate given the fact that self-defense is gen-
erally considered a justification defense rather than an excuse.
A finding that the defendant acted in self-defense represents a
normative conclusion that the defendant's conduct was the cor-
rect thing to do.419 This is not to suggest that the reasonable-
ness standard currently lacks a normative content. When a
jury in a self-defense case finds that a defendant acted unrea-
sonably or held unreasonable beliefs, it is also sending a mes-
sage that the defendant acted culpably. Use of a normative
conception of reasonableness in self-defense cases would
merely help make explicit the normative content of the reason-
ableness inquiry.
Use of a normative conception of reasonableness may be
novel in the self-defense context, but it is not a radical concept.
Courts have used a normative conception of reasonableness in
other legal contexts. For example, under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, a search has taken place if: "first [the defen-
dant] exhibited an actual (or subjective) expectation of privacy,
and, second, . . . the expectation [is] one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable."46 ° In his concurring opinion,
459. DRESSLER, supra note 24, § 18.01, at 199 ("Every state in the United
States recognizes self-defense, including the use of deadly force in self-
protection, as a justification defense."); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES § 27(c), at 10 (1984) ("In most modern codifications, self-defense is
appropriately treated, like lesser evils, as a pure justification.").
460. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). The two-prong test outlined in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion has
become the law of the land even though it first appeared in a concurring,
rather than a majority opinion. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990)
("Since the decision in Katz v. United States, it has been the law that 'capacity
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Justice Harlan used the term "reasonable" to describe what
was required for a search under his two-prong test;461 Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, used the word 'justifiable" to
describe the privacy Katz expected in the public telephone
booth at issue.462 Subsequent Fourth Amendment opinions
have used the terms "reasonable," "legitimate," and
'justifiable" interchangeably.463 Joshua Dressler explains why
the choice of terms is significant: "To say that a person's belief
is 'reasonable' ordinarily means that it is one that a reasonable
person in D's situation would hold. In the privacy context, this
would mean that an expectation of privacy is 'reasonable' when
a reasonable person would not expect her privacy to be in-
vaded." 4& In other words, under a positivist model of reason-
ableness, the term "reasonable" is usually a referent for what
the reasonable person would expect or believe. Dressler con-
tinues:
In contrast, to say that D has a "legitimate" or "justifiable" expecta-
tion of privacy is to draw a normative conclusion that she has a right
to that expectation. Or, as one court has put it, the privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment under this view "is not the privacy that
one reasonably expects but the privacy to which one has a right." 5
Use of the terms "legitimate" and "justifiable" to describe
the reasonableness of a defendant's expectation of privacy ex-
emplifies reliance on a normative conception of reasonableness.
Dressler explains how the two conceptions of reasonableness
(positivist vs. normative) are different in the following hypo-
thetical:
For example, suppose that D commits a crime in a secluded spot
in a park during the middle of the night after carefully ascertaining
that the area is virtually never frequented at that hour. Based on
this information, D expects that her actions will not be observed.
to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends.., upon whether
the person who claims the protection of the amendment has a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" ) (citations omitted).
461. Katz, 389 U.S at 361.
462. Id. at 353.
463. In 1987, twenty years after Katz was decided, Justice Brennan wrote,
"Since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), this Court has applied the
Fourth Amendment whenever 'the person invoking its protection can claim a
Justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy" that has
been invaded by government action." United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
315-16 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (1979)).
464. JosHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
30[D][31, at 61 (1991).
465. Id. (citing State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Or. 1988)).
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That expectation might be "reasonable" in the sense that a reason-
able person would expect to be free from observation.
Nonetheless, if a police officer happens by and observes the
criminal conduct, most commentators agree that D's subjective pri-
vacy expectation will not be protected. If this is so, it is because D's
expectation, although perhaps "reasonable," was "unjustifiable" or
"illegitimate." That is, as a normative matter, people have no right to
expect privacy if they conduct crime in the open, no matter how un-
likely it is that they will be discovered." 6
When we say that the police officer's observation of D's
criminal conduct did not constitute a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment, we are resting this legal con-
clusion upon a normative conception of reasonableness. Even
though D may have had an actual (or subjective) expectation of
privacy, and even though D's expectation of privacy may have
been one that other reasonable people might have had, D's ex-
pectation is not one that society is prepared to accept as rea-
sonable because it is not a justifiable or legitimate expectation
of privacy.
67
In the self-defense context, a positivist model of reason-
ableness might lead to the conclusion that a defendant's belief
that a Black man posed an imminent threat is reasonable if the
average American in the same circumstances would have also
believed the Black man posed an imminent threat. If, however,
the inquiry were shifted from the question whether most
Americans would have believed and acted as the defendant did
to the question should the defendant's beliefs and actions be
regarded as reasonable, meaning legitimate or justifiable (i.e.,
466. Id.
467. Another hypothetical illustrates the difference between positivist and
normative conceptions of reasonableness:
[Sluppose that D lives in a high-crime area in which burglaries are
very common. As a matter of foreseeability, it might be unreasonable
for D to expect privacy in her home. As a normative matter, how-
ever, a court could readily conclude that a person living in such an
environment may "legitimately" or "justifiably" expect privacy.
Id. From a positivist standpoint, D's expectation of privacy in her home is not
reasonable. Because burglaries are very common in D's neighborhood, D's ex-
pectation of privacy in her home is not truly likely to be shattered if her home
is burglarized. Given the high rate of crime in the neighborhood, it is only a
matter of time before D's home is burglarized. Arguably, an ordinary person
in D's position would not expect privacy in her home because of the burglary
statistics. Nonetheless, most of us would maintain that D's expectation of
privacy in her home is reasonable from a normative standpoint because D
should be able to have privacy in her home. In other words, to say D's expec-
tation of privacy is reasonable from a normative standpoint is to say that D's
expectation of privacy is legitimate or justifiable.
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from a positivist to a normative model of reasonableness), ju-
rors might conclude that the defendant did not act reasonably
in self-defense.
One problem with replacing or supplementing the positiv-
ist model of reasonableness with a normative model is the po-
tential conflation of the positive and normative standards. If
jurors feel that the defendant acted as a typical person would
have acted, they may also conclude that the defendant acted as
she should have acted. While conflation is a troubling possibil-
ity, it highlights why perhaps a normative model of reason-
ableness should be employed. Unless jurors are explicitly in-
structed that they should consider whether the defendant's
beliefs and actions were normatively justified, they may con-
tinue to equate reasonableness with typicality.
Another difficulty with a normative conception of reason-
ableness is that the scope of the normative standard is almost
by definition amorphous. It is difficult to define ex ante what
constitutes reasonableness from a normative perspective.
Whether a defendant's actions are normatively reasonable will
depend in part on where the crime occurred, who is deciding
the question, and the facts of the specific case.
These problems suggest that while it is important to rec-
ognize the normative nature of the reasonableness inquiry,
doing so by supplementing the positivist model of reasonable-
ness with a normative model may not be advisable at this time.
A full discussion of this idea is beyond the scope of this Article
but provides fertile ground for future inquiry.
CONCLUSION
The ferreting out of racial bias in the criminal justice system whether
willful or unintentional, occasional or routine, should be a priority in
a civilized and just society.... The focus should be on how to dis-
cover and eliminate racial bias in the criminal justice system, wher-
ever and whenever it exists.
- Angela Davis 68
This Article has examined how racial stereotypes about
Blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos might influence the rea-
sonableness determination in self-defense cases, causing legal
decisionmakers to perceive a defendant's use of force against a
victim of color as reasonable when they might perceive the
468. Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice
System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660, 1685-86 (reviewing TONRY, supra note 156).
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same acts as unreasonable if the victim were White. The cases
discussed in Part II provide some evidence suggesting that
stereotypes about Blacks as criminals, Asians as foreigners
and martial artists, and Latinos as immigrants and gang
members, may affect the ability of legal decisionmakers, from
prosecutors to jurors, to decide issues of reasonableness fairly
and impartially.
Questions about the influence of race on self-defense cases
constitute a microcosm of larger questions regarding race and
the criminal justice system. Even if it cannot be conclusively
proven that racial stereotyping influences jury decision-
making, the appearance of racial bias undermines respect for
the criminal justice system. Efforts to minimize the influence
of racial stereotypes, especially if the costs of such efforts are
low, can and should be made if we wish to remain true to our
ideals of fairness and equality.
